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PREFACE 
In the course of little more than sixty years, an inhospitable, 
disease -ridden wilderness in the heart of tropical Africa has been 
transformed into one of the major copper -producing areas in the 
world. This study is an attempt to explain and describe the rise 
of the modern industry from a technological point of view, the main 
theme being the work of the early, lone prospectors leading to the 
rise of the various mining companies with the enormous technical 
and economic issues involved creating in turn the need for huge 
combines, in the form of the Anglo- American Corporation and 
Rhodesian Selection Trust. Linked with all this, but separated as 
a detailed, intensive study, is the story of Nchanga, the largest 
copper producer in the Commonwealth. From its small beginning, 
with the discovery of a rock outcrop in a stream, the history of 
the venture is traced to its present -day dominance, with a 
capital of £28,000,000 and an annual output of well over 175,000 
tons of copper. 
At the end of the main body of the work are details of the 
various sources used in compiling the text, together with a list of 
other sources of general Copperbelt interest. There are also a 
number of appendices dealing with topics relevant to this study and 
a comprehensive collection of drawings and other data covering the 
technical history of Nchanga. Although the actual drawing, tracing 
and colouring of these is my own work, I am indebted to the firm of 
Victor Horne, Salisbury for providing me with duplicating 
- V - 
facilities and the use of their drawing office. The early 
photographs of the Copperbelt were taken by J.C. Ferguson and W. 
Scrymgeour, to whom thanks are due for permission to include them. 
The enlargements were made partly at the Teachers' Training College, 
Bulawayo and partly by the Photographic Department of the National 
Archives, Salisbury. 
Although this is a Rhodesian study, carried out entirely in 
Central Africa, large quantities of material were imported for my 
use, particularly from the London office of Rhodesian Selection 
Trust. My debt of gratitude to this group, as also to their 
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GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS 
(See also introduction) 
- a dome- shaped rock structure. 
- testing ores for mineral content. 
- rocks lying immediately below an orebody. 
" " " above " " 
- washing out of mineral particles from ore by 
water e.g. rain. 
- a vein of rock containing minerals (see ore -body) 
- rock containing quantities of minerals. 
- those containing copper in the form of sulphides. 
The main forms found on the Copperbelt are 
chalcocite, bornite, chalcopyrite. Carrollite is 
a copper /cobalt sulphide mineral. 
- those containing copper in the form of oxides. 
The main types found on the Copperbelt are 
chrysocolla and azurite. Malachite(copper 
carbonate) is classed as an oxide for treatment 
purposes. Oxide ores require complicated 
electrolytic refining ( "leaching ") before 
marketing. 
- rock exposed above the surface. 
- rock coming close to, but not reaching the 
surface. 
- a bowl -shaped rock structure - opposite of 
"anticline ". 
Ancient workings- pre -European mine workings generally abandoned by 
the time of discovery. 
Drills - various types - diamond, shot, churn - are used 
depending on circumstances. Diamond drills 
provide a core sample, can be used in any direction 
(i.e. underground), are good in hard rock, but 
otherwise are slow. Shot drills and churn drills 
are used vertically downwards, are good in soft 
ground and provide large diameter holes suitable 
for drainage or ventilation. 
Casing - lining for the holes to keep out water or 
prevent collapse in soft ground. 
passages tunnelled more -or -less horizontally 
underground. They serve various purposes e.g. 
haulage, prospecting, dewatering. They are 
generally referred to in terms of their depth 
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are excavated in a downwards direction, raises 
upwards. 
- incline(d) - diagonally downwards. 
vertical - vertically 
Sub -incline or sub -vertical shafts begin at a 
level below ground. 
INTRODUCTION 
THE MINING AND TREATMENT OF COPPER ORE 
Commercial copper is generally found not as pure metal but as either 
sulphides or oxides of the metal deposited, often in very small and 
irregular quantities, in otherwise useless rock. The actual values of 
the minerals which are economically workable naturally depend on various 
other factors such as the size of the deposits, their geographical 
location and the specific, technical problems involved in the actual 
mining and treatment. Thus, although the world average of copper 
mineralisation in ore is 1.5 %, deposits of as low as 0.7% are profitably 
exploited where their large size and convenient location justify 
development. The Copperbelt is actually most inconveniently situated 
in the heart of Africa, some 1,500 miles by rail from the coast with a 
further 6,000 miles by sea from Beira to the markets of Europe. 
it is considered also, that the pioneering days were fraught with 
disease and considerable physical hardship, it becomes clear that only 
substantially better than average yields of metal would justify the 
enormous expenses involved. In fact, many millions of tons of ore 
averaging around 3.6% were shown to exist, this percentage of metal 
being more than double the world average, so that from very early on in 
the history of the Copperbelt the physical difficulties involved have 
been regarded as obstacles which had to be overcome rather than as 
deterrents which could justify abandoning the enterprise. 
Mining The first step in the recovery of the metal is mining, which 
may be done either by underground methods or by the "open -pit" technique. 
Both are widely used throughout the world, but on the Copperbelt only 
three open pits are being operated at rresent, two at Nchanga and a new 
When 
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one now being developed at Chambishi. Although the technique, which 
involves the removal of the ore by digging down from the surface, is 
relatively economical, it requires the presence of orebodies 
comparatively close to the surface. As the bulk of the Copperbelt 
orebodies lie deep, the more complicated and costly underground 
methods must be employed. Shafts have to be sunk and from them 
tunnels are driven towards the orebody, to develop which and extract 
the ore a whole network of smaller tunnels and shafts have to be 
excavated. Electric power has to be led underground, compressed 
air is required for ventilation and drainage facilities must also be 
provided. In addition, basic materials, waste rock, ore and a 
labour force all require transportation. 
Three basic mining techniques are in use on the Copperbelt, 
all with modifications to meet specific local conditions. Some 
mines employ several different methods to cope with varying problems 
on the same property. 
Open stoping is largely used at Nkana and the Roan Antelope. 
The ore is removed in a series of workings or " stopes" at regular 
intervals along the orebody. Supporting the stopes are pillars of 
ore which are left behind by the miners until the adjacent stopes have 
been emptied of ore, when they are drilled and blasted from below, the 
ore being then driven off. The system has the advantage of permitting 
large -scale operations, but does lead to dilution of the ore with waste 
rock which adds to the problem of concentrating the ore later. It 
also involves wastage in that caving may occur before extraction is 
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complete. Only where ore values are sufficiently low for this not to 
matter is this technique justifiable. The unsupported hanging wall 
(overlying rock) eventually breaks or "caves" into the abandoned 
workings and this caving may continue right to the surface, where a 
crumbling and highly dangerous pit, up to 50 feet or more deep, may 
appear in the "bush ". Clearly, no surface development can take place 
above such underground workings. 
Where the ore is sufficiently rich to warrant total extraction, 
as at Chibuluma, a "cut and fill" technique is employed whereby the 
stopes are filled with waste material to prevent caving before the 
pillars are removed. Although more expensive, this method ensures a 
more complete and cleaner extraction of the ore. 
The larger and thicker orebodies are generally mined by a caving 
method, either on a continuous front,as at Nchanga,or in blocks. 
This latter technique is widely used at Mufulira. By it, a thin, 
narrow stope is mined under a block of ore, so completely undermining 
it and causing the roof to collapse by its own weight. It is similar 
so far to the "open stoping" method, with the essential difference 
that the hanging wall consists of ore, not of waste rock. Thus, 
instead of drilling and blasting the ore as in the other methods, the 
weight of the overlying rocks is used to break it up. The broken ore 
is drawn off from below. This method is relatively cheap to operate 
and ensures a substantial recovery of the ore. 
Concentrating 
After mining, the ore consists of lumps of rock throughout which 
are disseminated tiny particles of copper- bearing minerals which must 
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be separated from the rock before the copper can be obtained from them. 
As a preliminary to this the ore is crushed, usually in two or more 
stages, until it has been reduced to pieces of no more than 4 of an 
inch in size. The crushed ore is then fed into ball mills, large 
horizontal, revolving cylinders each about a quarter full of steel 
balls. Water is added, the mills revolve and the resulting pulp sent 
either for re- grinding if not fine enough, or if satisfactory, to the 
flotation plant. 
If the ore consists of sulphide minerals, the flotation process 
is straightforward. After suitable chemicals have been added and 
the pulp of ore and water violently agitated, the fine mineral 
particles cling to the bubbles at the top and may be skimmed off. 
The waste material sinks and the sludge, known as "tailings;' is 
pumped to the unsightly tailings dams which are a feature of the 
Copperbelt towns. The concentrated minerals, after filtering and 
drying, are ready for the smelter. 
More complex problems arise when the ore contains both copper 
and cobalt, when two flotation circuits are required to separate the 
two minerals. In the case of ore containing a mixture of sulphide 
and oxide copper, as at Nchanga, a differential flotation procedure 
must be adopted to separate the two for their subsequent very 
different treatment. The sulphide concentrate is railed to Nkana 
for smelting, but the oxides are sent to the leach plant where they 
are converted to a copper sulphate solution by treatment with dilute 
sulphuric acid. The copper is then recovered by electrolysis. 
Smelting 
After mixing with lime rock as a flux, the concentrate is 
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loaded into a reverberatory furnace, a box -like structure built of 
refractory bricks and some 110 feet long. At one end is provision 
for feeding in pulverised coal with pre- heated air. 
As the charge melts, it collects in the bottom of the furnace 
in two layers, the lower, heavier layer, the "matte ", being a 
mixture of copper and iron sulphides, while the upper layer -slag- 
consists of a mixture of silicates. The slag is skimmed off 
periodically and taken away to be dumped: the matte is tapped off 
when required from a tap -hole near the bottom of the furnace, being 
then carried off in ladles holding some twenty tons to the converters. 
The converters are steel brick -lined cylindrical furnaces, lying 
horizontally on rollers so that they can be rotated by compressed -air 
motors. In them, air under pressure is blown into the molten matte, 
resulting in the iron and sulphur present being oxidised. Molten 
copper alone remains at the end of the process. 
The oxidisation of the iron and copper sulphides takes place in 
two separate stages. First of all the iron sulphide is oxidised to 
iron oxide which combines with silica flux added to the mixture to 
form slag which is skimmed off and returned to the reverberatory furnace. 
Then the remaining copper sulphide is further oxidised to form 
metallic copper. Both these reactions generate considerable heat, 
sufficient to keep the contents of the converter in a molten state. 
Although the sulphur dioxide gas is lost at Mufulira, at Nkana it is 
recovered to form the base for the sulphuric acid required in the 
electrolytic process and for the leach plant at Nchanga. 
Copper from the converters - known as "blister" copper, because 
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when cooling the residual gases form small blisters on the surface - 
is about 99.4% pure. Much copper was sold in this form in the past, 
but there is now substantial demand for even purer forms of the metal. 
To achieve this the molten copper is transferred to anode furnaces, 
similar in size and shape to the converters, in which pulverised 
coal is used to maintain a high temperature. In these furnaces, 
compressed air is blown through the copper to oxidise the remaining 
sulphur and the old- fashioned technique of "poling" used to remove 
the oxygen in the copper. This involves the insertion of large, 
green, hard -wood tree- trunks into the molten mass. Although 
apparently crude, this still remains the best way of carrying out 
this final process in the furnace. The resulting copper, 99.8% 
pure is cast into anodes and sent to the refinery. 
Refining 
The refining process involves the passing of an electric current 
between plates of impure copper (anodes) and sheets of pure copper 
(cathodes) immersed in an acid copper- bearing solution. During the 
process copper is dissolved from the impure plates and deposited on 
the pure sheets. In the "tankhouse refinery" are hundreds of lead - 
lined tanks in which electrolysis takes place until the anodes are 
too small for further use1after 28 days, when they are returned to 
the smelter to be melted and cast into fresh anodes. 
Meantime, the impurities in the anodes have passed either into 
the electrolyte solution or are in sediment at the bottom of the 
tanks. This sediment - "slimes" - is removed and treated to obtain 
the gold, silver and other valuable metals which may be present. 
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Similarly, part of the electrolyte is continuously being removed and 
treated. 
The cathodes, now 99.98% pure are either sold as such or cast 
into specific shapes - wirebars, (for rods and wire), cakes and slabs 
(for copper sheeting), billets (round bars for pipes), or ingots 
(for preparing copper -based alloys such as bronze or brass). 
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CHAPTER I 
THE BACKGROUND 
The activities of Rhodes and his colleagues in the 1880's and 1890's 
can only be adequately judged when considered against the background of 
prospective mineral wealth in Central Africa, mingled in rumour and 
fact, which had developed as a result of the missionary and exploratory 
activities of previous decades.1 Although Rhodes thought that a 
"second Rand" might be found in Southern Rhodesia, it seems likely that 
he also hoped to find further quantities of minerals to the north of 
the Zambesi. Any such discoveries would be of great value to him in 
increasing traffic and thus furthering the cause of the Cape to Cairo 
Railway on which he had set his heart. And, most important, it can 
be taken for granted that Rhodes, the imperialist, envisaged any 
mineral discoveries as being in British territory. Yet in the mid 
1880's, Rhodes' dream of British territory stretching the length of 
Africa seemed as far away as it had ever been. He had only narrowly 
prevented the Transvaal Boers from occupying Bechuanaland and it 
seemed highly probable that the Belgians, Germans and Portuguese 
between them would seal off the British possessions from expansion to 
the north. They could do this legitimately, for the Berlin 
Conference of 1884 had not banned further European expansion in 
Africa, but simply laid down the rules under which it was to be 
cgrried out. The notification of acquisition of territory was 
required to permit of objections being lodged, and effective 
occupation - government officials, missions, traders, settlers - was 
1. For further information on this topic see Appendix I. 
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needed. Fortunately for Rhodes, the Conference agreed that "spheres 
of influence" would be recognised; it was on this that he pinned his 
hopes. 
Yet haste was essential, and it was in the realisation of this 
that Rhodes acted. Rumours of gold in Lobengula's country led to 
John Moffat being sent to make a treaty with him, in spite of protests 
from the Transvaal and Portugal, the treaty being followed by a 
mineral concession negotiated by C.D. Rudd, F.R. Thompson and Rochfort 
Maguire. Rhodes carried matters further on a visit to London in 
1889 when he allied with Harry Johnston and Lord Gifford, the 
Chairman of both the Exploring Company and the Bechuanaland 
Exploration Company, in an offer to Lord Salisbury to take over for 
Britain all of the interior of Africa north of the Zambesi and attend 
to its finance and administration until such time as the British 
public should appreciate its value and significance to themselves. 
Thus when Lord Gifford formally applied to the British Government 
for a Charter authorising the above to be put into effect, he was 
supported by Rhodes, Alfred Beit and Rudd, who represented the 
Matabeleland Concession. The objects of the proposed company were 
quite straightforward - 
1. To extend northwards the railway and telegraph systems in 
the direction of the Zambesi. 
2. To encourage emigration and colonisation. 
3. To promote trade and commerce. 
4. To develop and work mineral and other concessions under the 
management of one powerful organisation, "thereby obviating 
- lo - 
conflicts and complications between the various interests that 
have been acquired within those regions, and securing to the 
native chiefs and their subjects the rights reserved to them 
under several concessions." 
When the Government agreed to grant the Charter which formally 
established the new British South Africa Company, apart from giving 
very extensive powers of legislation and administration to the 
Company, along with instructions to prevent any liquor trade with the 
African peoples and to put down the slave trade, it deliberately 
failed to define accurately its sphere of operations, which were to be 
"the region of South Africa lying immediately to the north of British 
Bechuanaland and to the north and west of the Transvaal and to the 
west of the Portuguese dominions. In this way, the British "sphere 
of influence" as defined by the Berlin Conference could be further 
extended. 
Rhodes immediately despatched the Pioneer Column on behalf of 
the new Company, an event which led to the foundation of the 
present city of Salisbury on 12th September 1890. Meantime, the 
efforts of Harry Johnston in the north -east brought about the formal 
definition of the boundary between German East Africa (Tanganyika) 
and Nyasaland. The latter became a British Protectorate in 1891, 
with Johnston acting as Administrator for the British South Africa 
Company. The remaining frontier in the east, that between 
Manicaland and the Portuguese territory of Mozambique, was also 
clarified in the same year. 
Although successful in the east, Rhodes met with mixed 
fortunes in the west. His negotiations in Katanga were foiled by 
the well -known "Captain Stairs" episode in 1891, although, seeing 
that Katanga was already clearly within the boundaries of the Congo 
Free State, previously recognised by Britain, it is doubtful if any 
further treaties made on behalf of the Chartered Company would have 
been accepted in London.2 The mineral wealth of Katanga had 
already escaped Rhodes and passed to King Leopold, from whom it 
reverted to Belgium in 1908.3 
On the other hand, the British intervention in Barotseland 
came at a most opportune moment. Barotseland already enjoyed a 
well organised administration, but Lewanika remained apprehensive 
about possible incursions by the warlike Matabele. He had already 
been influenced towards seeking British protection by Francois 
Coillard, whose mission station for the Paris Evangelical Society 
had been established in Barotseland since 1884. Further favourable 
reports from Bechuanaland turned the scale in favour of Frank 
Lochner, who arrived at Lewanika's court at exactly the right 
moment. The Treaty, which was signed on 27th June, 1890, 
constituted an important step in the modern mining history of 
2. For a discussion of this point see A.J. Hanna, "The 
Beginnings of Nyasaland and North -Eastern Rhodesia 1859 -95 ". 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1956 p. 160. 
3. In spite of this personal setback to Rhodes, considerable 
interests in Katanga copper are held by the British Company, 
Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. in which the B.S.A. Company is 
represented. (See below, Chapter II.) Rhodesian Anglo- 
American Ltd. also acquired large holdings in Tanganyika 
Concessions in 1952 -53. 
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of Northern Rhodesia. By it, and the further agreements signed in 
October 1900 and August 1909, Lewanika ceded to the British South 
Africa Company a monopoly of the mining and commercial rights within 
the territory under his jurisdiction, whilst his own constitutional 
position was safeguarded. That portion of his territory actually 
occupied by the Barotse people was prohibited to prospectors, a 
position which still remains, the boundary of Barotseland and North- 
Western Rhodesia being subsequently extended in such a way as to 
embrace the ore -bearing regions beyond the Kafue.4 
4. It has sometimes been suggested, notably by the late J.E. 
"Chirupula" Stephenson, that the present Copperbelt did not 
fall within Lewanika's jurisdiction, although Lewanika himself 
claimed this was the case. If we accept Stephenson's contention, 
its significance, in terms of the B.S.A. Company's right to 
royalties and of economic and political development in general, 
is momentous. For his exposition of his theory see - 
J.E. Stephenson, "Chirupula's Tale ", G. Bles, London 1937. 
The author was not fortunate enough to meet " Chirupula" 
personally before his death on 15th August 1957, but had access 
to some of his books containing original marginal notes. For 
description of funeral etc. see "Central African Post" 
dd. 19th August 1957. 
A more academic discussion of the point is contained in L.H. 
Gann, "The Birth of a Plural Society ". M.U.F. 1958 pp. 135 -6. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE EARLY DISCOVERIES 
The recognition of the Lewanika- Lochner Concession by the 
British Government led to the formation of several prospecting 
companies the first of which was the Bechuanaland Exploration 
Company registered on the 25th April 1888 with Lord Gifford as 
Chairman and Edmund (later Sir Edmund) Davis as one of the directors. 
This was the pioneer of the Edmund Davis group of companies active 
in Rhodesia. More important though, within the context of 
Northern Rhodesia, were its later offshoots, the Northern 
Territories (BSA) Exploring Company, which was reorganised later, 
in June 1899, as the Northern Copper (BSA) Company, the Rhodesia 
Copper Company, the Rhodesia Broken Hill Development Company and 
the Rhodesia Copper and General Exploration and Finance Company, 
for all of which the Bechuanaland and Exploration Company acted as 
"Managers in South Africa ", and the Kafue Copper Development 
Company and the Bwana Mkubwa Copper Mining Company for which the 
parent company acted as "Agents ". All six were formed by Edmund 
Davis and allied interests.5 T.G. Davey was the Consulting 
Engineer for the group, the prospecting activities of which were 
co- ordinated by the Manager of the Bechuanaland Exploration 
Company, H.U. Moffat, who was later to become Prime Minister of 
Southern Rhodesia. 
5. For the interrelationship of the companies relevant to the 
Copperbelt see Diagram XI (endpapers). 
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The first of the Davis "offshoots ", the Northern Territories 
(B.S.A.) Exploring Company, which was registered in February 1895 in 
association with Rhodes, commenced operations almost immediately when 
F.G. Burnham and Pearl Ingram, followed later by F.R. Lewis, were sent 
to prospect north of the Zambesi. From this year onwards prospecting 
licences were granted to small companies or individuals, and a 
number of small finds were made, notably in the area north -west of 
Mumbwa, known geographically as the "Hook of the Kafue" and, from 1902, 
when the various claims were amalgamated and acquired by the 
Northern Copper (B.S.A.) Company, to geologists as the "Big 
Concession ". The most important of these were the Silver King and 
Sable Antelope. Others included the North Star, True Blue, 
Wonder Rocks, Crystal Jacket, Blue Jacket, Bob, Loulou, Sugarloaf, 
Lishambika, Inyarka, Kwemba and Beehive.6 
The other company to undertake pioneering work in Northern 
Rhodesia was Tanganyika Concessions Ltd., founded by Robert (later 
Sir Robert) Williams in January 1899, with a capital of only 
C100,000. Robert Williams, an Aberdonian, was, like Davis, an 
early associate of Rhodes who had been interested in Rhodesia from 
1891 when he founded the Zambesi Exploring Company to investigate 
6. For details of these mines see Bancroft, J.A: "Mining in 
Northern Rhodesia" B.S.A. Co. 1961 pp. 57 -59 and 68 -69, and 
for an article on their subsequent fate see "The Ghost Mines 
of Mumbwa" in "Horizon ", March 1961 pp. 18 -19. 
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the mineral possibilities on Rhodes' behalf. Originally his 
prospectors had sought, and failed to find gold. But Williams 
was convinced that, notwithstanding previous failures, minerals 
would be found in Northern Rhodesia and further north, and in 
particular on the Congo -Zambesi watershed which struck him as being 
geographically similar to the Rand. Thus motivated, and with the 
added hope of being able to further Rhodes' Cape to Cairo Railway 
by creating traffic, he obtained from the Chartered Company a 
concession to prospect for a mineral area of up to 2,000 square 
miles and to stake up to 1,000 claims anywhere in Northern 
Rhodesia. In return, the British South Africa Company was to have 
a 35% interest in these claims, and in addition, as part of Rhodes' 
railway scheme, Williams was to provide a steamer on Lake 
Tanganyika.7 The township of Abercorn and jetty at Mpulungu 
were subsequently built as the proposed terminus of the 
Rhodesian section of the railway, which has still not materialised. 
Williams also obtained from King Leopold of the Belgians, before 
the discovery of Kansanshi was known to either, a concession 
lasting five years over 60,00C square miles in Katanga plus an 
annual subsidy of £10,000 in return for a guarantee of 60% of the 
profits of any minerals discovered. 
7. Rhodes himself possessed 2,000 x £1 shares which 
subsequently rose to £25 a share. 
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Having achieved his concession, Williams now "played his hunch ". 
This was all it could be, in spite of his own convictions, for the 
evidence, as detailed in Appendix I, was meagre. True, ancient 
workings existed, but there was nothing to suggest that they were 
not almost completely worked out,8 and in any case they were oxide 
deposits, notoriously expensive to treat and possibly small in 
extent, as the Hook of the Kafue finds subsequently proved to be. 
And if this was the case, with the railhead many hundreds of miles 
away at Bulawayo, with the intervening country ridden with malaria 
and sleeping sickness, with transport dependent, at least initially, 
largely on human porterage, the operations involved in extraction, 
refining and marketing would be financially suicidal. Only the 
discovery of more large deposits, either of very rich oxides such 
as those at Kambove9 discovered by the Emile Francqui expedition in 
1891, or better, of substantial, easily worked sulphides, would 
justify future development work. At the time of Williams' 
decision to go ahead only one major deposit of any nature and no 
trace of sulphides had been found. Yet - 
"I instructed George Grey to proceed to the great divide 
8. All the ancient workings had been abandoned when discovered 
by Europeans, This could be caused only by a removal of the 
motivation (pressure from slavers ?) or by exhaustion of the 
oxide ores (malachite and azurite) accessible to the native 
and amenable to his smelting techniques. 
9. Leopold and his advisers completely failed to realise the 
implications of this find. If they had done so it is 
unlikely that any concession would have been granted to other 
than Belgian interests. 
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"between the Zambesi and Congo Rivers, and marked out on the map the 
most likely place to find minerals on that divide, and quoted in 
confirmation the writings of Livingstone, Cameron and other explorers 
who had either heard of minerals or visited one or two of the old 
workings at or near that divide during the past seventy or eighty 
years, and with this idea I secured a concession George Grey 
and his party --- first discovered the Kansanshi Mine and later 
opened up at an expense of about 100,000 the Katanga copper mines, 
proving the existence -- (of) -- probably the greatest copper fields 
in the world, extending over 250 miles in length, all within the 
area I had indicated. "10 In fact, the first major discovery made 
by Grey in Katanga was the extremely rich carbonate deposit of the 
"Star of the Congo." Not unnaturally, attention was now diverted 
from Northern Rhodesia to such effect that over a hundred other 
deposits had been found in Katanga by 1906, when the Union Miniere 
du Haut Katanga was formed to develop the new copper fields. 
"I had meantime at Rhodes' request;ll continued Williams, 
"negotiated his Cape to Cairo Railway through to the Nile with 
King Leopold, but after a great struggle to secure its extension 
to the Congo border, and although I offered Rhodes, shortly before 
he died, a half interest in our mineral interests to assist his 
10. Sir Robert Williams: Speech to Annual General Meeting of 
Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. London 30th July, 1925. 
11. Ibid. 
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railway, we failed to get that extension, as his financiers demanded 
further mineral concessions from the Belgians." 
It will be recalled that the Chartered Company held a 35% 
interest in the claims of Tanganyika Concessions in Northern 
Rhodesia, Rhodes personally possessed 2,000 Cl shares and that, by 
virtue of Williams' agreement with King Leopold, Tanganyika 
Concessions was to enjoy 40% of the profits of the Katanga 
operations.12 Rhodes' trustees, however, felt that this 
percentage was inadequate and pressed Williams to negotiate for a 
greater share. The failure to achieve this and the consequent 
hold -up in the advance of the railway occasioned bitter criticism 
in Northern Rhodesia, especially from Leopold Moore in Livingstone, 
who extolled at some length on the benefits which might be 
expected for the town once it stood on a rail link between the 
south and the future mining centres. there is promise of 
great activity in North -West Rhodesia. That the principal field 
of operations will be the huge mineral belt, a portion only of 
12. Subsequently in 1905, as a result of the amazing results of 
Williams' work, his concession was extended for a further 
period of four years, during the last three of which the 
Belgian Comité Special du Katanga agreed to meet half the 
expenses, but Tanganyika Concessions would receive only 20% 
of the profits of any new mines discovered. After eight 
years' work, Williams was to place his organisation at the 
disposal of the Comité Special for two more years, during 
which period the Comité Special would finance all the 
operations. Any new discoveries made during these two 
years would be placed in reserve. Thus the financial 
interrelationship between Tanganyika Concessions and Union 
Miniare, although substantially beneficial to the former, is 
very complex. 
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which lies within our borders, is certainly a point to the bad for 
Livingstone; but we feel justified in assuming that any enterprise 
such as we have indicated could hardly fail to have highly beneficial 
commercial effects on its prospects. "i3 But, "The Beit and the 
Rhodes Trustees appear to have declined to afford any financial 
assistance, and this seems to point to their disbelief in the 
likelihood of the section now to be constructed ever forming part 
of the main trunk line. "14 
This set -back, however, was only temporary. Williams 
immediately negotiated with the Portuguese for the building of the 
Lobito (Benguela) Railway to the Angola Coast at Lobito Bay. 
In practice, geographical problems, the outbreak of the First World 
War and economic difficulties prevented the completion of this 
railway until 1931, by which time communications with the south 
were fully established. In any event it was not necessary because 
immediately after Williams had secured the concession to build the 
Benguela Railway he was approached by Dr. Jameson, then Prime 
Minister of the Cape as well as a director of the Chartered Company, 
with a particular request to negotiate the extension of the 
13. Livingstone Mail, 3rd October, 1908. 
14. Livingstone Mail, 5th December, 1908. N.B. The proposed line 
to Tanganyika would have by- passed the present Copperbelt. 
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Rhodesia Railway to the Congo border and thence to the Katanga 
mines. It was as a result of the ensuing negotiations between 
Williams and Jadot that Tanganyika Concessions formed a new company, 
the Rhodesia -Katanga Junction Railway and Mineral Company, with a 
capital of 01,500,000, to connect the Rhodesian Railway to the 
Congo frontier, from which point it was extended to the mines by the 
Belgians in 1910. With the formation of this company, which also 
took over control of the Kansanshi Mine, Tanganyika Concessions had 
no major interests in Northern Rhodesia and concentrated thenceforth 
on its share of the Katanga prospects. The British South Africa 
Company was given 50,000 fully paid Cl shares for its interest in 
the mine, as a result of which transaction, Kansanshi became exempt 
from royalty payments. On the other hand, although the railway 
company enabled Tanganyika Concessions to shed most of its interests 
in Northern Rhodesia, it was the means by which the British South 
Africa Company was able to survive at all. Writing to Owen 
Letcher in August 1}31, Sir Robert Williams remarked, "Dr. O'ameson, 
when he asked me after Rhodes' death to try and get a connection 
for the Rhodesia Railways to the Katanga mines, told me that unless 
I got this, the Chartered Company would go into liquidation as 
that Company, of which Dr. Jameson was then the President, was 
losing 0300,000 per annum under its guarantee of interest to the 
Rhodesian Debenture Holders. "15 
15. Quoted in 0. Letcher: "South Central Africa ". African 
Publications, Johannesburg 1932 pp.133 -34. 
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KANSANSHI 
The George Grey appointed by Robert Williams to investigate 
his theories about the mineral wealth of the Zambesi -Congo divide 
was a brother of Earl Grey of Falloden, and a personal friend of 
Rhodes. The expedition, which left Bulawayo at the end of the 
rainy season in 1899, consisted of 5 European_s,16 38 Africans, 
67 donkeys, 8 oxen, 7 horses and 2 pack mules.17 A liberal 
quantity of trading goods and basic supplies, sufficient for one 
season, was carried. The party reached the Kafue on May 30th, 
but made no mineral discoveries worthy of mention until they 
reached the area previously designated by Williams.18 In this 
area, on 6th September 1899, Grey was led byan old native chief, 
Kapiji M'Panga, to the ancient workings at Kansanshi (see 
photograph No. 1). Here there had once been a large mine over 
7,000 yards in diameter. Pits of over one hundred feet deep were 
to be seen, extended down to the water -table, and, in some cases, 
with trees growing out of them.'9 Obviously the workings were 
very old. Thousands of tons of oxide ore had already been removed, 
but whether or not this was by the initiative of the local natives 
16. For an interview with W.R. White, the sole survivor in 1960, 
see "Horizon" March 1961 pp.10 -14. 
17. There is a photograph of the expedition in the Northern 
Rhodesia Journal, vol. 2 No. 3. 
18. For a full report on the activities of the expedition see 
"Report on the Discoveries made by Mr. George Grey's 
Expedition ". Tanganyika Concessions Ltd. London 1903. 
19. Personal information: J.E.G. Williams. 
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is not clear. Normally the primitive smelting took place fairly 
close to the extraction site, that is, within a few miles where - 
ever suitable wood for charcoal and a water supply were available, 
but the fact that no smelting sites have been discovered within many 
miles of Kansanshi and the nearest ones are easily accessible from 
other sources of ore suggests that either some form of overlordship 
was enforced, by which the ore was transported elsewhere for 
treatment, or that the ore was removed as an adjunct to the slave 
trade.20 
The Kansanshi deposit is more closely related to the Katanga 
mines than to those on the present Copperbelt. Unlike the 
Copperbelt deposits, there are plentiful signs at Kansanshi of the 
presence of copper. Most striking is an elliptical hill, 
practically free of vegetation, which rises to about 100 feet above 
the surrounding tree -covered plain. (see photograph No. 2) 
Traversing this hill from north to south, and continuing to the 
south for a few hundred yards, are a series of veins of minerals, 
including copper oxides, which vary in width from about fifteen feet 
to a matter of only inches. A variety of colours is to be seen, 
depending on the type of mineral exposed. Grey was deeply 
impressed by what he saw, especially the scope and extent of the 
ancient workings. Nevertheless, nothing immediate was done. 
Not only was there no railway at all in Northern Rhodesia, but in 
20. It is interesting to note in this connection that Grey 
complained in 1901 that the slave trade interfered with his 
own operations at Kansanshi: See L.H. Gann's "The End of the 
Slave Trade in British Central Africa, 1889 - 1912 ". Rhodes - 
Livingstone Journal. Vol. XVI. 1954. 
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any case, oxide ores were very expensive to treat. Thus Kansanshi 
remained merely as a base for subsequent explorations into the 
Congo, during which the famous "Star of the Congo" mine near the 
modern city of Elizabethville was discovered. 
It is not surprising that Tanganyika Concessions should decide 
to concentrate on Katanga rather than Northern Rhodesia, for Katanga 
was not only easier to prospect in, the copper outcrops, in the form 
of hills bare of vegetation, being comparatively easy to find, but 
at the same time, the values of ore there were - and still are - 
much greater than anything found in Northern Rhodesia. Expectant 
optimism was evident as early as 190821 - "The whole problem in 
Katanga is the question of producing and marketing the copper.--- - 
The engineer's estimate is that he can turn out copper from the 
Star and Kambove at £10 a ton." (The estimate for Kansanshi was 
£18) "It will cost less than C10 a ton to send it to Europe. 
Add the profit of the Union Miniare and this will make it less 
than £30 a ton. There is not a mine in the world, with the 
possible exception of the Rio Tinto, that can afford to sell 
copper below £38 a ton. - -- -Given the railway and efficient 
management, Katanga should control the world's copper supply and 
be the brightest spot in Africa.' Thus, whereas good Rhodesian 
ores assay at 5% copper or less, as early as June 1911 the Star 
of the Congo Mine was producing ore which yielded 15% copper.22 
21. Livingstone Mail,26th December 1908. 
22. See Livingstone Mail, 22nd June 1911 and 12th August 1911. 
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Some assays of samples sent to London contained copper values as high 
as 33 %.23 Ore which would have been considered a reasonable prospect 
elsewhere was sometimes used in Katanga as ballast on roads. It 
has also proved possible in Katanga to send some ore, from Kipushi 
for example, direct to Belgium for treatment, which again has helped 
to reduce expenditure. 
THE RHODESIA COPPER COMPANY - ROAN ANTELOPE AND BWANA MKUBWA 
Another important company which developed as a result of the 
Lochner Concession was the Rhodesia Copper Company, in which the 
leading figure was Edmund Davis. The Northern Territories 
(B.S.A.) Exploring Company formed by Davis and Rhodes in 1895 had 
later become the Northern Copper (B.S.A.) Company, and it was 
this latter company which eventually amalgamated with other small 
groups to form the Rhodesia Copper Company, which is noted for the 
two very great discoveries of the Roan Antelope and Bwana Mkubwa. 
Undoubtedly 1902 was a fundamental year in the economic 
history of Northern Rhodesia. Early in January, before the 
forming of the Rhodesia Copper Company at the end of the month, 
T.G. Davey, operating for the Davis Group, stumbled across 
outcrops of lead, zinc and vanadium on a "kopje" or rocky hillock 
which he named "Broken Hill" on account of its resemblance to a 
similar formation of that name in Australia. This fortunate 
23.Bancroft op.cit p.51. 
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occurrence was the result of Davey becoming lost in the "bush ".24 
On the formation of the Rhodesia Copper Company, Davey became 
its Consulting Engineer. About thirty Europeans were employed by 
Davey as prospectors, and it was one pair of these, W.C. Collier 
and J.J. Donohoe, who made the momehtous discoveries referred to 
above. 5 
There were actually three Europeans - Collier, Donohoe and 
W. Sellers - in the party sent from Bulawayo early in 1902 to 
Davey, who was then at the Silver King Mine in the Hook of the 
Kafue, but only the first two were sent on by Davey in a north- 
easterly direction which would bring them to the region of the 
present Ndola and Luanshya. They proceeded on their way 
together as far as Kapopo, where the first clue to the presence 
of copper was found. Here, as Livingstone and others had 
already recorded elsewhere, the local natives were using 
malachite as a treatment for tropical ulcers. Both Collier and 
Donohoe were experienced prospectors, each perfectly competent 
24. For details see his "Report to the Directors of the 
Rhodesia Copper Company" dd. 31st December, 1902. A 
separate company to develop the mine - the Rhodesia Broken 
Hill Development Company - was founded in 1910. 
25. There are many accounts in existence of Collier's discovery 
of the Roan Antelope, all of which show discrepancies in 
detail. In compiling this one I have used - 
a): Collier's account to Chester Beatty (address to New 
York section of the American Institute of Mining and 
Metallurgy, October, 1931) 
b): An interview with Collier in the Bulawayo "Chronicle" 
28th March, 1934. 
c): Lucy Cullen: "Beyond the Smoke That Thunders" O.U.P.1941. 
d): O. Letcher: "South Central Africa ". op.cit. 
e): Personal accounts given to me by two of Collier's 
friends, N.M. Airey and W. Pickering. 
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to proceed on his own. Thus, in order to cover the maximum possible 
amount of ground, the two agreed to separate and rejoin forces later 
at the village of Chiwala, a retired Arab slaver who enjoyed some 
measure of domination over the local inhabitants. Although Chiwala 
had apparently ordered the Africans in the area not to divulge the 
sources of the malachite used and claimed to the last that it came 
from Katanga, (it may have done for no recent, native workings have 
been found in the area) an old man, whom Collier befriended by 
shooting meat for him, informed him where the ore might be found. 
On the following day Collier visited the indicated area, stalked 
and shot a Roan antelope, and to his amazement, found that it had 
fallen on an outcrop of pure malachite - hence the name of the 
future mine. Although in fact it was thus discovered fortuitously, 
it would be most unjust to dismiss the find as depending on pure 
chance. Collier was an expert and already in a known copper - 
bearing region. It could, therefore, have been only a matter of 
time before the secrets were revealed, regardless of luck. 
Near to this outcrop Collier found some minor ancient workings 
on which he pegged claims. The next day he investigated further, 
discovering a large -open clearing, some 2,000 feet wide and a mile 
long, which doubled back in the form of a hairpin, the arms of 
which were about 2,000 feet apart. Collier pegged claims on each, 
one being named the Roan Antelope and the other Rietbok (another 
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type of buck. 
26 
 ) along the line of the clearing later 
disclosed copper oxides, such as malachite and chrysocolla, very 
similar to the deposits found in the Congo. Nevertheless, the 
find was neglected until the revival of interest from 1923 (see 
Chapter Iii below), partly because of the difficulties applying 
also to Kansanshi, but also largely because of the extraordinary 
find which Collier and Donohoe were almost immediately to make. 
Having pegged the Roan and Rietbok claims, Collier proceeded 
at once to join Donohoe, with whom he was secretly led on 4th 
December 1902 to the most intriguing ancient workings ever to be 
found in Northern Rhodesia. There are two principal workings, 
parallel to each other and about 30 feet apart, on the north- 
eastern slope of a "kopje" which rises for some 75 feet above the 
surrounding plain. The first of these, which is about 750 yards 
long, varies in width from 5 to 23 feet. The second runs 
intermittently for almost 300 yards, with a width of 4 feet. 
Both vary in depth from 2 to 30 feet. Obviously, a large quantity 
of high -grade malachite had been removed at some time in the 
26. There has been considerable controversy regarding the date 
of these discoveries. Irwin - the General Manager of Roan 
Antelope in 1928 - believed that the date was 1904, (letter 
to D'Eath of R.S.T. dd. 2.8.48 in R.S.T. Archives) and in 
fact further claims were pegged in the area for the Rhodesia 
Copper Company in that year. But the original date was 
almost certainly June 1902, the claims being all finally 
pegged in November. See letter from T.W. Baxter (Federal 
Archives) to Roan Antelope Mine dd. 25.11.48 in R.S.T. 
Archives. The claims were finally beaconed and registered 
in 1913 in terms of the Mining Proclamation of 1912. 
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past; equally, the deposit was not being worked when discovered and 
no smelters were found in the vicinity. (Subsequently, a smelting 
site which may have served the mine was discovered some miles away 
alongside a "dambo" or grassy, drainage area in the bush which would 
have provided a water supply.) J.E.G. Williams, who was employed 
there as an assayer from 1921, informed the writer that the remains 
found gave the impression that the early workers had either left in 
a great hurry, abandoning their equipment and extracted ore, or had 
been forcibly removed. There is an unresolved mystery here, but, 
as at Kansanshi, it seems probable that the mine was an accessory to 
the slave trade. Arab slavers were undoubtedly active in the area 
before the coming of European administration, the presence of 
Chiwala himself being living evidence. Apparently the focal point 
of the slave trade was a large tree, standing in Ndola and now 
preserved as a national monument, below which the caravans are 
reputed to have gathered before their arduous march to the coast. 
It is reasonable to suppose that the slaves might have been 
burdened with either smelted copper or malachite on their journey. 
Further west, of course, Portuguese slavers dominated, the actual 
areas of the respective spheres of influence not being perfectly 
clear. Thus, clashes between Arab and Portuguese agents in the 




Donohoe named the mine "Bwana Mkubwa" - the Big Chief or Great 
Master - a name which has aroused mild controversy ever since. 
C.M. Doke believed that it was named after the Administrator, 
Codrington.28 A.E. Beech, writing in "Horizon" in March, 1959, 
thinks it was in honour of Collier himself. However, it is fairly 
clear that when Donohoe had stayed with the Native Commissioner at 
Kapopo, Francis Enilius Fletcher Jones, 9 known to the local 
Africans as the " Bwana Mkubwa ", he had promised to name a mine 
after him if one should be discovered. There is little doubt that 
Jones was the Bwana Mkubwa in question.30 
27. For information on the slave trade see - 
0. Letcher: "South Central Africa" op.cit. p.125. 
M. Gelfand: "Northern Rhodesia in the Days of the Charter" 
Blackwell, Oxford 1961. 
J.M. Mowbray: "In South Central Africa" Constable and Co. 
London 1912 p. 118. 
H. & W.E. Masters: "In Wild Rhodesia" F. Griffiths London 1920. 
L.H. Gann: "The End of the Slave Trade in British Central 
Africa 1889 -1912" op.cit. 
C.M. Doke: "The Lambas of Northern Rhodesia ". G. Harrap, 
London, 1931. 
28. C.M. Doke: Op.cit. p.47. 
29. This same F.E.F. Jones, along with J.E. Stephenson, founded 
the bornas at Mkushi and Ndola. 
30. K. Bradley: "Copper Venture ". Mufulira and Roan Antelope Mines 
1952 p.67 agrees, but more conclusive evidence is to be found 
in a pencilled footnote by J.E. Stephenson in his own copy of 
"Chirupula's Tale" op.cit p.97 (copy in Rhodes- Livingstone 
Institute Library, Lusaka.) Collier also supported this 
theory - see Bulawayo "Chronicle' 28.3.34. 
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Exploratory work began in 1903 when four vertical shafts, sunk 
to the 250 foot level in dry ground, disclosed considerable reserves 
of rich, oxide ore below the old workings. Nevertheless, as in 
the case of the other discoveries, it was impracticable to attempt 
to operate the mine without adequate transport facilities and nothing 
further was done u4til the arrival of the railway. The line was 
opened late in 1909. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE SECOND STAGE OF EXPLORATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
During the interim period of waiting for the completion of the 
railway to Bwana Mkubwa, the Rhodesia Copper Company was succeeded 
by the Rhodesia Copper and General Exploration and Finance Company, 
from which latter company the property was acquired by the newly 
formed Bwana Mkubwa Copper Mining Company in March, 1910. This 
company, which was registered in London, had an initial capital of 
0600,000 in Cl shares. Development work now began in earnest from 
a number of vertical shafts with drives extending from them at 
the 100 foot and 250 foot levels. These showed the existence of 
a rich, central lode with poorer areas surrounding it.31 Only 
the main, central lode was developed at this stage, the ore 
reserves being estimated in 1913 at 55,000 tons at 12% copper 
with possibly double that quantity at 5 %. The assayer about 
this time was Mr. Blackie, the grandson of the founder of the 
publishing firm. All of the estimated ore reserves lay in dry 
ground, water not being encountered until a depth of 270 feet 
was attained. This water proved excessive at greater depths, 
with the result that little attempt was made to deepen the 
workings. 
31. For full geological details see J.A. Bancroft: "Notes on 
the Geology of the Bwana Mkubwa Mine" in the 
International Geological Congress Yearbook 1929. 
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A concentrator, capable of handling 90 tons a day, commenced 
operations in January, 1913 and continued until September, 1914 
when the mine was temporarily closed on account of the shortage of 
labour and materials occasioned by the 1914 -18 War and the low 
copper prices then prevailing. In fact, this was premature, for 
the price of copper rose from £61 to £170 a ton by the end of 1916. 
From this rapid price rise Katanga reaped the benefit and greatly 
increased its production as may be seen from Table I on page 33. 
It is clear from this table that the increasing demand and rise 
in prices during the 1914 -18 War greatly stimulated production in 
Katanga, the dramatic drop in 1918 being; largely accounted for by 
the epidemic of "Spanish'flu" which struck Central Africa in that 
year. The post -war depression is also clearly mirrored in these 
production figures. The Bwana Mkubwa Company endeavoured to 
exploit the favourable situation brought about by the war by 
coming into production again in June 1916, but the operations 
were inefficient and unprofitable, for although the concentrator 
treated over 69,000 tons of ore averaging 10% copper which yielded 
6,972 tons of copper concentrate, yet the actual weight of copper 
produced was only 2,845 tons.32 Thus either the concentrator 
was operating inefficiently or the estimated value of the ore was 
excessively high. As a result of these disappointing results 
the mine closed in March, 1918. 




COPPER PRODUCTION (LONG TONS) 










1911 997 905 
1912 2,492 1,972 
1913 7,408 24o 
1914 10,722 218 £62.6 
1915 14,054 176 79.6 
1916 22,149 167* 125.2 
1917 27,462 132* 125.0 
1918 20,237 96 113.5 
1919 22,366 195 86.o 
1920 18,961 130 80.4 
1921 30,464 184 57.6 
1922 43,362 180 61.6 
1923 57,886 130 66.5 
1924 85,379 89 60.o 
1925 90,110 74 64.7 
1926 80,639 708 63.6 
* According to Dr. Bancroft (op.cit.123) Bwana Mkubwa produced 
2,845 tons of copper between June, 1916 and March, 1918. If 
this production was exported as concentrates it would not be 
reflected in the records as metal production. This would account 
for the apparent discrepancy. 
33. These figures, plus those in Tables II and III are 
extracted from "The Story of the Cape to Cairo Railway and 
River Route" (ed. L. Wienthal) Pioneer Publishing Co. 
1923 vol. IV p. 64 for Katanga, and from Guernsey "A 
Prospector's Guide to Mineral Occurrences in Northern 
Rhodesia" B.S.A. Co. Salisbury 1952, Chamber of Mines Year 
Books and the Government Mines Dept. for Northern 
Rhodesia. A price list which does not always coincide 
with official figures is published in Gann: "A History of 
Northern Rhodesia" Chatto and Windus London 1964 p.329. 
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Provided the railway had at least reached as far as Broken Hill, 
it mattered little, as far as Kansanshi was concerned, how much 
further it progressed in Rhodesia - (although a future branch line 
from Katanga might solve many difficulties in transport and supply 
to the mine.) Even now, the nearest point on the Rhodesia 
Railway, at Bancroft, is some hundred miles away. The transport 
problem to Kansanshi therefore still remains. Nevertheless, in 
spite of the difficulties involved, when the railway reached 
Broken Hill in 1906, Grey felt tempted to endeavour to smelt some 
of the high -grade ore at the mine. He assembled a blast furnace 
at Broken Hill, and, profiting from the experience of the Northern 
Copper Company in the use of traction engines to provide transport 
to and from the Silver King, Sable Antelope and other mines in 
the Hook of the Kafue,34 engaged a Captain Hamilton to construct 
a road suitable for these machines over the three hundred miles 
from Broken Hill to Kansanshi. The blast furnace arrived at 
Kansanshi in 1917 and smelting began on a small scale in February 
1908, the furnaces using local charcoal and fluxes, and producing 
over two tons of copper daily when in operation.35 This was 
increased to over four tons a day by 1910, using a larger 
furnace, but the necessary supply of high -grade ore could not be 
34. See Report by Lord Gifford to a meeting of the Northern 
Copper Company London 1903, quoted by 0. Letcher: op.cit 
Pp. 75 -7. 
35. E.g. 72 tons in 27 days in May. Livingstone Mail dd. 22nd 
August, 1908. 
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maintained, with the result that production fell to 1.25 tons per day.36 
This was completely uneconomic and led to the closure of the mine on 
the outbreak of war in August 1914, by which time some 2,800 tons of 
copper valued at 0170,000 had been produced. By this date the 
property had been transferred to the Rhodesia -Katanga Junction 
Railway and Mineral Company. The mine then lay dormant until 1927. 
THE NKANA AREA 
Many years ago, as the traditional accounts tell us, a girl 
named Nachimbala, a relative of Mushiri, the Paramount Chief of the 
Walamba, gave birth to a daughter. This child, who was born 
during a period of severe famine, was named "Nkana" in honour of 
the Nkana Palm, the leaves of which were eaten by the tribe to 
prevent starvation. When Nkana reached Womanhood she married a 
certain Yalobe. Their son, Nkana Yalobe, was the grandfather of 
the first Chief Nkana, whose grandson, the late chief, died in 
December, 1961 aged 58.37 
About three miles north of the present road bridge across the 
Kafue River, near the modern town of Kitwe and close to where the 
36. At first, a great future had been forecast for the mine, since 
the costing estimates for the mine were £18 a ton plus £1 a 
ton transportation charges to Europe, i.e. a total cost of 
some £10 a ton less than any other producing mine. See 
"Livingstone Mail "dd. 26th December, 1908. The Katanga 
estimates were even less. Only a fortnight earlier the 
same paper was berating the Rhodes & Beit Trustees for 
alleged disbelief in the future as evidenced in their 
attitude to the extension of the railway (see footnote No. 
14 p. 19 above) 
37. For obituary see the "Northern News" dd. 28.12.61. In his 
youth, before being crowned in 1932, he had himself worked 
on the mine which was named after his father. 
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Wusikili Stream flows into this river, a small outcrop of copper - 
mineralised rock has been exposed in the bed of the stream. It is 
still not absolutely certain who was the first European to see this 
outcrop. Two prospectors, F. Lewis and O. Baragwanath, who were 
based on the Silver King may have reached it and pegged a claim 
there in 1901, after travelling up the Kafue by canoe.38 This would, 
of course, have been some months before the well -known expedition 
of Collier and Donohoe to the Roan Antelope and Bwana Mkubwa. 
Certainly, the reef was known by 1906, for a map produced in 
London in September of that year by Edward Stanford and now in the 
geology files of the Anglo- American Corporation clearly indicates 
it. Nevertheless, the first time that attention was seriously 
drawn to the outcrop was in 1910 when J. Moffat Thompson, then 
Assistant Magistrate at Ndola, was shown the outcrop by an African 
whom Bancroft suggests was Nkana.39 He may have been the father 
of the late Chief who was then only seven years old. Thompson 
pegged the outcrop, later selling the claims to Zeederberg of 
Bulawayo, who eventually sold them to the Johannesburg financiers, 
Colonel J. Donaldson, D.S.O. and E. Sievewright. 
Further conflicting information came to light in 1956 when 
38. Reported in "Horizon" April 1963. The account had already 
formed the subject of a most interesting historical novel, 
"Trail of the Copper King" by T.V. Bulpin, published by 
Timmins, Cape Town in 1959. 
39. Bancroft: op.cit p.66. 
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J.F. Kapnek of Johannesburg, who had been connected with mining in 
Southern Rhodesia since 1904, supplied a memorandum detailing his 
own activities to J.C. Ferguson, then Director of Geological Surveys 
for the territory, by whom it was shown to the author. Ferguson, 
who is an old friend of Kapnek, is satisfied that the memorandum 
and also a letter subsequently written by Kapnek to the Secretary 
of Mines, Lands and Surveys in Salisbury on 21st August, 1957 are 
valid evidence. 
In 1910 Kapnek and Theodore Berwitz sent out from Salisbury a 
Scotsman, Dark Fraser, to trade cattle on their behalf in 
Barotseland. While on this venture, Fraser formed the opinion that 
there were good prospects for coal, copper, gold and other 
minerals in Northern Rhodesia and suggested to his employers that 
he should undertake some prospecting on their behalf. As a 
result, relates Kapnek, he formed a syndicate which included 
Berwitz, Eli and Harry Susman, who were then living at Livingstone, 
Henry Ellenbogen, a former mayor of Bulawayo, Abe Fingleson and 
himself. The syndicate contributed £75 a month between them to 
the scheme, of which £60 was for monthly expenses - native wages, 
food, picks, shovels, and other equipment - and the balance of 
£15 made up the wages of Fraser, who was also to receive a sixth 
share in anything he discovered. 
In the course of his expedition Fraser located some small 
copper outcrops, one of them being the present Nkana deposit. 
Samples taken by him assayed around 4% copper. Kapnek then 
claims that he submitted the assay results, along with samples, 
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to the Bulawayo mining interests, without gaining any response. 
The claims, which had been registered in the name of Dark Fraser, 
were therefore abandoned. In view of the apparently great potential 
of Katanga, Kansanshi and Bwana Mkubwa, a minor outcrop of only 4% 
copper was unlikely to have much speculative value at the time. 
It is known, however, that in 1916 H.C. Winnicott pegged two blocks 
of claims in the area for the Susman brothers, and these may have 
been the same claims. This action was very probably stimulated by 
the considerable rise in copper prices already noted (above p.32). 
The claims were registered as "Nkana Copper " in 1916. The 
Susmans offered the claims to the Bwana Mkubwa Company for nothing 
more than their expenses, amounting to 0100. On this offer being 
rejected (itself perhaps not unexpectedly in the light of the 
frustrating results from the richer deposit at Bwana Mkubwa) the 
claims were sold to a William Lee for the same sum in December, 
1918. Lee now went to work trenching and sinking prospect shafts 
and soon proved valuable deposits, ranging up to 4.6% copper, in 
reefs several feet wide and totalling up to 1,800 feet in length. 
By June, 1919 Lee was demanding 010,000 for his two blocks of 
claims. In the same month, Lee and F.A. Unger, a representative 
of the Consolidated Mines Selection Company,40 who had been 
inspecting Lee's property, were taken by Chief Nkana some fifteen 
miles to the northwest where they were shown the ancient workings 
40. In 1928 this Company was one of the participants in the 
formation of Rhodesian Anglo- American. 
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at Chambishi, which had previously been pegged by Collier and 
Donohoe in July, 190341 and before that by George Grey in 1899. 
The earliest known registration of these claims was on 3rd 
March, 1913,42 when they were registered in the name of the 
Rhodesia Copper and General Exploration and Finance Company, which 
company abandoned them in June, 1917. They were re- registered on 
2nd January, 1920 in the name of Malian' Lee, transferred to the 
Messina Coal and Metal Mines in June of the same year and resold 
to Donaldson and Sievewright in 124. 
41. There is no record of this except for a note found amongst 
Collier's papers after his death. Personal information: 
L. Tucker. 
42. It should be noted that all claims pegged before the Mining 
Proclamation of 1912 were recorded in the Mines Department, 
Ndola, from which department no further information could be 
obtained. See letter ref. RD 331/49 dd. 23.12.49 from the 
Registrar, Mining Titles, Livingstone, to Mufulira Copper 
Mines Ltd. in the R.S.T. files. Unfortunately, too, all 
the records dated prior to 1912 held by Copper Ventures, 
R.S.T. and the B.S.A. Co. were destroyed by enemy action 
during the 1939 -45 War. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DEVELOPMENT AND EXPLOITATION 
TO 1939 
After the impetus of the initial spurt of prospecting had lost 
momentum in the early years of the twentieth century, it seems 
clear that, as far as Northern Rhodesia was concerned, the results 
were relatively disappointing. Gold finds were negligible, the 
numerous small copper mines in the Hook of the Kafue were all 
either already failures or shortly to become so, Kansanshi was too 
far away from transport facilities, Bwana Mkubwa, although 
apparently promising, was also a long way from the rail -head, and 
in any case, its potential was soon to be shown to be greatly 
exaggerated: it has never been a paying proposition. What else 
remained? Old workings on oxide deposits at Chambishi, Roan 
Antelope and Nkana, but all inferior in values to Bwana Mkubwa. 
What hope was there for these? And all were overshadowed by 
the plenteous bounty of Katanga. On the credit side - a 
substantial lead and zinc deposit at Broken Hill. In fact, the 
mineral wealth of Northern Rhodesia lay deep down out of sight of 
prospecting eyes and was not to be revealed by the amateurish 
methods then in vogue. Prior to the advent of systematic 
prospecting - an innovation brought about by Dr. Bancroft in 
192? - a success or failure depended either on luck - and it is 
astonishing how high a percentage of Copperbelt mines were so 
discovered by the random stumbling upon either ancient workings 
or mineralised outcrops - or on the goodwill of the local 
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natives. It was common, therefore, for prospectors to carry samples 
of malachite, azurite and other easily identifiable ores in the hope 
that they would be recognised by the local inhabitants and similar 
outcrops indicated. Streams would be usefully investigated for 
their mineral content, and by following any such indication to the 
point at which it was no longer present, it was sometimes possible to 
isolate the source of the occurrence within the drainage area. 
It may be noted that although to reveal the potential of the 
Copperbelt mines required intensive, scientific investigation, with 
the one exception of Chibuluma, all the present operating mines were 
initially located by such elementary methods as those detailed above. 
In the light of the lack of substantial success, stimulated by 
instability in the prices of base metals during 1907 and 1908, there 
was a decline in prospecting activities in Northern Rhodesia for 
the few years after 1906, a decline, however, which was checked by 
the Mining Proclamation of 1912. This laid down that, after the 
simple formality of taking out a prospector's licence costing only 
El, anyone could search for minerals anywhere in Northern Rhodesia, 
except for those areas already pegged or assigned by previous 
agreements. If the prospector was fortunate enough to make a 
discovery he could stake claims in a stipulated area and 
subsequently protect them against encroachment by others by 
undertaking some annual development work. Unfortunately the 
stimulus which this gave to prospecting proved only very- temporary, 
for the outbreak of the First World War on 4th August, 1914 
brought investigations almost completely to a halt. Further, 
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the influence of the war was not immediately beneficial to Northern 
Rhodesian Copper. It did indeed demonstrate to the British 
Government that in times of crisis it was undesirable to be too 
dependent on the United States for supplies of raw materials, and 
this factor undoubtedly helped to stimulate subsequent activity in 
Commonwealth countries, including Northern Rhodesia. But Katanga 
rather than Northern Rhodesia was the area to profit from the war- 
time price increases, and the post -war decline - to £62 per ton by 
1922 - meant a proportionate decline in interest in base metals as 
investment prospects. Nor was this all, for the two -fold calamity 
of a minor famine in the area together with the post -war epidemic 
of "Spanish 'flu" also added to the difficulties of investigation 
and subsequent development. Thus little prospecting work was 
undertaken from 1918 to 1922. 
So far, apart from the work at Kansanshi, all the operations 
noted had been under the aegis of the Edmund Davis group of 
companies. Nevertheless, the mineral rights ultimately belonged 
to the British South Africa Company, with which friendly 
co- operation was essential. In return for disposing of 
mineral rights to other groups, it looked for recompense to 
income from royalties and share holdings in development 
companies. During the period of administration from 1889 to 
1924, far from making a profit, the Company had suffered heavy 
annual deficits. The shareholders had never received a 
dividend. Thus it was that the Company negotiated with the 
British Government, the negotiations resulting in the successful 
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agreement of 29th September, 1923, by which the Crown provided 
£3,750,000 to recompense the Company for its losses while it had 
acted as the governing body and agreed to take over the 
administration of Northern Rhodesia, which therefore passed to the 
Colonial Office as from 1924. This in no way affected the 
mineral rights, which were still held by the Company. 
BWANA MKUBWA 
Although the immediate post -war years saw no revival of 
prospecting activity in Northern Rhodesia, some attention was 
given to the most likely prospect, Bwana Mkubwa. Early in 1918 
the London firm of Minerals Separation Ltd., a company which 
specialised in metallurgical operations and held a number of 
patents for extracting metals from ore concentrates, was 
engaged by the Bwana Mkubwa Copper Mining Company to investigate 
the possibilities of treating the lower - grade ores by a 
flotation process. The tests, which were completed in January 
1920, showed that when the ore averaged over 4.25% copper, over 
77% recovery was possible. It was not clear, though, how the 
average grade of ore - an estimated 3,700,000 tons at 4 %43 
would respond. Nevertheless, the mine was closed in March 
1920 to enable preparations to be made for the new techniques 
43. The Emery Report 1st March 1920. A.B. Emery, an American, 
was the general manager of the Messina (Transvaal) 
Development Company. His Report cannot be considered 
enthusiastic or his estimate (relative to Katanga) 
startling. 
involved in the treatment of the ore. In 1921, J.E.G. Williams44 
arrived as assayer and in the following year, Minerals Separation 
Limited, with Preston K. Horner, an American, as Consulting 
Engineer and W. Perkins as Consulting Metallurgist, was commissioned 
to prepare the mine for the new "Perkins Process" which was 
designed to handle 1,000 tons of ore a day. Horner's decision 
to use steam shovels to remove the ore from the surface down to the 
water -level was an error of judgment. It involved the removal of 
a great deal of barren overburden before any ore could be reached, 
and in addition, caused the ore to be mixed with a substantial 
amount of waste material which seriously affected the true copper 
values of the rock sent for treatment. In consequence, although 
Emery had estimated the average value of the ore as 4% copper, 
much of the material sent to the plant averaged only 2% or 23% 
copper. 
The accidental error in copper values brought about by the 
work itself was not the only cause of false values reported from 
Bwana Mkubwa. The Manager, G. Broadbridge, had long suspected 
that the high values of the central lode had been influenced by 
large pieces of pure malachite occasionally intersected in the 
workings. On further investigation by the assayer, Williams, 
it was proved beyond doubt that particles of malachite were being 
44. Mr. Williams - known as "Bugs" because of his interest in 
Lepidoptera - has provided me with much of the detail 
regarding work at Bwana Mkubwa in the 1920's. 
For obituary see "Horizon" May 1965 p. 25. 
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found in bags of samples which had been taken in areas where 
malachite did not exist. When this knowledge was made public, 
the Africans who handled the samples suddenly disappeared. It 
seems probable that at the instigation of some local native chief 
who wanted to see increased development taking place in the area, 
with consequent greater prosperity for the local population, the 
samplers were deliberately increasing the ore values by mixing 
malachite, possibly obtained from Katanga, with the genuine 
samples. It may be, therefore, that the dilution of the ore in 
the actual mining process was not so serious as at first thought. 
The error in estimating copper values, together with the 
unsatisfactory results given by the Perkins Process soon had the 
mine in financial difficulties. Its subsequent short and 
unhappy history is soon told. For the year 1928 -29, although 
5,550 tons of copper were produced, the operating loss was 
L41,000. The slump of the early 1930's proved fatal. The 
plant closed in April, 1931 and has since been neglected in 
favour of the more recent substantial discoveries on the 
Copperbelt. The Company itself had been sold to Rhodesian 
Congo Border Concession Ltd. in 1930 and subsequently became 
the property of Rhokana Corporation,45 which carried out a 
further investigation in 1956. Although nothing further has 
45. These companies are discussed below (p.Lt`t, ioo,et seq.) 
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been done and no further reserves have been found, the Corporation 
remains unwilling to surrender its rights over the area, which is 
also required for future expansion by the town of Ndola. 
One of the most compelling aspects of the First World War, as 
far as the copper industry was concerned, was the rise to 
dominance of the United States, which, by the end of the war was 
responsible, along with Latin America, for approximately three - 
quarters of the annual world production. Inevitably, therefore 
American engineers and metallurgists possessed considerable 
advantages in background knowledge and experience, and were greatly 
in demand in other parts of the world. American interests also 
enjoyed very great financial strength and to a very great extent 
determined the future prospects of the industry. Much as 
American skill and knowledge we. required in Northern Rhodesia it 
was a very debatable point to what extent the financial and other 
"strings" attached were either welcome or desirable. These 
factors were to loom large, especially in the thinking of. 
Ernest Oppenheimer and his Anglo- American Corporation of South 
Africa, which was soon to appear on the scene. This does not, 
of course, imply that in the immediate post -war years, American 
mining interests were already anxious to invest in Northern 
Rhodesian projects. On the contrary, American experts were 
generally sceptical about the prospects in the territory, the 
Emery Report on Bwana Mkubwa being typical of the type of 
thinking which envisaged only very moderate profits. But 
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individual Americans were already interested and were soon to become 
prominent within the copper mining industry. 
Two of these were Preston K. Horner, a former manager of the 
Union Miniere du Haut Katanga and Alfred Chester Beatty who had long 
experience of the Congo, having taken part in the initial 
negotiations on behalf of the Guggenheim group which led to the 
formation of "Forminiere", the diamond concern, as far back as 1906. 
Beatty had also considerable experience in American copper affairs, 
but had given up these interests to settle in England in 1913. 
Subsequently in 1933 he became a British citizen. Beatty had been 
the instigator in 1914 of a company known as Selection Trust which 
in 1920 he interested in Bwana Mkubwa, himself becoming a director 
of the latter company, on the Board of which by this time were also 
P.K. Horner, Edmund Davis and W. Broadbridge. These four now put 
up half of the capital of £5,000 required to form a new syndicate 
known as Copper Ventures Limited which was registered on 10th 
November, 1921. The other half share in this syndicate was held 
by Minerals Separation, and the function of the new company was to 
apply the "Perkins Process's in the treatment of copper ores in 
Northern Rhodesia. As already seen, the fiasco at Bwana Mkubwa 
resulted, but by good fortune the other new activities of Copper 
Ventures soon rendered this failure of relatively minor imlortance. 
Towards the end of 1922 the British South Africa Company 
abandoned its policy of granting individual prospecting licences 
in favour of exclusive prospecting rights to large concerns. 
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Although the credit for this is often given to Edmund Davis,46 who 
indeed did possess some influence with the British South Africa 
Company, becoming a director of it in 1925 and of Anglo- American in 
1928, yet there was almost certainly more prompting this decision 
than his advice alone. The fact that the first action of the 
British South Africa Company was actually a reservation to itself47 
of an area of some 1,800 square miles known later as the Nkana 
Concession, which contained three prospects, Nkana South, Chambishi 
and the Roan -Rietbok claims in which oxides similar to those at 
Bwana Mkubwa had been found, suggests very strorLy that the 
Chartered Company was confident that the operations at Bwana 
Mkubwa were going to be highly successful. In fact, this reserved 
area now contains the present Roan Antelope, Nkana, Mindola, 
Chibuluma, Baluba, Chambishi and Mufulira properties. A further 
stimulus to the British South Africa Company was provided by 
F.K. Horner who had already suggested to Copper Ventures in August 
1922 that a large concession should be asked from it. The first 
major concession was therefore granted for a period of five years 
from 31st December, 1922 to Copper Ventures Ltd. It consisted 
of 50,000 square miles stretching along the Congo border, west of 
46. See e.g. Sir T. Gregory: "Ernest Oppenheimer and the 
Economic Development of Southern Africa. O.U.P. Cape Town 
1962 p. 392. 
47. By Government Notice No. 73 dated 8th June 1922. See 
"Northern Rhodesia Gazette" dd. 21.6.22. 
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the railway, to the border with Angola. In terms of the agreement 
arrived at, £9,000 was to be spent each year on prospecting and the 
working capital was to be £45,000. 150,000 Cl shares were to be 
assigned to the new syndicate which would actually undertake the 
work. Thus was formed Rhodesian Congo Border Concession Limited 
to acquire the Concession from Copper Ventures Limited. The 
Chairman was F.L. Gibbs, who was also chairman of Minerals 
Separation Limited and the directorate included A. Chester Beatty 
and W. Broadbridge. The first manager was an American, Raymond 
Brooks.48 Of the initial capital, 100,000 fully paid Cl shares 
were to be allotted to Copper Ventures Limited of which 15,000 
were to fulfil the obligation to the British South Africa Company. 
Subsequently the area of the Concession was increased by a further 
2,000 square miles, involving the allocation of a further 2,000 
shares to the British South Africa Company and an increase in 
annual expenditure from £9,000 to £9,600.49 It is not 
absolutely certain, therefore, whether the decision of the 
British South Africa Company to grant concessions was prompted by 
the advice of Edmund Davis, which implied that the enormous scope 
48. For obituary and commentary see the "Northern News" dd. 12th 
and 23rd August, 1960. 
49. For details of the negotiations see P.K. Horner: "History of 
the Prospecting for Copper in Northern Rhodesia 1921 -25" - 
unpublished paper in R.S.T. Archives. Eventually the 
Concession was extended for a further period to 1929 and then 
to 1940. 
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of the work involved, both financially and in terms of the actual 
area to be covered, was beyond the powers of individuals or small 
organisations, or by the knowledge that Copper Ventures actually 
wanted such a concession, or by continued faith in the value of 
Bwana Mkubwa, or by a combination of all three. The results, at 
least, were clearly summed up in 1939 by Sir Dougal Malcolm, 
the President of the British South Africa Company:50 
"The growth of the Northern Rhodesia copper industry has 
indeed, in the sphere of mining, been the most remarkable 
development which has taken place in the recent history of the 
British Empire. It is mainly to be attributed to the adoption 
by the British South Africa Company, some sixteen years ago, of 
what was then a new policy with a view to the development and 
exploitation of its minerals. The method adopted has been that 
of granting to large Prospecting Companies, well equipped with 
capital, the exclusive right, for definite terms of years over 
large defined areas, to prospect for minerals on the terms that 
the grantees were to spend during the currency of their rights 
such minimum annual sums as would secure that the whole of their 
areas should be adequately prospected. During the currency of 
their rights the Prospecting Companies were given the exclusive 
rig;ht within their areas of marking out mining properties to be 
held by them under the terms of the Mining Law of the territory 
and of a common form of Prospecting Licence. The practice has 
50. R.S.T. Archives Memo 5 pp. 19 -20. 
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"been for the British South Africa Company to stipulate that mining 
properties so marked out when worked for profit shall be worked 
through mining companies formed for the purpose in which the 
British South Africa company is entitled to a share interest, its 
remaining interest in the properties being commuted for royalties, 
or agreed scales, on the minerals produced.51 The great areas 
covered by the grants of exclusive prospective were intensely 
prospected at a cost of many thousand pounds by thoroughly well - 
equipped geological organisations. This policy during its 
continuance had the effect of shutting out the individual 
prospector, and small worker who in Southern Rhodesia produced 
so substantial a proportion of the gold output. But, as a 
mining country, Northern Rhodesia is not like Southern Rhodesia. 
The great deposits of copper -bearing ore found in Northern 
Rhodesia can be exploited only by great companies commanding 
abundant resources of capital. 
51. As an example, the agreement made with Rhokana Corporation 
August 1931 was on the following scale - 
If price less than £55 per ton (copper) royalty to be 2% 
tt It £55 -E60 " n " " tt 2Á-% 
" " E60 -á;80 tt " tt tt " 23 / 
+ 10% on price over £60 
If " over C80 " " royalty to be 5% 
+ 10% on price over £80 
(Figures in Nchanga files) 
In 1960 the arrangement was a price of 13.5% of the London 
Metal Exchange average prices per ton for the month less 
£8 e.g. if average price was 0300, the royalty was 13.5% 
of 0300 = C40.5 less C8 = £32.5 per long ton copper. 
In 1947 the B.S.A. Co. agreed to hand over all mineral 
rights to the Northern Rhodesia Government on 1st October 
1986. Meantime, the Company was paying 20% of its 
mineral revenues as tax, but in 1964 immediately prior 
to Zambian independence the new government negotiated for 
a complete hand -over of the rights with immediate effect. 
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Operations on the scale of those which have produced the great 
results are not within the reach of the small man, and in fact, 
during all the years before 1923, when practically the whole of 
Northern Rhodesia was open to public prospecting by anyone who 
chose to take out a prospecting licence for E1 almost nothing 
resulted from exploration by individuals." This remark is 
not, of course, strictly true. It would be invalid to argue 
that such as Davis and Beatty were individuals in that they 
involved already organised companies enjoying substantial 
capital. On the other hand Moffat Thompson was purely an 
amateur when he was first shown the Nkana outcrop. Basically 
though, the argument that no private individual, prospecting off 
his own resources and developing his finds with his own 
capital, has ever enjoyed success in copper mining in Northern 
Rhodesia is incontestable.52 This applies equally to the 
post -1940 era during which the areas not already covered by 
prospecting licences and special grants have been open to 
individual prospectors. Nothing noteworthy has resulted. 
52. On the other hand, mica, bismuth, tin, gold and a little 
silver have been successfully worked by the small worker. 
See T.D. Guernsey (ed.) "A Prospector's Guide to Mineral 
Occurrences in Northern Rhodesia ". Salisbury B.S.A. Co. 
1952 p. 9. 
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NKANA 
At about the same time as the Nkana Concession was 
established Donaldson and Sievewright tool over Lee's prospects, 
(see above p.39) retaining him to carry on further work on their 
behalf. Lee concentrated on sinking a pump shaft some 3,500 
feet north of the Wusikili Stream. Although at a depth of 100 
feet the flow of water was 3,000 gallons an hour, he still 
managed to prove the presence of an orebody of about 60 feet wide 
averaging 3.4% oxide copper. Obviously the area had enormous 
possibilities; equally obviously, substantial financial backing 
was necessary to develop it. C. Gordon James, a mining 
engineer, who was asked by Horner to represent Copper Ventures 
in investigating the Nkana claims, therefore visited the property, 
where he found Lee in residence. Nine shafts had been sunk to 
a depth of 60 feet, the dumps of five of which showed signs of 
copper. James took samples from all the shafts and also from 
the cross -cuts, and in view of the satisfactory results obtained, 
secured from Donaldson and Sievewright an option on the claims 
for the sum of £35,000 cash or alternatively for a small cash 
consideration and a substantial share holding. It soon became 
obvious to Horner that the original claims would not cover the 
actual area of the deposits. He therefore asked for and 
obtained in 1924 the exclusive right to prospect the Nkana 
Concession for three years and to select three areas each of ten 
square miles, two possessing full land and mineral rights, the 
remaining one land rights only. This was the "small" 
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Nkana Concession.53 Almost at once, Copper Ventures, which did not 
itself possess the capital necessary for development, sold its 
rights to the Concession, together with the eight blocks of claims 
already registered in its name at Nkana, to the Bwana Mkubwa 
Copper Mining Company for a lump sum of £60,000 together with 
517,500 fully paid shares of five shillings each in the latter 
Company. A further 57,500 shares became the property of the 
British South Africa Cor¢pany. The Bwana Mkubwa Company almost 
made a totally unexpected profit on this deal, for when 
J.E.G. Williams was making his heroic journey to Nchanga54 he 
noticed, whilst shooting for the pot, that the boundary between 
the Concession granted to Rhodesian Congo Border Concession 
Limited and the Nkana Concession did not coincide with the areas 
marked on his official map, with the result that part of the 
Nchanga area was indicated as being within the Nkana Concession. 
Surveys were carried out by both sides before the matter was 
referred to litigation which was won by Rhodesian Congo Border 
Concession Limited.55 
53. For a first -hand account of the work at Nkana see - 
a) letter from C. Gordon James to Krogh (R.S.T.)dd.10.12.48. 
b) C.G. James: "Notes on the Early History of the Copperbelt" 
24.5.59 unpublished. (Both in R.S.T. Archives.) It should 
be noted that the Nkana Concession was granted to Copper 
Ventures on 21.2.24 over a year after Rhodesian Congo 
Border Concession Ltd. had been formed on 16.2.23. This 
contradicts K. Bradley ( "Copper Venture" op.cit. p.80) who 
places them, without giving dates, in the reverse order. 
54. See below p.Irq 
55. Personal information: J.E.G. Williams and L. Tucker. 
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Copper Ventures had worked very hard on the Nkana Concession, 
having extended drives and cross -cuts at the level of the water - 
table, which lay between 50 and 60 feet below the surface, at 
frequent intervals from a position some 800 feet south of the 
Wusikili Stream to a point about 5,400 feet northwards. As might 
have been expected, only oxides were found. From 2,400 feet to 
4,800 feet north of the Wusikili Stream a syncline was discovered 
which gave rise to two parallel sub -outcrops, which, however, 
petered out into barren rock when explored by cross -cuts to the 
east and west. Unknown to the prospectors at the time, the ore - 
body descended steeply to the west before rising again as the 
Mindola outcrop. A great prospect was missed at this point. 
By 1924, a considerable amount of work had also been done 
on the eight Nkana claims themselves. Many feet of prospect 
shafts, drives and cross -cuts were excavated all at groundwater 
level, except for the pump shaft which was sunk to a depth of 
113 feet. Then, in September, Bwana Mkubwa prospectors made a 
momentous discovery. About 8,000 feet northwest of the 
Wusikili Stream lay an open glade, completely devoid of trees, 
which appeared to the prospectors as 4 typical "copper clearing" 
such as had already been seen at the Roan Antelope and elsewhere. 
There was no obvious sign of copper. Nevertheless, the Bwana 
Mkubwa men tried the experiment of a prospect shaft- which, 
between depths of 10 and 25 feet, passed through micaceous ore 
averaging 3.6% oxide copper. This was the southern tip of the 
very important Nkana North Orebody. Further investigation 
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disclosed that this orebody, within a length of strike of 500 feet, 
varied from 35 to 39 feet in width and contained 9.7% copper. 
There was no other surface indication of copper and a great deal 
of further exploratory work was necessary before the continuation 
of the orebody was located to the northwest. From the end of 
October 1922 until December 1923, under the supervision of the 
local manager, Raymond Brooks, sixteen shot -drill holes had been 
distributed along the line of the strike. Of these, six showed 
no copper and the remainder encountered ore dipping so steeply 
that accurate estimates of values could not be made. One, 
however, had penetrated a value of 2.9% sulphide copper. In 
consequence of these results, obtained before 1924, it was 
concluded, erroneously, that several ore -bodies rather than a 
continuous one had been discovered at Nkana, the values of which 
were not as high as the orebodies at Bwana Mkubwa. The Bwana 
Mkubwa Company itself was primarily concerned with starting 
production when it took over in 1924 and devoted very little 
attention to further prospecting. 
MUFULIRA AND BANCROFT 
Although a number of other concessions were granted during 
the following years, notably in the Roangwa, Serenje and Kasempa 
areas, 1923 was the vintage year for discoveries on the 
Copperbelt, during which all the honours went to Rhodesian Congo 
Border Concession Limited. For in spite of the failure of the 
company adequately to appreciate the potential of Nkana, 
geological teams operating under the overall control of Raymond 
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Brooks had within a few months discovered the three major mines 
of Nchanga, Mufulira and Bancroft. The fortunes of Beaton and 
Osterberg in the Nchanga area are detailed in Chapter V. The 
gist, if not the details, of this story has been known for many 
years. Recently, though, its interest has been overshadowed by 
the fascinating corollary to the activities at Mufulira. 
The original account of the expedition of James Moir and 
Guy Bell, as generally accepted by mining historians, was related 
by the Chairman of the Rhodesian Selection Trust group, Sir 
Ronald Frain, when he unveiled the memorials at Mufulira and 
Luanshya in honour of their discovert*s on 28th September, 1960. 
Moir and Bell, he explained, had been sent out with instructions 
similar to those normally issued at the time, namely to follow 
streams and make enquiries amongst local Africans about the 
presence of malachite outcrops. This was, ef course, before the 
introduction of systematic prospecting by Dr. Bancroft in 1927. 
Having camped one evening in August, 1923 by the banks of the 
Mufulira Stream, they were excited to find evidence of copper 
mineralisation - a clump of peat moss stained green, and, a 
short distance away, further green stains on a rock outcrop - 
both suggestive of the presence of copper oxides. Immediately 
they took samples which were despatehed to the Nkana laboratory 
operated by J.E.G. Williams, where they were received by Lewin 
Tucker, who, twenty -three years later, was to become the 
General Manager of Mufulira Mine. The African runner who 
carried the now famous sack of specimens was still employed at 
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Mufulira in 1960 and attended the ceremony along with Tucker. 
But although Guy Bell was known to have worked at Mufulira in 
1934, no trace of either him or James Moir could be found. Bell 
has still not been traced, but, alone in his shack in the 
Mkaradzi valley near Mount Darwin in Southern Rhodesia, the 
seventy -seven year old, almost blind James Moir hear Sir Ronald 
Prain's speech relayed by the Federal Broadcasting Corporation. 
Within a few days a number of people in the Mount Darwin area had 
written to the Press verifying his whereabouts. As a result the 
Rhodesian Selection Trust directors agreed to offer him an annuity 
for life and soon afterwards he was visited by Lewin Tucker. 
Visits to leading eye specialists followed, but nothing could be 
done to alleviate Moir's almost total blindness. Nevertheless, 
he had not permitted this disability to interfere with his 
prospecting career, claiming to be able to identify by touch 
the specimens brought to him by his African servant. He refused 
to return to civilisations preferring to continue his nomadic 
search for the fortune which has always eluded him.56 
The finding of James Moir, apart from its great human 
interest, is of importance to the history of the Copperbelt in 
that subsequent conversations with him have led to a complete 
56. For an account of James Moir's career see the "Northern 
News" dd. 9th May 1961 and also an article in "Horizon" 
December 1960. Moir died in Bindura Hospital on 4th 
May 1964. For obituary see "Horizon" June, 1964 p. 9. 
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revision of the original account of the discovery of Mufulira. 
Moir claimeithat he was prospecting alone in the Mufulira area 
towards the end of 1922 and early in 1923, during which time he 
recorded a number of copper indications including the peat moss 
which caused such commotion later. He had never at any time 
camped at this spot, as was commonly believed. Bell had been 
sent to assist him some months later, when the two men again 
visited the discovery in June. It must have been Bell, thôighl5 
Moir, who later sent the samples in August. 
Apparently, though, the find was deceptive, for when in 
192+ prospectors from Bwana Mkubwa put down four prospect shafts 
to a maximum depth of 110 feet, the cross -cuts showed nothing 
greater than patchy areas of 1% copper. The work was therefore 
abandoned and the area lay dormant until the Rhodesian Selection 
Trust began further investigations in 1928. 
The third party to gain success for Rhodesian Congo Border 
Concession Limited was that of Williams and Babb. By 1923 
Williams had been transferred from Bwana Mkubwa to Nkana, where 
he first made the acquaintance of Raymond Brooks. Brooks hnd 
Horner had failed to find Beaton's discovery at Nchanga in July, 
1923,57 and had later sent Collier to investigate the find. It 
was in the course of further trenching by Collier that the 
important Nchanga Dambo Lode was discovered. Williams and 
Babb - who was later accidentally shot in a hunting accident - 
57. See below p. Ilñ- HY 
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were also sent on an expedition, part of which involved the taking 
of samples en route from the Nchanga discoveries. Having 
accomplished this, the two men continued along the line of the 
copper to the Kafue in the vicinity of Konkola. Here, whilst 
chasing a guinea -fowl for the pot, Williams tripped over a stone 
and fell sprawling to the ground. On looking round to ascertain 
the cause of his mishap he saw, to his amazement, that the 
dislodged stone showed traces of green underneath. The two 
traced the copper four miles through feldspathic quartzites to 
Kirila Bomwe. Samples were taken and, along with a sketch -map, 
sent along to Brooks early in 1924.58 Little attention was 
paid to the find and no further action was taken until the deposit 
was "re- discovered" in 1928 by two of the men carrying out the 
new systematic prospecting scheme devised by Dr. Bancroft. 
Bancroft Mine is situated in one of the few areas of the 
Copperbelt where ancient workings have not been found. 
58. Personal information: J.E.G. Williams. 
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS: THE ANGLO- AMERICAN CORPORATION 
AND RHODESIAN SELECTION TRUST. 
On 25th September, 1917 some two thousand miles away in 
Johannesburg, Ernest Oppenheimer finally evolved his own 
independent company, the Anglo- American Corporation of South Africa 
Limited, with the now apparently meagre capital of E1,000,000. 
After negotiations with an American, W.L. Honnold, who had 
formerly been managing director of the Consolidated Mines 
Selection Company and the Rand Selection Company, both gold - 
mining houses, American financial interest was gained and the 
new company had a distinct American identity. Honnold became 
a permanent director and two other Americans also joined the 
board, Mr. Sabin of the Guaranty Trust Company and W.R. Thompson, 
through whom the Newmont Mining Corporation acquired an interest. 
The American fi'nciers, J.P. Morgan and Company were also heavily 
involved., Apart from the American interest, Oppenheimer 
himself became a permanent director and other board members 
included H.C. Hull, the Minister of Finance in the first Union 
of South Africa Government in 1910, and H. Crawford of the 
National Bank. The alternate directors were E.S. Langerman 
and F.R. Lynch, who was then managing director of the 
Consolidated Mines Selection Company. 
Oppenheimer rapidly made himself a major force in South 
African mining circles and, ever anxious to widen the sphere of 
the Anglo- American Corporation's interests, sent his American 
consulting engineer, Carl R. Davis, and his brother -in -law, 
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Leslie Pollack, to the Copperbelt area in October 1923 to see if 
there were any developments likely to prove of interest to his 
company. Apparently, as far as Northern Rhodesia was concerned, 
there were not, and it was Oppenheimer's old associate Edmund 
Davis who finally involved him in Copperbelt affairs, as 
Oppenheimer himself pointed out :59 
"....The corporation's original incursion into Northern 
Rhodesian mining was really the result of our diamond activities. 
After negotiations with the Belgian and Angola Diamond companies, 
through the intermediary of Sir Edmund Davis, for the purchase of 
their diamonds had been successfully completed, Sir Edmund Davis 
asked me as a favour to assist with Bwana (M'kubwa) finance and 
I agreed to participate in a small way on condition that we were 
appointed consulting engineers. We looked upon the deal as a 
share transaction; it was liquidated fairly promptly, actually 
with the assistance of Sir Edmund. 
"Later on, after negotiations with Mr. Chester Beatty with 
reference to West African diamonds had brought us into closer 
relations with him, he asked the corporation to help in 
Rhodesian Congo Border Concession finance, which it did, again 
stipulating for the consulting engineership, which was readily 
granted. It must be recorded that at this time Bwana was in a 
state of continuous reconstruction, and nothing of any value had 
59. Memo dd. August 1930 from Sir Ernest Oppenheimer quoted in 
Godfrey op.cit. pp. 385 -86. 
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been found in the Rhodesian Congo Border Concession territory. 
"In due course the corporation became interested in other 
enterprises in Northern Rhodesia...." It is clear, therefore, 
that although the two companies, Rhodesian Congo Border Concession 
and Bwana Mkubwa were linked through Chester Beatty, the 
involvement of the Anglo- American Corporation in both of them was 
the result of two separate negotiations not connected by this 
common factor. 
Oppenheimer's small participation involved the purchase by 
the Anglo- American Corporation of 100,000 Bwana Mkubwa shares and 
the election of himself to the Bwana Mkubwa board of directors. 
This investment seems to have been purely speculative in view of 
Edmund Davis' pressure and the apparent optimism of the British 
South Africa Company. Subsequently though, as the optimistic 
reports of Carl Davis on the Copperbelt and other concessions 
were presented to him, Oppenheimer's activities became 
increasingly widespread. By the end of 1925 the Anglo- American 
Corporation had acquired interests in all of the concession 
companies and had become consulting engineers to them. In 
addition, Oppenheimer became a director of each. Within a 
year the network had been further extended by the appointment 
of Anglo- American to the position of consulting engineers to 
the British South Africa Company itself. These appointments 
were of vital importance, not merely in the degree of 
unification thus brought about, but in that the Anglo- American 
Corporation now became possessed of the overall picture as it 
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developed and could anticipate future prospects accordingly. 
Already, then, Anglo- American was a factor to be reckoned with 
in Copperbelt economics. 
The rise of Anglo- American Corporation in Northern Rhodesia 
in no way deterred Oppenheimer's colleague and rival, Alfred 
Chester Beatty. Although Copper Ventures Limited, having 
satisfactorily completed its original purpose, had sold the 
Nkana Concession to the Bwana Mkubwa company and then gone into 
voluntary liquidation in 1925, Beatty remained a director both of 
the Bwana Mkubwa company and of Rhodesian Congo Border Concession 
Limited. ge was too, extremely optimistic about future copper 
prospects in Northern Rhodesia and anxious to continue operations 
on his own behalf in the develgpment of some suitable property. 
Be therefore put an intriguing proposition to Pollack and 
Wetzlar of Anglo- American to the effect that - "a syndicate 
consisting of himself (1/3) A.A.C. (1/3) and an American group 
(1/3) of the best creddntials and with whom he is in touch should 
secure options on two or three promising areas from certain 
properties such as the Gold Fields Concession, Congo Border, etc.; 
that the funds of the syndicate be used to prospect these areas 
and to take up the most promising one, assuming of course it is 
sufficiently attractive. Then a company should be floated to 
60 
take over, develop and produce 
60. For the text of Pollack's letter to Oppenheimer on this 
subject see Gregory: op.cit. p.404. 
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This was the first mention of an American syndicate, as distinct 
from individual experts, taking an active interest in Copperbelt 
affairs and was a clear pointer to possible future trends. 
Beatty obviously meant business. By April, 1926 he had 
re- organised his original Selection Trust into the new Selection 
Trust Limited with its capital enlarged to 0800,000 to cope with 
his future plans. And even before this he had satisfactorily 
concluded negotiations with two other companies, The Northern 
Rhodesia Company and the Rhodesia Copper and General Exploration 
and Finance Company. The first of these was yet another offshoot 
of the Edmund Davis group which had been formed to take over the 
Roan Antelope and Rietbok claims from the Bechuanaland 
Exploration Company, the Bwana Mkubwa Company and the Rhodesia 
Copper and General Exploration and Finance Company. This latter 
company held shares in it. In return for taking over these 
shares together with other shares in the Northern Rhodesia 
Company, Beatty's Selection Trust was granted the option to take 
over the Roan and Rietbok claims until the 31st March, 1926. 
Under these circumstances Beatty proposed that a new company, 
"The Northern Rhodesia Option Venture ", should be formed with a 
capital of 0200,000 and offered Anglo- American a 24% share in 
the scheme, which was accepted. Out of the subsequent 
operations developed the Roan Antelope Mine. Similarly, when 
in August 1926 Edmund Davis and the Bwana Mkubwa Company 
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permitted Beatty to form the "Muliashi Venture" to examine the 
Muliashi claims,b1 contiguous to the Roan Antelope area and since 
acquired by the latter, Anglo- American were offered and accepted a 
15% share in this enterprise also. 
It is reasonable to suppose that Beatty was not unaware of 
the possibility that sulphide ores might be found at depth below 
the oxides of the claims possessed by his company, of which the most 
noteworthy were the Roan Antelope and Rietbok. Thus a relatively 
junior engineer, the late Russell J. Parker,62 was engaged to 
investigate the problem. One of his main tasks was to "prepare 
the ground" for an examination by R.M. Geppert, one of the American 
engineers in the employ of Selection Trust. Accompanying Parker 
was S.H. Ford, the consulting engineer to the Northern Rhodesia 
Company, which had ceded the option on the claims to Selection 
Trust. 
Parker arrived in September, 1925 at a time when very little 
was known of bedded deposits and no substantial quantities of 
sulphide copper had been found either in Northern Rhodesia or in 
Katanga. On his arrival he found the original work which had been 
61. Not to be confused with the adjacent Baluba deposit, to 
investigate and develop which a separate company was floated 
in 1954. 
62. Parker was tragically killed when a time bomb exploded in an 
aircraft in which he was a passenger, causing it to crash 
into the St. Lawrence River near Montreal. 
For obituary see "Transactions of the Institute of Mining 
and Metallurgy" Vol. L1X pp. 327 -8. 
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carried out by the Rhodesia Copper Company between 1902 and 1907, 
consisting of fifteen trenches and four inclined shafts on the 
Roan outcrops, together with a further five trenches which had been 
started on the Rietbok side. The trenches were about 6 feet deep 
and the shafts some 60 feet in length with short cross -cuts after 
50 feet. 
As Parker later pointed out,63 the original workers had 
missed the most important points which were - 
a) a gradual increase in copper values with depth. 
b) an increase in the width of the mineralised shale with depth. 
c) the possibility of the two parallel reefs forming a 
synclinal structure. 
He therefore immediately pegged the intervening ground between 
the Roan and Rietbok claims on behalf of the Bwana Mkubwa Copper 
Mining Company, the new claims being known as the "Luanshia" 
claims, from which the present name of Luanshya derives. 
Following on this action, Parker sank the two centre shafts 
to greater depths and put in further cross -cuts. No. 3 Shaft, 
which was sampled at intervals of 5 feet, at once showed a great 
increase in chalcocite from depths of 50 to 110 feet. Parker 
then began to suspect the presence of a sulphide mine.64 
63. Letter to D.C. Sharpstone dd.11th March 1929. In R.S.T. 
Archives. 
64. NB. Just before these events the Manager of Nkana, C.O. 
Wraith, had drilled into sulphides there - Personal 
information: L. Tucker. See also his letter to D'Eath 
(R.S.T.) dd. 20.12.49 in R.S.T. Archives. Raymond Brooks 
had also proved sulphides at the Nchanga Dambo Lode in 1925 
and had drilled a 2.9% sulphide deposit at Nkana in 1923. 
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A senior director of Selection Trust, W. Selkirk, who was also a 
consulting mining engineer in London, then came out to examine the 
property and recommended a large -scale programme of shaft -sinking 
and drilling to the extent of 027,000. This exercise commenced 
towards the end of April, 1926. 
The astounding results which followed, with the discovery of a 
belt of sulphide ore some 36.5 feet thick and averaging 3.87°% 
copper at a depth of 500 feet, greatly encouraged all those 
concerned with the other oxide deposits in the area. Not only 
would sulphides be much easier and cheaper to treat, but the much - 
vaunted Perkins Process for dealing with oxides was already 
proving to be a failure. It was undoubtedly with all these 
factors in mind that Beatty approached Sir Edmund Davis in 
November, 1926 with the request that Selection Trust should be 
permitted to undertake the prospecting of the hitherto unexplored 
areas of the Nkana Concession and for the same reasons that Davis 
retained for the Bwana Mkubwa Company a one -third share in the 
enterprise, together with the rights over a large area of 
approximately 6236 square miles to the south of the Nkana workings. 
It was this foresight of Sir Edmund Davis which accounts for the 
present Rhokana Corporation having a substantial interest in 
Mufulira and the other properties within the Nkana Concession. 
Anglo- American were offered and accepted a 7y'% share in the 
new company - Mineralized Venture - formed to carry out the work.65 
65. The inter -relationship of the various companies may be 
followed on Diagram XI. (endpapers) 
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A great deal of the credit for the demonstration of the 
potential of the Roan Antelope mine must go to Parker and his 
successor, Nicolaus. Parker had been sent to examine a 
considerable number of prospects in Northern Rhodesia, and he must 
be credited with being the first to appreciate the significant 
resemblance of the feldspathic quartzites in the areas of the 
major deposits - Bwana Mkubwa, Roan Antelope, Nkana and Nchanga - 
and for recognising the sulphide deposit at the Roan Antelope. 
It was Parker, too, who recommended to Selkirk that Selection 
Trust should endeavour to acquire the Nkana Concession and 
thoroughly survey it: and it was through this that the sulphides 
at Mufulira were found. Although the original Copper Ventures 
never possessed sufficient capital to develop its findings, and 
never even intended to do so, there must certainly have been 
pangs of regret in the breasts of P.K. Horner and his associates 
at this time at the thought of what they had unwittingly 
surrendered so cheaply to the Bwana Mkubwa Company in 1924. 
It is interesting to speculate that in 1924 the possibility of 
sulphide ore lying at depth below the oxides may have been 
completely overlooked. If such a find had been made then it 
might have meant the ultimate survival of the Bwana Mkubwa 
Company after the Bwana Mkubwa mine itself had been abandoned. 
When diamond drilling was started in 1928 by Rhodesian Selection 
Trust geologists under Parker, the very first hole proved a 
success, showing a width of 20.7 feet of sulphide ore averaging 
9.49% copper at a depth of 291 feet. There was, naturally, 
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great excitement, especially as the surface deposits - which were 
no more impressive than at Nchanga - were in quartzite and the only 
other known deposits in quartzite up till then were at Bwana Mkubwa 
and the Nchanga Dambo Lode. The tonnage at Bwana Mkubwa had 
already proved to be small, whilst at Nchanga the mixture of 
sulphide and oxide ore posed considerable technical problems. 
However, in this case a further width of 32.6 feet averaging 
5.72% copper as sulphides was found at a depth of 391 feet and 
yet a third, this time 58.7 feet wide and assaying at 6.6% copper 
at 491 feet. After an intensive-drilling programme it was clear 
by 1934 that there were three superimposed ore -bodies showing a 
combined total of 116,000,000 short tons of ore.66 The Mufulira 
Special Grant of 9,344 acres was registered in January, 1930 and 
a new company, Mufulira Copper Mines Limited, formed early in 
February. During this same period, another programme of pitting 
and drilling northeast of the Muliashi property had disclosed the 
extensive Baluba deposits, which are not yet being mined. 
The advent of the American Metal Company as a colleague and 
partner to Beatty's Selection Trust is regrettably undocumented, 
at least on the eastern side of the Atlantic. This was 
explained by D'Eath of the Rhodesian Selection Trust when he was 
gathering material for their archives in 1949: 
"You must wonder how it is that I haven't got this 
66. In 1961 the published reserves were 182,205,000 short tons 
averaging 3.35% copper. (Chamber of Mines Yearbook 1961) 
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"information already in our files. The reason is that in the early 
days Mr. Beatty having a 90% interest, ran these companies through 
"Ventures" and for reasons which you will understand, very meagre 
details were put in the minutes of Selection Trust as they were 
private ventures, and the same applied to the keeping of the 
Records. I think these must have been sent out as salvage during 
the war when the Government were pressing us for all waste paper. "67 
It is known, however, that the first connection of the 
company with Rhodesia was in 1925 when it made a loan to the 
Bwana Mkubwa Company under a sales agency agreement.68 It is 
known, too, that the Vice -President of American Metal, Dr. Otto 
Sussman, visited the Copperbelt in July, 1927 when he examined 
the Roan and Rietbok claims. He was deeply impressed and on the 
9th was cabling69 Hochschild: 
"Roan promises to become very important. Probably annual 
production 100,000,000 lbs. likely in three or four years. 
Capital required ,/12 ,000,000. Advise you to try to acquire an 
interest." This was done to the extent of almost a half of the 
67. D'Eath to Hochschild (American Metal Company) dd. 22nd 
December 1949. In R.S.T. Files. 
68. Hochschild to D'Eath 14th December 1949. R.S.T. Files. 
Apart from this bald statement, no further information is 
available on this. 
69. Copy in R.S.T. Archives. 
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original development capital of £175,000 and was maintained at 
approximately one -third as the capital increased. Subsequently 
in March, 1928, two American Metal Company engineers, A.D. Storke 
and P. Wilson came to the Copperbelt and examined the Bwana Mkubwa, 
Nkana, Nchanga and Roan Antelope properties in July of that year, 
reporting on them in turn to Hochschild. But as Roan Antelope 
Copper Mines Limited was floated in June, 1927, with 33% American 
interest, it is clear that Hochschild had already made up his 
mind to participate prior to his consideration of Storke's 
report, and on the strength of Sussman's opinion alone.70 
The new company, with an initial capital of £600,000 acquired 
the Roan, Rietbok and Luanshia Claims, exploring them to such good 
effect that by October, 1927 reserves of approximately 20,000,000 
tons averaging 3W/ copper had been found.71 The capital was 
therefore increased to £1,000,000 in April, 1928 and again to 
£1,250,000 in April of the following year. 
The early development of the Roan Antelope was rapid. By 
July 1928, when D.D. Irwin was appointed as General Manager, the 
construction of the plant area and the township had already 
70. Hochschild himself makes this point in his letter to D'Eath 
of 14.12.49 previously referred to. (Unfortunately this 
contradicts the statement made by K. Bradley: "Copper 
Venture" op.cit. p.92, that, "As a result of their reports 
and another by Mr. T.F. Field, Dr. Sussman was convinced of 
the magnitude of the discovery and staked his reputation on 
it to the extent of persuading The American Metal Company and 
other American interests to put up an almost 50% share in the 
capital of £175,000 needed for the early development work. ") 
71. Statement by Chester Beatty to shareholders 27th October 1927. 
These reserves have been continually expanding through 
further prospecting, and, after thirty years of mining, stood 
at 93,429,000 short tons averaging 3% copper in June, 1961. 
(Chamber of Mines Yearbook 1961) 
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begun and a pilot plant was actually in operation. The railway 
was extended from Bwana Mkubwa early in 1929 and before the end of 
1931 the smelter and concentrator were ready to commence operations. 
The first copper to be produced was marketed in October, although 
concentrates had been sent to the United States before this.72 
It was, in fact, the generosity of the American Metal Company, 
which paid in advance for the concentrates supplied to it, which 
enabled the Roan Antelope Mine to weather the depression of 
1931 -32 and remain in production.73 
During this period, in the late 1920's feverish activity was 
taking place in many areas of the Copperbelt. In the extreme 
west there was a spate of activity at Kansanshi from 1927 to 1932 
when the economic depression forced the mine to close down for a 
second time. A great deal of surface diamond drilling and 
underground development, comprising vertical shafts, drives and 
cross -cuts was carried out. To the north of the hill a three - 
compartment vertical shaft failed to penetrate water at a depth 
of 150 feet. To the south, a similar shaft had reached a depth 
of 543 feet by April, 1931, but through poor drilling conditions 
72. It is interesting to note that the first smelting of copper 
at the Roan Antelope on 20th October 1931 was the first 
production from any of the companies still in operation. 
The wood fire had been ceremoniously lit in the furnace 
fifteen days earlier by Mrs. Lucy Cullen, the niece of 
Mr. Irwin. 
73. Letter from Irwin to D'Eath in Memorandum No. 14(D) in 
R.S.T. Archives. Quoted by K. Bradley (op.cit.) p.97. 
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and the peculiar lay -out of the strata, the figures quoted for the 
value of the deposit - 11,000,000 tons averaging 4.34% copper - 
were wildly inaccurate.74 
A hundred miles to the east, Nchanga Copper Mines Ltd., a 
subsidiary of Rhodesian Congo Border Concession, which held 43% of 
the capital, and with the Anglo- American Corporation as consulting 
engineers was busily engaged on the River and Dambo Lodes of 
Nchanga Mine. (see Chapter V below) Further investigations 
were being made in the Bancroft area ( see below p.ós-i) and 
Mineralized Venture75 was beginning its work in the Nkana 
Concession. The Secretary of this new company was Lewin Tucker 
and in charge of the geological operations was R.J. Parker, who 
had previously been at the Roan Antelope, with two assistants, 
T.F. Andrews and A. Gray. This team undertook to make a 
geological map of the entire concession area, from which Special 
Grants of 150,000 acres could be selected, the remainder of the 
concession being then abandoned. The work was carried out with 
such skill that almost all the copper -bearing deposits fell 
within the selected areas. 
74. A more accurate figure of 4,000,000 tons averaging 3.65% 
copper is given in the Weldon Report dd. 23rd August, 1938, 
written after sampling in 1937/38. This figure is also 
quoted without acknowledgment by K. Bradley: "Copper 
Venture" op.cit. p.61. 
75. See above p. 68. 
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The area first selected for investigation in the Nkana 
Concession in 1927 was Chambishi, the relevant claims being bought 
by Selection Trust Limited from Donaldson and Sievewright in 
February, 1928 for 03,000. (Subsequently these claims were 
transferred to Rhodesian Selection Trust Limited and from them to 
Mufulira Copper Mines Limited in 1931.) 
Chambishi was the area first selected for investigation by 
Parker and Gray in 1927 in the Nkana Concession, partly because 
of its nearness to Nchanga and Nkana - it is approximately equi- 
distant between the two - and partly because the outcrop there was 
similar to those at Nkana and the Roan Antelope. It consisted of 
a sandy, shale bed, of a very porous nature, containing many small 
cavities in which were particles of limonite and malachite. It 
appeared to have been thoroughly leached, a fact which suggested 
to the geologists that there might originally have been sulphides 
present. Parker and Gray exposed the mineralised rock over about 
2,000 feet. The initial results were not particularly 
impressive - a 25 feet width averaging 4.27/ copper sulphides - 
but previous experience of large deposits under poor surface 
outcrops justified the decision to continue further development.76 
It was soon shown that a valuable orebody existed, but in common 
with so many others, the mine was abandoned as a result of the 
76. For a full account and description see R.J. Parker and A. 
Gray: "Prospecting and Geological Survey (1927 -29) of the 
' Nkana Concession'" - with comments by Y.K. Horner in 
"Transactions of the Institute of Mining and Metallurgy ", 
1935 -36 pp317 -364 
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economic depression of the early 1930's. Later, attention was 
devoted to developing Mufulira and the Roan Antelope, Chambishi 
being further neglected, even though the ore reserves stood at 
35,000,000 short tons averaging 3.37% copper. 
Exploitation of the Mufulira property, which began in 1929, 
was severely handicapped by the financial depression. Early in 
February, 1930, the Rhodesian Selection Trust, the British South 
Africa Company and the Bwana Mkubwa Company agreed to sell the 
Mufulira Special Grant to a new Company, Mufulira Copper Mines 
Limited, which was incorporated on 2nd March with a capital of 
£600,000 (now 218,000,000). Then, as a measure to reduce the 
immediate capital requirements and at the same time increase 
efficiency by unifying the management, Rhodesian Selection Trust 
decided that as from 1st, December, 1930 all its mining properties 
in the Nkana Concession and the claims at Chambishi should be 
transferred to the Mufulira Capper Mining Company. Rhodesian 
Selection Trust then became an Investment Holding Company having 
approximately a two -thirds interest in Mufulira Copper Mines 
Limited. 
By April 1931, when the combined ore reserves at Mufulira, 
Chambishi and Baluba totalled 162,000,000 tons averaging 4.14% 
copper, the depression brought prospecting to a halt. In 
January of the same year, also, by agreement with the British 
South Africa Company, the Mufulira Company had been relieved of 
its development obligations for a period of five years, in 
return for 50,000 fully paid up Mufulira shares. 
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Meantime, although a concentrator to handle 1,500 tons of ore 
a day had been completed in December 1931, the introduction of 
the "quota system" - the voluntary reductions in production devised 
to meet the economic crisis - led to operations being temporarily 
suspended before actual production had even begun. The quota 
applicable to Mufulira was produced partly from the stockpile of 
o.re,there, which was carried to the smelter at Nkana by the newly 
built railway which arrived in April 1932, and partly from 
production at the Roan Antelope and Nkana. Some 49,000 tons of 
ore from the Mufulira stock -pile which were treated at Nkana proved 
to contain the very satisfactory figure of 5% copper. 
PROSPECTING AND DR. BANCROFT 
In April 1927 Dr. J. Austen Bancroft arrived in the Nkana 
Concession as consultant geologist to the Anglo- American 
Corporation. Already an outstanding geologist and former 
professor in the subject at McGill University, he combined with 
his great scientific ability a most convincing air of his own 
infallibility. Both of these aspects were to make their mark 
on the Copperbelt. Thus, as related in his own work and quoted 
by Gregory77 he was largely responsible for Oppenheimer deciding 
77. op.cit. p.401 -2. It may reasonably be argued, though, that 
as reserves of over 24,000,000 tons averaging 4.2% copper 
were already known Oppenheimer would not really have needed 
very much persuasion to participate in the venture. 
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to back substantially the developing Nkana Mine. Nevertheless, he 
remained an egotistical, intolerant and irascible man under whom 
very few of his subordinates really enjoyed working. Further, 
his claims to fame on the Copperbelt are greatly exaggerated. It 
must be borne in mind that before he had even arrived in the 
Copperbelt area the major mines - Nkana, Roan Antelope, Nchanga, 
Mufulira, Chambishi and even Bancroft itself were already known. 
Dr. Bancroft, therefore, cannot be hailed as a discoverer of new 
mines; his fame rests upon two things - his genius for disclosing 
the potential of the already known deposits and his new scheme of 
"systematic" prospecting. Even in this latter field he cannot 
claim to be the introducer of scientific techniques into 
Northern Rhodesia. From 1925 to 1927 electrical prospecting78 
was attempted - without particularly impressive results on the 
Copperbelt. In 1926 also, another intriguing technique had been 
tried - 
"An important feature of this year's programme is the 
carrying out of an aerial survey of the concession. This is, 
I believe, the first occasion on which aerial photography has 
been applied to mineral prospecting, but from the results obtained 
by the aircraft company in Burma where they carried out a forest 
survey, there is every reason to believe that very valuable 
information regarding the potentialities of the company's 
78. See Appendix II and photographs no's. 3,4,5 and 8. 
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"property will thus be obtained. "79 However Oppenheimer proved to 
be wrong in this instance, the experiment being an expensive failure, 
partly through the heavy expense of constructing and maintaining the 
necessary chains of emergency landing fields in a region where 
termite hills can appear overnight, and partly because the 
continual dry- season haze of dust and smoke from bush fires very 
effectively obscured the view of both aircrews and cameras. 
Nevertheless, operating from the main bases at Nchanga and 
Lunsemfwa, 12,000 square miles were photographed and another 3,000 
square miles visually surveyed between May and December 1927, when 
the venture came to an end.8O 
Bancroft's technique, depending on field parties operating on 
foot, was far more empirical than these, yet vastly more effective. 
It will be recalled that the old system as applied under Raymond 
Brooks from 1923 envisaged prospectors finding outcrops under 
native guidance or through routine testing for mineralisation in 
such likely places as streams. The prospectors were looking 
specifically for mines without having any preconceived notions as 
to where or how they might be found. Normal practice, after 
discovering a hopeful area was either to trench across the 
suspected line of the orebody, if the soil cover was sufficiently 
79. Sir E. Oppenheimer: Anglo- American Corporation Chairman's 
Annual Report 1926. 
80. See G.L. Walker: "Surveying from the air in Central Africa" 
Engineering & Mining Journal, New York, January 1929. 
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thin to permit this, or to sink "prospect pits" at regular 
intervals similarly. Both methods served to show the 
possibilities of ore being below ground without outcrops being 
visible and also proved a rough indication of the scale of visible 
outcrops. The prospect pits were shafts, circular for strength, 
approximately 234 feet in diameter and some 60 to 70 feet deep. 
At the top a primitive form of windlass, constructed from rough- 
hewn timber felled on the spot, served to hoist the bucket filled 
by the African labourer at the bottom of the shaft. Samples of 
rock were taken from the bottom and also at regular intervals 
from the side of the shaft by the geologist, for immediate 
analysis. 
Bancroft's scheme was an enlargement and improvement upon 
these existing techniques. The object now was to search for any 
formations that might conceivably contain mines and then 
interpret them to decide whether or not they were worthy of a 
full investigation. The plan therefore involved virtually the 
mapping and cataloguing of outcrops within the entire concession 
areas. For this the district was divided into predetermined 
surveyed areas, for example ABCD (Fig. I) 
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The geologist "G" travelled along a set track as indicated, 
measuring distances with a cyclometer. On both sides he was 
flanked by native "outriders" (XX) so spaced that the entire area 
was covered. These'butriders" were trained to detect ore -bearing 
outcrops which would be accurately pinpointed on the surveyed 
plan. 
Notwithstanding the skill and care of the prospector, the 
above methods could indicate nothing more than likely fields for 
more intensive investigation. This investigation could be carried 
out only by means of deep drilling, both to delimit the actual area 
of the orebody and also to provide regular samples to determine 
its precise value and potentiality as an economic proposition. 
Not every prospector could afford the expense of the cumbersome 
steam- driven drills then in use,81 with the inevitable result that 
much that might have deserved immediate investigation had to be 
shelved until more economically sound syndicates or individuals 
could undertake the necessary drilling and core -sampling. It 
becomes apparent, therefore, that prospecting is not merely a 
matter of chance. Although the discovery of an individual vein 
may be so, the actual determination of ultimate values involves 
skill, persistence and considerable expenditure. These were 
the assets which Beatty, Parker and Gray on one hand and 
Oppenheimer and Bancroft on the other provided for the emergent 
81. See photographs no's. 6 and 9. 
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Copperbelt. 
The immediate task facing Dr. Bancroft when he arrived on the 
Copperbelt was to make an assessment of the Nkana claims themselves. 
The main development work, which had been to determine the possible 
extension of the Nkana North Orebody, consisted of prospect shafts 
sited every 400 feet along the strike and sunk to the groundwater 
level at approximately 100 feet, from which drives and cross -cuts 
were extended into the ore. As a result, an additional length of 
2,400 feet with a mean true width of 30 feet and an average assay 
of 5.7% of copper oxides was revealed. By the end of December 
1926 the estimated tonnage of ore was 1,409,000 tons averaging 
4.6% copper.82 
This was the situation when Bancroft arrived in April 1927. 
Bearing in mind that Brooks and Parker had already drilled into 
sulphide ore at depth,83 Bancroft came to the conclusion not only 
that there might be considerable replacement of oxides by sulphides 
at depth, but that the general dip of the orebody to the west might 
indicate a synclinal formation. He therefore instigated an 
intensive search for outcrops, by means of parallel traverses, 
to the west of the Nkana outcrops, a search which brought to light 
not only the western end of the Nkana syncline but also some copper 
staining in the Mindola Stream, which in turn led to the discovery 
82, Figures quoted at the Annual General Meeting of the Bwana 
Mkubwa Copper Mining Co. Ltd. 1926. Report in R.S.T. Archives. 
83. See above p.56 and p.68. 
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of the Mindola Orebody. This was the beginning of Bancroft's 
scheme of systematic traversing which contributed in no small 
measure to his fame in Copperbelt mining circles. 
By the end of 1927 the mine plus its extensions covered an 
area of 62)6 square miles, and during the following year, the ore 
reserves had been increased to 24,106,000 tons averaging 4.2% 
copper. 
Meantime, a major, three- compartment shaft, known as "A" 
Shaft, was being sunk into the Foot -Wall beds, from which it was 
proposed to extend cross -cuts, at the 300 foot and 450 foot levels 
to obtain bulk samples of the ore. A temporary township began to 
appear, including workshops, a power plant, offices, houses and a 
hospital. These Kimberley brick and thatch buildings replaced the 
tents in which Horner, Brooks, Tucker and the others had lived. 
The drilling programme on the North Orebody continued in 
spite of the difficulties of poor equipment and shortage of casing 
for the holes. The first hole, some 450 feet west of "A" Shaft, 
penetrated a width of 21.5 feet of oke averaging 5.82% copper, 
mainly as sulphide. The second hole, a further 400 feet to the 
west, passed through 16 feet averaging 5.01% copper, and the third 
encountered 38 feet averaging 4.52 %. The programme was now 
considerably intensified in view of these early successes. On 
16th. June 1930 the Consulting' Engineers were able to report81 
that the reserves then totalled 70,000,000 tons averaging 4% 
84. R.S.T. Archives: memo 12. 
- 84 - 
copper, and were concentrated in three major orebodies, the Nkana 
South Orebody, 6,500 feet long with an average width of 20.5 
feet, the Nkana North Orebody, 7,900 feet by 27.5 feet and the 
Mindola Orebody, 4.2. miles long and 15.5 feet wide. By the 
time that drilling operations were suspended early in 1931 a total 
of 41 holes had been drilled and 22,500 feet of ore had been 
developed. The reserves then totalled 127,000,000 tons 
averaging 4.0% copper.85 
The preparation of Nkana for the production stage coincided 
with the similar activity then taking place at the Roan 
Antelope. The initial output was to be 5,000 tons of ore per 
day, for which almost all the surface equipment - ore bins, 
crusher plant, power plant and so on - was ready early in 1931, 
and the first unit of the concentrator by the end of the year. 
The famous landmark of the 300 feet steel smelter stack was 
erected at the same time, the smelter itself being completed 
in March, 1932. Preparations were also being made to extract 
cobalt from the ore, production beginning in 1933. The railway 
had already arrived in May 1930. 
Nkana, similarly to the other Copperbelt properties, was 
handicapped by the financial depression which coincided with the 
start of production. Output was severely curtailed and the 
staff drastically reduced. Although a little more shaft 
85. Bancroft, J.A. op.cit. p. 158. 
- 85 - 
sinking was done, the total production during the three years 
from June 1932 to June 1935 was only just over 5,750,000 tons 
of ore which yielded 186,000 tons of copper selling at about 
£30: 5: 0 per long ton. The situation eased, however, from 
this year when the new electrolytic refinery at Nkana came 
into operation, thereby obviating the expense of sending ore 
to the United States for treatment by the American Metal Company. 
Dr. Bancroft's activities ranged throughout the promising 
areas of Northern Rhodesia and were by no means confined to the 
Nkana area. Thus in 1928, two of his prospectors carrying out 
his "systematic" prospecting scheme "re- discovered" the 
Konkola deposits.86 The two men, T.V. Wilson and A.H. Douw,87 
recognised the possibility of copper existing in the Konkola 
area, where the strata outcrop in an elliptical ring, some ten 
by five miles in extent, enclosing a dome -like structure of 
older rocks. The international boundary between Northern 
Rhodesia and the Congo Republic runs along the long axis of 
the ellipse, thus separating Konkola itself from Musoshi in 
Katanga. Douw and Wilson also rediscovered Kirila Bomwe to 
the south -east. Kirila Bomwe, which lies on the northern 
86. See above p.60. 
87. Mr. Douw was in 1962 a consultant geologist resident in 
Bulawayo. I am indebted to him for much of my detail 
on early work *t Bancroft. 
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extension of the Nchanga shales, was recognised as being part of 
the Lower Bwana Mkubwa Series of rock formations in which the 
main copper -bearing deposits were found. In addition to these 
finds, an anti -clinal structure was located some four and a 
quarter miles distant from the Konkola Dome and copper shales 
were discovered at Kakosa,88 some miles north of Nchanga on the 
bank of the Kafue. These results were obtained by the 
systematic traversing and plotting methods introduced by Dr. 
Bancroft, in whose honour the new mine was subsequently named. 
Keen interest and excitement were aroused and an intensive 
programme of exploration and verification was instituted at 
both Konkola and Kirila Bomwe. 
The investigations, which were carried out by means of 
prospecting pits, began early in 1929. At about the same 
time, a number of widely spread diamond -drill holes, RLE 
(River Lode Extension) No's 1 to 8, were put down at intervals 
from Nchanga to Kirila Bomwe. Some of the most senior men 
available, including Brooks himself, W. Burns, D. Gilchrist, 
E.G. Bishop and D.H. Ellis, personally supervised these 
drilling operations. Their immediate hopes were doomed to 
disappointment; only fractional copper values were found and 
with the financial stringencies occasioned by the depression 
88. Kakosa is the site of a well -known pioneer farm which was 
-sold in 1963 to Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. by 
its owner, the late Mr. Percy Quinsee. 
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work was suspended altogether. This was most unfortunate, 
for one of the two holes which were stopped before reaching 
maximum depth was immediately over the rich Kirila Bomwe South 
Orebody which it failed to intersect by only a few feet. This 
orebody remained unknown until 1939. 
FURTHER ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS - AMALGAMATION 
It is abundantly clear from the remarks of Sir Dougal 
Malcolm (see pp.5O /51above) that Northern Rhodesia was not 
envisaged as being a suitable area for the operations of the 
independent prospector or miner, and indeed this would seem to 
be eminently reasonable. The small worker has never been able 
to undertake any but the most elementary mining processes, which 
generally preclude the deep, sub -aquatic excavating necessary on 
the Copperbelt; he was unlikely to be able to fihd the 
substantial capital required for transportation costs, shaft - 
sinking, pumping, labour and the miscellany of equipment and 
stores necessary before work could even commence; it was 
practically impossible for him to finance and operate the 
metallurgical processes required in the concentrating of the 
ore and extraction of the metal - a vastly more complicated 
business than in gold mining; he would not normally possess the 
expert technical knowledge necessary to minimise the physical 
and eoonomic risk; and he had no access to the capital markets 
in Johannesburg, London and New York. Although some 
individuals possessed a selection of the necessary requirements, 
even the wealthiest, such as Rhodes himself, found it essential 
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to operate some kind of joint -stock enterprise. The assistance 
of investors was a prerequisite to the successful exploitation of 
any substantial quantity of Northern Rhodesian copper.89 
In certain circumstances, where risk appears small and the 
chance of gain substantial, it is possible for individuals to 
create separate mining companies, retaining a controlling 
interest for themselves and using the proceeds of the remaining 
shares as working capital, but in the normal conditions of 
prospecting and exploitation, the risk of investment in a single 
property may seem far too great to entice the cautious investor. 
It is, therefore, obviously more desirable to spread the risk of 
a property failing by creating companies which would hold interests 
in several. Not only does this technique reduce the possibility 
of loss, but at the same time it greatly enhances the chances of 
securing ultimate financial control of all, and this at the 
minimum level of capital investment. 
Such a system is also in the interests of the individual 
companies because of the administrative convenience of operating 
from a single centre and because of the savings possible through 
the centralisation of finance, sales, technical assistance and 
common necessities such as stores. Sir Ernest Oppenheimer 
89. It is worth noting in this connection that although the 
initial capital of Rhodesian Anglo American in December 
1928 was £2,500,000 it had proved necessary to increase 
this progressively to C6,500,000 by January 1931. 
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has himself publicly summed it up :90 
"The advantages of the system are manifold but I will mention 
a few of the more outstanding features: 
The financing of the individual companies is facilitated. 
The parent company acts as a link between the various operating 
companies, and promotes co- operation in matters of common 
interest. 
The services of a staff of highly skilled experts in all 
departments of mining and metallurgy are constantly available 
to the individual companies. 
Administration is standardised, in itself a matter of premier 
importance in all secretarial and accounting work. 
The stores and other requirements of the mines are bought to 
the best advantage and at a minimum cost for the service. 
Where, as is the case on the Rand, there are many companies whose 
properties adjoin or are adjacent to each other, all engaged in the 
same class of work, the existence of a central organisation for the 
supply of expert advice and information on matters which must in 
the nature of things be of common interest, is clearly of 
incalculable value. It certainly ensures to the individual 
companies great economies compared with the cost which would have 
to be faced if each company were called upon to maintain a separate 
and complete staff." 
90. Presidential address to the Third (Triennial) Empire Mining 
and Metallurgical Congress, South Africa 1930. 
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It is clear that the situation described relative to the Rand 
in the above paragraph applies with equal force to the Northern 
Rhodesian Copperbelt. Nevertheless, it is possible to over - 
centralise with the result that maximum local advantage is 
sometimes lost. There is sometimes, therefore,a case for 
decentralisation to the extent of forming a sub -group to handle 
the affairs of a particular region. Such a situation arose in 
Northern Rhodesia, operations in which formed only a minor part 
of the interests of both Selection Trust and the Anglo- American 
Corporation. The initiative, though, came not from Oppenheimer 
but from Chester Beatty. 
On 22nd May 1928 Beatty registered his Rhodesian Selection 
Trust with an initial issued capital of £500,000. The purpose 
of the new company was to develop the work of Mineralised 
Venture from which it took over the exclusive rights in the 
Nkana Concession, including the Mufulira properties. Selection 
Trust had now divested itself of its direct interests on the 
Copperbelt to Rhodesian Selection Trust and Roan Antelope Copper 
Mines Limited, whilst continuing to dominate both through share 
holdings. And, as it proved impossible to undertake the full 
requirements of the British South Africa Company concerning the 
surveying and pegging of the entire area, this latter company 
issued twenty -one Special Grants to the Rhodesian Selection Trust 
in exchange for an interest in any resulting mines. In 
consequence, the Chartered Company holds a minor interest in 
Mufulira and the other developments within the Nkana Concession 
Area. 
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This was not all. A further complication arose from the fact 
that the Anglo- American Corporation, a 71/6 shareholder in 
Mineralised Venture, thereby held a 10% interest in Rhodesian 
Selection Trust. There was, therefore, already considerable 
interlocking of the interests of the major groups.91 
When Beatty formed his Rhodesian Selection Trust, the Anglo- 
American Corporation, with its interests in Broken Hill, the 
Amalgamated Concession Companies, Bwana Mkubwa, ) changa, the 
Roan Antelope and various ventures in Southern Rhodesia,was fully 
as deeply involved in Copperbelt affairs as the Beatty group. 
With the need for co- ordination and the obvious future demands 
for ever -increasing capital, the amalgamation of the rival group 
merely crystallised the need for Oppenheimer to institute some 
similar proceedings. But, unlike the Rhodesian Selection Trust, 
Oppenheimer was determined that his further ventures in Northern 
Rhodesia should be under British control and dominated by British 
capital. Thus the new Company was registered in London on 8th. 
December 1928 with a chairman and deputy to be appointed by the 
Anglo- American Corporation,92 and American participation - in 
91. For a detailed chart see the "Economist" dd. 12th May 1934 
and for the modern situation (1963) see diagrams XI and 
XII (endpapers) 
92. They were Sir Ernest Oppenheimer and Sir Edmund Davis 
respectively. Other board members were S.B. Joel; 
representing the Barnato interests (the Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment Co.), Sir Drummond Chaplin and 
Sir Henry Birchenough of the British South Africa Company, 
F. Searls Jnr. for the Newmont Corporation, L. Pollack, 
C. Davis and later, S.S. Taylor. 
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practice the Newmont Mining Corporation - restricted to a 
minority role. Oppenheimer's position was clearly stated in a 
letter from H.B. Hagart to C.B. Kingston -93 
"Sir Ernest has asked me to mention to you that he would be 
glad if you would take the first suitable opportunity of giving 
the Governor an outline of the position of the new company. As 
you are aware, from the very outset of development in Northern 
Rhodesia, a great point has been made of the fact that there was 
being developed a big and practically the only copper -field in 
the British Empire, and the political importance of this fact has 
been emphasised on several occasions. This being so, we feel 
that this great national asset is passing into foreign hands. 
From the figures - -- -you will see that the capital94 of the new 
company is being provided almost entirely by British interests, 
the only American interest involved being the Newmont Company, 
whose co- operation it was desired to obtain as it was felt 
essential that we should have on the technical side some large 
American copper group interested.95 You will be able to assure 
the Governor, therefore, that the Rhodesian Anglo- American Ltd. 
is a British company with almost entirely British capital and that 
we have not overlooked the importance of the political aspect in 
93. Quoted in Gregory: op.cit. pp.415 -16. 
94. £2,500,000 initially. 
95. In fact an American, H.S. Munroe, became consulting engineer. 
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"this respect. Incidentally, I might mention that the Bwana 
Mkubwa Copper Mining Company has recently had several 
extraordinarily attractive offers made to it in connexion with 
N'Kana and the N'Kana Concession by large American copper 
groups96 and these have been unhesitatingly turned down on the 
ground that, apart from other reasons, the board is anxious that 
the vast potentialities of N'Kana should be developed by British 
capital. I might also mention that when the company was first 
under oonsideration we investigated fully the question of 
registering it in the first place in Northern Rhodesia, but for 
various reasons it was decided that the registration should be 
effected in London, and I am sure the Governor will appreciate 
our attitude in this respect." 
Although Oppenheimer could not have been aware of the full 
facts at this time, the Americans were already seriously 
investigating the prospects in Northern Rhodesia. Already they 
largely controlled the Rhodesian Selection Trust, of whose 
directors six out of nine were Americans. Oppenheimer's 
natural fear was that if the Americans controlled the Copperbelt, 
96. Possibly the American Metal Company which had concluded a 
ten year sales agreement through its British Associate, the 
Anglo -Metal Company with the Bwana Mkubwa company in 1925. 
The latter was offered 01,000,000 for a 4/5 interest in the 
Bwana Mkubwa holdings in Nkana i.e. 4/15 of the total. 
The bidder therefore valued Nkana at £3,750,000. See 
Rosenthal, A.J. & Co: "Report on the Copper District of 
Northern Rhodesia, Africa ". dd. 18th February, 1929 p. 31. 
This is an unpublished report prepared for the above by 
Rogers, Mayer and Bell, New York. In R.S.T. Archives. 
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being already a major force in the world of copper outside it, 
their manipulations of production markets in their own general 
interest might well act unfavourably on the specific interests of 
the Copperbelt itself. And the Americans were possibly already 
taking their future domination of the Copperbelt for granted. 
"In the matter of labor, the English feel their experience 
in the African gold and diamond fields will stand them in good 
stead in the Rhodesian copper fields, but the American group in 
London has the view that, inasmuch as there has always been talk 
of shortage of labor in the South African gold country as well as 
in the Katanga copper operations to the north, perhaps the 
shortage may be due to a policy of living conditions which the 
Americans can and will improve in Rhodesia. Though native 
labor is cheap as to daily remuneration, the Americans do not 
look on it as low labor cost, in reality, and base their copper 
cost estimates on the American standard of unit prices."97 In 
fact this report considerably over- simplified the position. It 
is true that there was a shortage of labour in both Katanga and 
the Copperbelt, these areas being relatively unpopulated in the 
first instance,98 but this was further aggravated, as far as 
Northern Rhodesia was concerned, by recruiting for the Katanga 
97. Rosenthal Report op.cit. p.2. My own emphasis. For 
particulars of wages at the Roan Antelope in 1929 see 
Table I (endpapers). 
98. In 1933 Merle Davis quotes a figure of 2.2. persons per 
square mile for the Ndola district. J. Merle Davis (ed.): 
"Modern Industry and the African ". Macmillan, London 
1933 p.33. 
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mines from within Northern Rhodesia itself. Thus in 1921, when 
the Copperbelt was only really beginning to develop, Northern 
Rhodesia supplied about 56% of the Union Miniére labour force. 
Yet by 1931 this figure had fallen to a nominal 0.7 %.99 It is 
clear, therefore, that as the demand for native labour increased 
within the territory, so the Northern Rhodesian African preferred 
to remain within his own country. Even so, the manpower resources 
were strained to the limit. Merle Davis considered that as many 
as 60% of the able- bodied Bemba men aged from 15 to 45 were away 
from their villages in 1931, most of them on the mines.100 The 
figures quoted above- indicate that most of these must have been 
employed on the Copperbelt, in spite of the fact that the death- 
rate on the Copperbelt was appreciably higher than in Katanga101 
and living conditions less attractive under a system of temporary 
labour as opposed to the permanent conditions offered under 
Belgian auspices. Such was the demand for work on the mines that 
from October, 1931 it was no longer necessary to recruit labour, as 
sufficient numbers were presenting themselves in person for 
employment. 
99. Ibid p. 159. 
100. Ibid p. 57. 
101. In 1931 the deaths on the Northern Rhodesian mines were 
25.03 per 1,000 native employees as opposed to 8.01 per 
1,000 in Katanga. Casualties reached as high as 39 per 
1,000 at Nkana (ibid p.66). NB. These figures are not for 
accidents alone but include loss from disease and other 
causes attributable to poor living conditions. These 
rapidly improved as the pioneering era was left behind. 
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On the other hand during this period of economic depression and 
retrenchment far fewer men were being engaged than previously. 
Nor was the economic situation in terms of labour costs as 
straightforward as the Americans purported it to be. The Merle 
Davis Commission who were actively investigating social conditions 
on the Copperbelt in the early 1930's pointed out102that there was 
no accurate measurement of local purchasing power; yet it was clear 
that expenditure on welfare, medical attention, food and housing 
already greatly exceeded the actual cash remuneration of the 
African employees, itself approximately double that offered by 
the missions. Much of the necessary expenditure by the Northern 
Rhodesia copper companies on their employees was not paralleled by 
operations outside of Africa; thus a comparison of actual cash 
incomes at once becomes invalid. 
The first two years, 1929 and 1930, of the new Rhodesian 
Anglo- American company inaugurated the years of depression which 
were to close all the Copperbelt mines except the Roan Antelope 
and Nkana. Amalgamation seemed the obvious means of increasing 
both capital and status to the level necessary successfully to 
weather the storm. Oppenheimer had long envisaged this on a grand 
scale with the amalgamation of the interests of the two major 
groups Rhodesian Anglo- American and Rhodesian Selection Trust - 
into one enormous combine which could more readily resist the 
Markers 
potential domination of the world copperAby American interests 
102. Merle Davis: op.cit p.170. 
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and at the same time preserve Northern Rhodesia as a predominantly 
British sphere which could not be submerged or neglected through 
American self -interest. Although Oppenheimer's idea seems grandiose 
and unrealistic, for neither Copperbelt group would voluntarily take 
second place to the other, and it was unlikely that they would put 
themselves under the control of a third party, such as the British 
South Africa Company as Oppenheimer later suggested,103 nevertheless 
Oppenheimer's fears about American ousting of Imperial interests in 
the Copperbelt were certainly not without foundation. Two 
significant points had already been seen, even before the slump, 
the first of which occurred in 1928 when the Rhodesian Selection 
Trust proposed to sell most of its Bwana Mkubwa holdings to the 
American Metal Company. Anglo- American, also a major shareholder, 
were so antagonistic to the scheme for "imperial and financial 
reasons" that rather than agree to it the Corporation was prepared 
to abandon its Rhodesian operations altogether. The negotiations 
were therefore dropped.104 
Much more serious was the conflict over the financing of 
Nchanga, in which Rhodesian Anglo- American held an interest. On 
103. Letter to S.S. Taylor dd. 5th August 1938. Quoted in 
Gregory op.cit. pp. 442 -6. Indeed Oppenheimer himself 
later realised this. See below p.103 
104. For details of these negotiations see Gregory, ibid pp. 
412 -15. One of the most important consequences was a 
break -off of discussions between Anglo-American and the 
American Metal Company and the opening of new negotiations 
regarding Rhodesian Anglo- American with the Newmont 
Company which was already a large shareholder in Anglo- 
American. 
- 98 - 
28th January 1929 the Nchanga shareholders received a circular 
letter containing proposals for obtaining finance from the American 
Smelting and Refining Company on terms which would have given that 
company control of Nchanga, including the major deposits of Nchanga 
West which were to be handed over to Nchanga by Rhodesian Congo 
Border Concession Ltd. The result of this would have been 
American majority control of the entire Copperbelt as they were 
already strong in Rhodesian Selection Trust. In fact, the only 
company to remain clearly under British control would be Bwana 
Mkubwa. 
An outcry followed, which was commented on significantly by 
the authors of the Rosenthal Report, but before the final decision 
had been reached -105 
"While this report is being written the (Nchanga) company 
has suddenly come into public notice, due to a surprise 
announcement that an option on Nchanga shares was given to the 
American Smelting and Refining Company subject, however, to the 
approval of the shareholders at a meeting to be held on February 
7th.(1929). Immediately the following comment appeared, being 
abstract from the 'Financial Times' of London: 
'By what can only be considered a clever coup, the famous 
American Smelting and Refining Company has secured, provisionally, 
the technical control and the reversion of the financial control 
105. Rosenthal Report: op.cit. p.7. 
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'for immediate payment of under 0210,000 (118,750 shares at 35/- 
each against a current market price of well over £4.) For this 
miserably inadequate "mess of pottage" they would have the right 
eventually to increase their holdings to 1,375,000 Cl shares out 
of a total of 03,000,000. 
'What are our Kaffir houses doing to let the A.S. & R. get a 
throttle -hold on one of the best of the coming Rhodesian copper 
producers on such easy terms. Only the Anglo- American Corporation 
of South Africa, and to a lesser degree the Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment Company, appear to have as yet shown 
anything like the same vision. Is it too late for one of the 
others to make a better bid than the Guggenheims have put forward ?' 
"The foregoing is quoted to give evidence of the change of heart on 
the part of the English in connection with the Rhodesian copper 
situation, in that they how realise that they have in large 
measure parted with property which, from a national standpoint, 
they ought to have retained." 
However, this conclusion was premature. A counter -offer 
came from the Oppenheimer group which resulted in the withdrawal 
of the American offer. After some months of disuussion, 
financial support for Rhodesian Congo Border Concession and 
Nchanga came from the British South Africa Company, the British 
Metal Corporation, the Johannesburg Consolidated Investment 
Company, Minerals Separation Limited, Rhodesian Anglo- America, 
N.M. Rothschild and Sons, the Union Corporation, the Anglo -Metal 
Company and Rio Tinto, which thus entered Northern Rhodesian 
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mining enterprise for the first time. (It is interesting to note 
in connection with this company, which was closely connected with 
the banking house of Rothschilds, that the chairman in 1929 was 
Sir Auckland Geddes, who had formerly been the principal of McGill 
University. As Dr. Bancroft had himself been a professor at 
McGill, there exists at least the possibility that Geddes was 
influenced to some degree from this source. It should also be 
noted that as Oppenheimer had recently invested 1,000,000 in 
Nkana106 he now had an interest in every major venture on the 
Copperbelt.) 
In terms of the agreement finally arrived at, Rhodesian Congo 
Border Concession shareholders were to be offered approximately 
300,000 shares at £5, these being guaranteed by the concerns 
involved. From the proceeds, R.C.B.C. was to subscribe for 
100,000 Nchanga shares at £3, with a further 200,000 being 
offered to the Nchanga shareholders at the share price. The 
Nchanga shares were to be guaranteed by R.C.B.C. In consequence 
of this influx of capital, the Nchanga Company could proceed to 
develop and equip its own property and the Rhodesian Congo Border 
Concession Company could conclude the intensive prospecting of its 
concession area. Chester Beatty supported Oppenheimer in the 
negotiations, which also resulted in the shedding by Rhodesian 
Anglo- American of its shareholding in Rhodesian Selection Trust 
(but not the holdings in the operating companies, where Rhodesian 
106. See above p.77/78. 
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Anglo- American representations on the boards was still desired.) 
The increasing interest in Northern Rhodesia shown by the 
American copper concerns, together with the worsening economic 
depression caused Oppenheimer to give serious thought to the 
question of further amalgamation within his own interests. 
Already he was a substantial shareholder in the Bwana Mkubwa 
company; and in May 1931 he proposed to increase the Rhodesian 
Anglo- American shareholding in Rhodesian Congo Border Concession 
Ltd.from 169,000 to 200,000 as a means of redressing the imbalance 
between his holdings and those of Rio Tinto. Further, in view 
of his amalgamation schemes, substantial increases in Rhodesian 
Anglo- American capital were authorised. Discussions on 
amalgamating Nchanga and Rhodesian Congo Border Concession Ltd. 
(which owned the Nchanga West area) took place throughout 1930 
without any immediate developments. But by the end of the year 
it was clear that an even greater amalgamation was desirable. 
It will be recalled that although the Bwana Mkubwa Mine itself 
had proved disappointing, the Bwana Mkubwa Company still enjoyed 
rights over the proven Nkana Mine and over one -third of the Nkana 
Concession. The discussions therefore began to centre around the 
possible amalgamation of all three companies. Oppenheimer 
wholeheartedly supported the move on the grounds that it would 
greatly help the financing of technical developments, would 
render borrowing easier in view of the greater security 
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available107 and would place the company "in the same class as 
such groups as Kennecott /Utah, Anaconda, Phelps Dodge /Calumet and 
Arizona and Union iVini4re. "108 Oppenheimer based this conclusion 
on his own calculation that by about 1935 the combined annual 
production of R.C.B.C., Nchanga and Nkana would amount to 
approximately 195,000 short tons, or roughly 10 per cent of the 
world production in 1929. Not only would these economic 
considerations be greatly assisted by amalgamation, but 
Oppenheimer's fears of Government intervention would also be 
substantially allayed.109 
"The formation of one large company would greatly strengthen 
the position vis -á -vis legislation and the Government authorities 
generally. There is a tendency among governments today to intrude 
themselves into the affairs of private enterprises and invariably 
when they do so it is with disastrous results. This disposition 
is probably most accentuated in regard to mining. In the nature 
of things, for profitable operation, mining has to be conducted 
today on a very large scale, which, for financial reasons, leads 
to the creation of powerful groups and combines. This naturally 
tends to place the control of large sections of the mineral wealth 
of a country in a few hands. On the other hand it is a popular 
107. It had already been estimated that an expenditure of at 
least 05,000,000 and a delay of four years would be 
necessary before there would be any return on investments 
in any of the Copperbelt properties. (Memo No. 13 p.8. 
R.S.T. Archives.) 
108. Letter from Oppenheimer to Sir Auckland Geddes read at the 
8th A.G.M. of R.C.B.C. Ltd. 17th December 1930. 
109. Letter: Oppenheimer to Geddes, ibid. 
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"argument in these democratic days that the mineral wealth should 
be the property of the nation. In their efforts to reconcile the 
irreconcilable, governments incline to exercise control over 
mining operations. This tendency to interferefinds fruitful 
soil in dissensions among rival mining enterprises, because it 
provides the government with an excuse to intervene ostensibly 
with the object of settling those differences but really with the 
aim of controlling the industry. It is improbable that any basis 
could be found for merging all the enterprises in Northern Rhodesia 
because the interests are too divérgent. As between Bwana and 
R.C.B.C. -Nchanga, however, there is much common ground. The 
value of a united front as presented by these companies, as 
opposed to individual action and divided council in negotiations 
with the Government, cannot be over -estimated." In the event, 
there was little that the Government could do when faced with the 
enormous financial combines which arose and without which the 
Copperbelt could hot have been developed at all. In fact, the 
Government has largely failed to carry out even its legitimate 
functions on the Copperbelt with the result that health, 
education, housing and indeed all aspects of welfare, particularly 
of African employees and their families have been attended to by 
the companies themselves.110 
110. The present African Government of Dr. Kaunda continues to 
insist that it will never nationalise the copper mines - but 
it has already cancelled the B.S.A. Company's royalty 
agreement 
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The need for finance was rather more obvious, for Rhodesian 
Anglo- American interests were already straining its resources. 
By August 1930, the Company held a 54 per cent interest in the 
Bwana Mkubwa company and (as this latter owned approximately a 
30% interest in all the Rhodesian Selection Trust properties in 
the Nkana area) a substantial minority share in the Chester 
Beatty interests. It held the first option for the purchase of 
the British South Africa Company's holdings in the Nkana grants 
and was in any case the largest single share -holder in the B.S.A. 
Company. It was the largest shareholder in Rhodesian Congo 
Border Concession Ltd., controlled the various concession 
companies, and acted as consulting engineers to all of them. 
The estimates for developing these interests to the 
production stage were enormous111 for Nkana and 
up to £5,000,000 for Nchanga where the mixed sulphide and oxide 
ores might require the erection of an expensive electrolytic 
refinery. Given an amalgamation of the two, the first to 
commence operations (Nkana) would be able to subsidise and act 
as security for the latter until it too became self -supporting. 
111. Figures provided by Oppenheimer: Letter to Geddes, op.cit. 
NB. As late as 1962 the entire revenue of Northern 
Rhodesia including copper was only 017,000,000 (quoted 
in the context of education in the "Northern News" 21st 
Feb. 1962.) Obviously the Government in the 1930's 
could not even begin to compete with the private 
enterprise involved. 
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There was, of course, no doubt that the proposed 
amalgamation would inevitably become an accomplished fact, for 
Rhodesian Anglo- American controlled the Bwana Mkubwa company and 
also, along with Rio Tinto, predominated in R.C.B.C.- Nchanga. 
Nevertheless there was some initial dispute both from the American 
interests and the representative of the British "Union Corporation ". 
The points on which the two directors, R.E. McConnell and Sir 
Henry Strakosch, opposed the scheme were quite straightforward: 
they were not satisfied with the claims made on behalf of the 
Nchanga mine by the experts on the spot (who included Dr. Bancroft 
and who were, of course, absolutely correct in their optimistic 
prognostications): and secondly, at a time when R.C.B.C. and 
Nchanga did not need immediate finance, they objected to having to 
channel capital through these companies to bolster the Bwana 
Mkubwa company. As anticipated the objectors were outvoted and 
the merger took place, with Rhodesian Congo Border Concession Ltd. 
increasing its capital from £750,000 to £2,000,000 and then buying 
out the other two companies. This was accomplished by the Bwana 
Mkubwa shareholders selling their assets to Rhodesian Congo 
Border Concession Ltd. for 550,000 Cl shares in R.C.B.C. 
The Nchanga company was then liquidated and taken over by R.C.B.C. 
for 126,000 shares in the latter. The new company now held all 
the above interests together with a one -third share in Mufulira. 
Finally the outside shareholders in the Bwana Mkubwa company 
exchanged their shares for Rhodesian Anglo- American at the rate 
of ten for three and the Bwana Mkubwa company then went into 
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voluntary liquidation in January 1935. The new company, with Sir 
Auckland Geddes of Rio Tinto as chairman and Oppenheimer and Edmund 
Davies as deputies, took the name of Rhokana Corporation Limited.112 
Rhodesian Anglo- American now withdrew from its role of consulting 
engineers to the various concession companies in favour of Rhokana 
Corporation, to which company it transferred its consulting and 
mechanical engineering staff, the geologists going to the British 
South Africa Company. 
This manoeuvre alone oould not save the copper industry from 
the effects of the slump, which itself had not occurred by chance. 
It was, in fact, a direct reaction to a scheme designed to prevent 
such an occurrence ever taking place. In spite of the fears of 
many experts, the end of the 1914 -18 War had not brought with it 
a major depression in the copper industry (although there was a 
minor one - see p.3/ above), for the ever -increasing demands of 
the electrical and automobile industries maintained an 
unprecedented consumption of the metal. , In October 1926 there 
was founded in the United States of America a combine known as 
"Copper Exporters Incorporated ", the purpose of which was to 
stabilise copper prices. All the main American groups, some of 
the main European concerns, Rio Tinto and the Union Miniéïe, 
totalling some 90% of the world's production, joined the combine. 
However its attempts to eliminate the price - fixing function of the 
London Metal Exchange by restricting supplies simply led to 
consumer resistance to the high prices demanded by the group, 
112. An amalgam of Rhodesia and Nkana. 
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which in turn stimulated the operations of low -cost producers such as 
Northern Rhodesia and Katanga, and, even worse from the Americans' 
point of view, led to experimentation in the use of other alloys to 
replace copper in industry. These factors caused stock piles to 
accumulate and ultimately, in late 1929, the collapse of the copper 
market, with the price slumping from 24 cents per pound in April 
1929 to only 6/4 cents per pound by November, 1931.113 It may 
therefore be seen that the development of the Northern Rhodesia 
properties in 1930 and 1931 was guided by a spirit of optimism for 
the future rather than in the hope of immediate gain. 
The only hope for the copper producers was to allow the 
natural law of demand and supply to operate in their favour by 
drastically reducing their output. A conference to consider this 
matter in November 1930 - before the Copperbelt mines had begun to 
operate - failed to bring about any reduction, but a second 
conference in August 1931, which included Northern Rhodesian 
representatives, resulted in a general agreement to limit 
production during the first three months of 1932 to 26rß% of the 
capacity of each mine. In April 1932 this was reduced to 20 %. 
The Northern Rhodesian companies, in view of this, decided to 
operate only from the Roan Antelope for the Rhodesian Selection 
Trust group and.from Nkana alone of the Rhodesian Anglo- American 
interests. Bwana Mkubwa had already closed down in February 1931. 
113. Figures quoted in L.H. Gann: "A History of Northern 
Rhodesia ". Chatto and Windus, London 1964 p. 251. 
- lo8 - 
The Anglo- American decision, which involved the closure of the 
recently flooded Nchanga - a much richer ore -body than ATkana - was 
taken not only because of the flood situation at Nchanga, but also 
in view of the lack of railway and treatment facilities there, and 
the difficulties involved in the actual extraction of the metal from 
the mixed oxide and sulphide ores at Nchang,a. Nevertheless, 
although the decision was eminently reasonable, it evoked great 
resentment on the part of the Nchanga Manager, G.C.R. Stewart, who 
remarked bitterly that the Rhokana quota could be produced entirely 
from the material extracted during the mere development of Nchanga 
West.114 
114. Personal information: N.M. Airey. Stewart's angry remark 
was not really valid. Figures quoted in Bancroft: op.cit. 
p.139 give the value of ore dumped at Nchanga during the 
development operations prior to the flood as - 
2,867 tons at 5.8% copper - 166.286 tons copper 
996 " " 26% ,t _ 258,96 " t, 
1,739 " " 9.39 tt - 161,727 " 
5,602 " ' ay.10.16% - 586,973 " " 
N.M. Airey who was employed at Nchanga at the time states 
(personal information) that each 8 ft. x 8 ft. drive was 
advanced by six 6' rounds on each day shift and similarly 
on each night shift and that this amount of progress 
permitted the removal per day of 384 tons of ore, which was 
the maximum hoisting capacity of No. 1 Shaft. In the light 
of the copper values quoted above this would realise approx. 
38 tons of copper per day, say 1,200 per month, which at the 
selling price of around 30 per ton would realise £36,000 
per month. During this period, Nkana was raising 30,000 
tons of ore per month at an average of 5.17% copper i.e. 
50 tons of copper per day, say 1,500 tons per month. This 
is considerably more than the Nchanga potential. Further, 
during the next three years, the Nkana production rose to 
around 6,000 tons per month, (although during the period of 
quota restrictions only 4,200 tons per month were marketed.) 
It is probable that if the flood problem at Nchanga had been 
immediately tackled and solved, the mine could have equalled 
the Nkana production, but with the necessity of having to 
rail the ore to Nkana for processing. In the light of the 
current economic depression it is highly improbable that the 
very high dewatering and capital development expenditure 
required for Nchanga would have been forthcoming. 
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Copper Exporters Incorporated collapsed in 1932 when many of 
the original signatories, including the Union MiniLre and the 
producers in Canada and Chile withdrew because the United States 
introduced a protectionist tariff of 4 cents per pound in favour 
of its own producers. Britain had also imposed a tariff of 2d per 
pound on all copper coming from outside the Empire as a result of 
the negotiations which took place at the Ottawa Conference. A 
further conference held in New York in December 1932 broke down 
over the request of the Roan Antelope for an increase in its quota, 
and in 1933 unrestricted competition returned. Although further 
quota agreements were made in 1934 and 1935, the failure of the 
Geneva disarmament talks obviated any further collapse during 
the 1930's, the position of the mining groups being consolidated 
by the outbreak of war in 1939. Table II on p.110 indicates 
these trends. The rise in prices was sufficient to permit 
Mufulira to re -open in 1933 and for the constitution of Nchanga 
as Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Limited to be a feasible 
proposition by 1936. This new company, formed with a capital of 
E5,000,000 in March 1937 was bigger in scope than the original 
Nchanga Company, in that it also included the Nchanga West and 
Chingola mining grant areas, the latter now being the site of the 
Chingola Open Pit. 
Meantime, Belgian prospectors had begun to investigate the 
north or Congo side of the Konkola Dome (see above p.85 ). In 
October 1935 they discovered an outcrop of copper ore on the 
slope of the Dome, and, on further investigation by drilling, an 
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TABLE II 
NORTHERN RHODESIAN AVERAGE PRICE 
COPPER PRODUCTION (LONG TON) 
(LONG TONS) 
1927 3,289 C59.5 
1928 5,930 67.1 
1929 5,465 83.5 
1930 6,269 59.8 
1931 8,764 37.4 
1932 67,887 25.6 
1933 103,516 32.4 
1934 137,897 38.8 
1935 143,501 40.2 
1936 142,333 43.6 
1937 208,172 60.7* 
1938 213,031 46.1 
1939 211,668 50.6 
1940 262,394 63.6 
1941 228,254 62.0+ 
* Re- armament. 
+ Official control price. 
orebody 37 feet wide, containing 3.17% of mainly sulphide copper, 
was found at a depth of approximately 150 feet. Twenty -four shot 
drill holes were put down during the next two years, by which time 
the Musoshi Orebody, 26,000 feet long, 25.5 feet wide and averaging 
2.6% copper had been discovered. 
The excitement of this find stimulated further activity on the 
Northern Rhodesian side of the Dome. In May 1936, the Field 
Manager, Dr. Brock, was able to report to Dr. Bancroft at Nkana 
that prospect pitting on the eastern side of the Konkola Dome had 
exposed a sub -outcrop of shales containing copper ore. In the 
following July diamond drilling began under the immediate 
supervision of J.J. Lambertsen.X15 Twenty -five holes were drilled 
at Konkola, followed by a further twenty -two in the Kirila Bomwe 
area, beginning in January 1939. One of these latter holes 
finally intersected the Kirila Bomwe South Orebody in December of 
that year. Lying 900 feet deep, it had a width of almost 32 feet 
and averaged 5.30% copper. Another well -mineralised orebody 
designated as Kirila Bomwe North. Orebody was also found before 
work was discontinued in December 1940 for the duration of the war. 
It was already clear that the area showed considerable promise, but 
insufficient was known to justify the opening of a new mine at this 
stage. Special Grants totalling 88 square miles were secured for 
further investigation. 
Unspectacular progress was also taking place throughout the 
115. Mr. Lambertsen has provided some of the data on the early 
exploratory work at Bancroft. 
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Nkana area during the same period. Mufulira began operations 
again in October 1933, a decision having already been taken to 
erect a smelter on the mine and increase production to 70,000 long 
tons of copper a year once all restrictions on production were 
removed. After this had taken place in October 1937, Mufulira 
steadily progressed to become the largest underground copper mine 
in the Commonwealth. 
On the Nkana Mine itself, until quota restrictions were lifted 
production was limited to little more than 4,000 tons per month. 
Development meantime took place at Mindola where the vertical 
shaft begun in 1933 reached a depth of 1,943 feet by mid -1936. 
The ore reserves were continually being increased by further 
exploratory work, reaching over 123,000,000 tons averaging 3.45% 
in 1937,116 and continuing to expand, in spite of continuous 
removal, up to the present time.117 As in the case of the other 
mines, the real impetus to production came with the outbreak of 
war in 1939. During the war years 251,789 short tons of 
blister copper were produced, along with a further 6,154 tons of 
cobalt. 
116. Annual Report for year ended 30th June 1937. 
117. The figures for 1961 (Annual Report 30th June 1961) were 
Nkana North - 24,328,000 short tons averaging 3.06% copper 
Nkana South - 14,913,000 short tons averaging 2.65% copper 
Mindola - 81,106,000 short tons averaging 3.15% copper 
TOTAL 120,347,000 It " rr 3.07% " 
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CHAPTER V 
THE EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF NCHANGA MINE 
The change in policy of the British South Africa Company and 
the formation of Rhodesian Congo Border Concession Ltd. have 
already been discussed in the previous chapter. With the approval 
of the local manager, Mr. Raymond Brooks, five young mining 
engineers were recruited in England along with six experienced 
mining prospectors. A sixth young engineer, James Beaton,118 who 
was actually studying land surveying at the time, was also engaged. 
In April 1923 a base was set up at Ndola, and from this 
headquarters, six teams, (including those operating for Copper 
Ventures Ltd.), each consisting of an engineer and a prospector 
were sent out to prospect in pre -defined areas.119 The fortunes 
of one of these teams, James Moir and Guy Bell, have already been 
described. (above pp.57 -9) 
Early in May 1923, Beaton and his companion Andrew Osterberg 
set out on foot north -westward to Elizabethville, their plan being 
to proceed up the north side of the Kafue River and return by the 
south. In view of the general trend of the Bwana.lubwa series 
of rocks which had already been surveyed, the logical continuation 
of the orebodies appeared to lie in this direction.120 The 
prospecting was of the simplest nature. The limited field of 
118. Lately Director of Public Works, Salisbury. 
119. I am indebted for much of this information to personal 
statements from Mr. Beaton himself. 
120. See geological map at end. 
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operations and continued travel along river banks meant that the 
only feasible possibilities were either the accidental discovery 
of an outcrop or the hope that some native en route might be able to 
supply the necessary guidance. To this end, Beaton and Osterberg 
carried with them a sample of malachite, which, they hoped, might 
be recognised by the Africans through whose villages they passed. 
Osterberg's equipment was of the simplest - merely a prospector's 
hammer and the chemicals necessary for the tests to determine 
characteristic mineral reactions.121 "It was," wrote Brooks,122 
"a system of search best suited to the conditions. Little 
specialised training was required for this type of prospecting, 
and so it is that Nchanga owes its first discovery, not to a 
professional prospector but to a man trgined as an architect. "1 3 
Their optimism was not shared by officialdom. Brooks 
himself requested help from the Governor in the making of roads 
in the area, to be met by the somewhat dampening response that he 
based no part of Northern Rhodesia's future development programme 
on the "doubtful possibility of finding mineral deposits of 
importance.rr124 In view of the rich copper deposits known to 
121. Information by J.J. Beaton. 
122. "How the Rhodesian Coppers Were Found" Engineering and 
Mining Journal, New York 1944. Reprinted in N.R. Journal 
1950 Vol. 1 No. 2. 
123. Brooks appears to have overlooked Osterberg and also 
Beaton's training in surveying in this unnecessarily 
disparaging comment. 
124. Brooks, op.cit. 
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exist in the neighbouring Haut Katanga for many years this was an 
incredibly short -sighted decision.125 Nevertheless, the general 
uncertainty of the venture persisted for some time, as the 
fluctuations in the share prices indicated. From C7 in 1925, these 
sank to 25/- in 1927, varied between 17/6 and C2 during 1928 and stood 
at E4 5/- early in 1929.126 The Company itself was obliged to plan 
and cut over six hundred miles of road in its first year alone. 
Beaton and Osterberg, however, travelled on foot with African 
porters. They were provided by the Company with a generous 
supply of camping equipment including a large double flap tent, 
camp beds, table, chairs, bath, bedding and cooking utensils. 
A monthly ration of tinned foodstuffs, flour and other goods was 
also provided in addition to their basic salary, these extras 
being sent out monthly along with their mail, pay, food for the 
porters, instructions and other requirements.1 7 The porters 
normally carried loads of approximately fifty pounds for up to 
twenty miles a day. 
The expedition travelled up the north bank of the Kafue to 
its source without any success. No outcrops of mineral 
125. See "Livingstone Mail" dd. 26.12.08 and 12.8.11 (quoted 
above p.23) 
126. Figures quoted in the Rosenthal Report, op.cit. p.38. 
127. Personal information from J. Beaton. 
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deposits were observed and the display of the sample piece of 
malachite met with no response. Similar failure greeted the 
return journey to Ndola until the party reached the village of 
Chief Chipopo on the Mushishima slam about seventy -five miles 
from their base, and near to where the main Chingola -Solwezi road 
crosses the stream. Here, the headman had a vane recollection 
of seeing an outcrop of rock similar to that carried by the 
explorers. Even then, it was not until his memory was 
stimulated by a gift of C2 and some native blankets that he led 
them some eight miles to a point where the Nchanga River, then a 
clear, narrow, fast - flowing stream, flowed across a rocky outcrop 
in its bed. "There," said Beaton, "just below the surface of 
the water we could see clearly what was obviously a fine copper 
vein." 
128 
This was certainly a piece of the greatest good fortune, 
for not only is there no other malachite outcrop near the surface 
for miles around, but the Nchanga Stream also by chance flowed 
right over it, so washing away the soil and dead vegetable 
matter and revealing the green rock underneath. Beaton 
himself openly acknowledges the element of chance in his 
wonderful discovery. 
Reaction was swift. Brooks and Horner set out in July to 
128. Beaton has stated to the writer that this was, in fact, 
the only time in his experience in which a native ever 
identified a malachite outcrop in this way. On every 
other occasion there was no response at all. 
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find the discovery, but failed. Brooks himself wrote to 
Collier early in August, instructing him to investigate Beaton 
and Osterberg's find. Beaton, returning to Nkana with his 
carriers, met Collier on the footpath,; but returned with him to 
the Nchanga outcrop. The two cleared the bank of vegetation 
and exposed about 30 feet of the outcrop from which Collier took 
samples. Beaton left for Nkana on the following day, whilst 
Collier started a trench on the west side of the stream, the 
ground to the east being swampy. The trench on the east side, 
which was situated on higher ground, was still in a very soggy 
area requiring lining with poles. Eventually, at a depth of 
4 feet Collier found some reddish copper oxide in the mud, from 
which he at length took samples over a width of 140 feet. The 
ore, subsequently known as the River Lode, proved to contain 436% 
copper. "This," related Brooks later,129 "created the first 
confidence in the real possibilities of Northern Rhodesia and 
was goodness indeed to the men who had to raise the capital. "130 
Brooks immediately visited the site to arrange for food supplies 
and a shot drill to be provided. Collier also transferred about 
129. Brooks, op.cit. 
130. It is interesting to note that the R.C.B.C. had set up a 
system of bonuses for discoveries, ranging from 0100 for 
a workable prospect to C1,00C for what proved to be a rich 
discovery, the assessment to be decided by the Company, 
after development and assay testing. All employees were 
to participate in these bonuses on the basis of 75% of the 
bonuses to be paid to the joint discoverers and 25% to go 
into a common pool. The Nchanga Mine was subsequently 
assessed at 0500, Beaton and Osterberg being paid 
accordingly. (The mine is now the richest in the British 
Empire, with an authorised capital of 028,000,000. See 
N.R. Chamber of Mines Year Book 1959) 
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this time from his original grass hut to a more permanent mud and 
wattle one, and, with the arrival of his wife, the European 
population was increased to two.131 
The hard -working Collier, who was noted for his patience and 
skill in handling native labour,132 now began an investigation of a 
"dambo" parallel to the River Lode about 1,000 yards to the south. 
He put in a long trench, some 14 feet deep, which showed no visible 
signs of copper, but yet proved to contain small amounts when assayed. 
By this time the drill had arrived and the camp began to grow in size, 
especially after the Rhodesian Congo Border Concession's headquarters 
was transferred there from Nkana. 
It is obvious that although prospect pitting, soil analysis and 
the other weapons of the prospector may in themselves determine the 
presence or otherwise of copper, the ultimate decision regarding the 
workability of the prospect, its area and the gross tonnage of 
copper present can only be reached after long and exhaustive 
examination for which comprehensive diamond drilling is essential. 
With the interest shown by the Anglo- American Corporation, which 
bought 2,000 reserve shares for 55/- each in May 1925, the floating 
in 1926 of the Nchanga Copper Mines Ltd., favourable reports from 
Carl Davies for Anglo- American and P.K. Horner for Minerals 
131. There is an original note by Collier on his work dd. March 
1931 in the R.S.T. Archives. See also letter from Mrs. 
Collier to D'Eath (R.S.T.) dd. 2.5.59 in R.S.T. Archives. 
132. Personal information. Lewin Tucker. 
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Separation Ltd. in 1926, and finally, the appointment as Consultant 
Geologist in 1927 of Dr. J. Austen Bancroft, the future seemed 
reasonably assured. 
Meantime, Williams had been given the contract of moving the 
first shot drill from Ndola to Nchanga, a distance of seventy -two 
miles, for only forty of which a track was in existence. The 
Kafue River also had to be crossed. The heavy, steam - driven drill, 
forming together with its boiler a load of five tons, was dragged 
by oxen and man -handled by Williams' 128 Africans for no less than 
26 days before the convoy finally arrived at Nchanga.133 
Williams has related how the most difficult parts of the 
journey were downhill, when the heavy load would run away from the 
handlers and bury itself in soft ground. Then at the Kafue, the 
original pontoon of oil drums and planks sank under its burden. 
Two pontoons had to be constructed and lashed together before the 
party could. cross. The route from Ndola to the Kafue had been 
"scuffled" - that is the vegetation cut down by hand - but from 
there the party had to carve its own way through the bush. 
Once in operation, the machine quickly demonstrated that the 
"River Lode" lay in vertical strata, curving underground as in 
133. Information from J.F.G. Williams. 
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Fig. II. The use of vertical and diagonal drill holes speedily 
delineated its shape, thickness and direction, whilst analysis of 
the copper present gave some indication of the percentage and 
quantity of copper available.134 
Fig. II 
Already, even at this early stage, a grave difficulty to future 
mining in the area had become apparent. During an average rainy 
season on the Copperbelt, approximately fifty to sixty inches of 
rain falls during the short time of five months. Of this water, 
some evaporates, and some drains into the Kafue River and so to 
the sea. However, a large percentage of it percolates below 
ground where it lodges in certain well- defined "water- horizons" 
immediately above the more impermeable rocks, below which are 
generally to be found the copper ores. 
"One may approach this problem from several angles ", wrote 
Dr. BancroftX35 "from each of which one is forced to the 
134. According to the Chamber of Mines Year Book for 1959 it 
contains at present 2,280,000 tons of ore of 4.21% copper. 
135. Memorandum dd. 15.10.31. In Nchanga "Dewatering File ". 
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"conclusion that a very large total volume of water is involved and 
that safe, efficient and economical mining of the ore -bodies at 
Nchanga will in very major measure depend on the operation of 
requisite pumping capacity." 
He goes on to analyse the geographical and geological 
situation. The Nchanga syncline is a structural trough with high 
lands to the north and South, both underlain by comparatively 
impervious rocks. An area of about twenty -five square miles plus 
the fifteen square miles of the syncline itself, discharges its 
water into that portion of the syncline within which the ore -bodies 
are located. The rocks of the syncline itself are often so 
permeable as to permit the underground circulation of large amounts 
of water. 
During the rainy season it is noticeable that much of the rain 
falling on the surrounding higher ground runs down into the 
Nchanga area and more important, that the Nchanga Stream, which 
flows lengthwise along the syncline, carries off only a small part 
of this rainfall.136 On the assumption that 30% of the rainfall 
percolates underground this adds up to the astonishing figure of 
24,000,000 gallons a day per year, disappearing underground 
within the Nchanga syncline, most of it during a period of about 
136. Subsequently, two weirs were installed on this stream to 
measure the seasonal rise and fall of the flow. Even 
without these it is plain that the stream cannot account 
for the substantial rainfall which occurs every year. 
five months. 
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"No one can say" continues Bancroft137 "just how much 
of this water will enter mine workings. As the workings are extended, 
an increasingly large proportion of this volume will have to be coped 
with." 
"When, however, one considers this phase of the problem in 
conjunction with the permeability of the rocks, one arrives at the 
conclusion that sufficient water is entering the basin to maintain 
the steady circulation of an important volume of water through all of 
the various waterbearing horizons that will be intersected by mining 
operations, and that eventually when the workings are sufficiently 
extended, a major proportion of this volume of water from rainfall 
will gain access to the mine. "i38 
A cross -section of the strata at Nchanga is shown in Diagram 
I (endpapers.) (See also Diagram IV.) As will readily be seen, 
water is fairly universal within the strata. A heavy flow of 
artesian water from some of the drill -holes, a very low core 
recovery through certain groups of strata (i.eaconsistency of 
liquid mud) and the universally porous nature of much of the rock 
indicated plainly iot only that the Nchanga syncline contained a 
large amount of water, but also that at certain levels or horizons 
the rocks were sufficiently broken up to permit the ready 
137. Memo op.cit. 
138. In February 1931 Bancroft estimated that at least 15,000,000 
gallons per day would have to be handled. By October 1931 
he had revised this estimate to a figure very close to the 
truth - 171h million gallons per day - an amount which was 
still being pumped until recently. 
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circulation of water. 
For purposes of discussion and commentary, the water -bearing 
strata may be divided into three groups: - 
1) THE FOOTWALL WATER- BEARING HORIZONS which include the top of 
the Basal Arkoses, the Transition Beds and the Lower Banded Shales 
(10 -8 on diagram.) These transition beds of some 12 -15' in 
thickness form an important horizon for circulating water. They 
frequently contain high -grade copper values which also are found 
at the top of the basal arkoses, mainly in the form of oxides. 
The beds are, however, ver porous and decomposed, except for a 
few relatively small impervious patches where the copper is found 
as sulphides. Dr. Bancroft, when discussing these points139 
compared these impervious patches to islands within an ocean. 
However, in the more general porous areas, considerable 
thicknesses of the overlying Lower Banded Shales have also been 
oxidised and the minerals washed out in solution. Cavities 
have been left which are so numerous that water freely 
circulates. 
Further up through the Lower Banded Shales the rocks become 
much less mineralised and are relatively impervious. Water 
therefore gathers on top of these rocks to form a water horizon 
139. Memo dd. 27.10.31. In Nchanga "Dewatering File ". 
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at the bottom of group two - 
2) THE INTERMEDIATE WATER- BEARING HORIZONS including the Banded 
Sandstones and Schists and the Feldspathic Sandstones. The 
Banded Sandstones and Schists almost invariably gave much trouble 
in diamond drilling. At depths of 600 feet or more core recovery 
was frequently only 10% or even less, and even at depths of 1,500 
feet core recovery seldom exceeded 20 %.140 These strata proved 
to be what is known as "caving and running ground ". Frequently 
the drill rods sank for several feet under their own weight. 
When the underground workings were begun in the River Lode and 
the Dambo Lode it was these beds which gave considerable trouble 
there and necessitated the abandoning of No. 8 shaft at a depth 
of 256 feet. The realities of mining fully proved the evidence 
of the diamond drilling in these beds. They proved to be heavily 
charged with water and liable to develop spasmodic "mud- rushes ". 
When Bancroft wrote in 1931 they had not been fully penetrated, 
but even then it was evident that their presence immediately above 
the ore -bearing Lower Banded Shales would constitute a serious 
handicap to mining at Nchanga. Bancroft was adamant141 that they 
would have to be fully drained before economical and safe mining 
could be carried out, and warned that it was quite probable that 
they would have to be drilled and pumped before they discharged 
all their water. 
140. Ibid. 
141. Ibid. 
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On the other hand, the Feldspathic Sandstones are much less 
heavily water -charged and present no mining difficulty. 
3) THE CHINGOLA DOLOMITE SERIES 
(HANGING WALL WATER- BEARING HORIZONS.) 
Resting directly upon the Upper Banded Shales is a group of beds 
approximately fifteen to twenty -five feet thick so decomposed that 
the core recovery from them was actually nil in places. This is 
an important water- bearing horizon. Immediately above is the group 
of Dolomitic Schists, also heavily charged with water. Here too, 
the drills often sank under their own weight. The middle part of 
some 175 feet thickness of the Dolomite Series,: the white, shaly 
dolomites, is overlaid with sandy dolomites so decomposed that they 
may be described as 'running sands ". The rock is honeycombed with 
fissures and much artesian water was found there while drilling. 
When Dr. Bancroft opposed the sinking of No. 2 Shaft - which 
was in fact stopped at 292 feet, he did.so on the basis of his 
knowledge of the precarious state of this part of the Chingola 
Dolomite Series. A Layne and Bowler pump introduced into a nearby 
drill -hole of 11+ inches diameter where it pierced the water - 
bearing horizon had been used to pump 1,440,000 gallons per day 
from'the area continuously frog March 1931 to October 5th, when 
it was finally withdrawn. During these seven months, the pump 
made no appreciable impression on the water level in the hole, 
although it did cause the artesian flow to cease at another hole, 
1Y4 miles to the eastward. This, of course, was a most 
unsatisfactory feature, implying as it did that the water -bearing 
horizons were interconnected over a wide area. 
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The midaceous shales above the Chingola Dolomite Series 
also contain considerable water, although not to the same extent 
as the beds below. 
Throughout the syncline, therefore, considerable water had 
to be encountered in well -defined area. This known hazard, 
however, did not indicate the real danger which was ever -present, 
namely that at some point, whilst apparently in perfect safety, 
the miners might pierce an unknown cavity connecting one water 
horizon with another. These undoubtedly existed, and the puncture 
of one of them would result immediately in a gush of water - a 
flood of which could have deadly consequences. Excessive care 
would be necessary to ensure that before any development took 
place pilot holes were pushed forward to make certain that the 
ground was safe. 
The earliest development, which was mainly exploratory, is 
shown in Diagram II (end -papers). Initially shafts numbers 
One to Four were sunk to the fifty foot level in the ore -body. 
The technique was, of course, very primitive, being simply a 
version of the prospect pitting already described (see above 
p.80). The shafts, each measuring eight by six feet were 
dug by hand, the earth being removed in buckets by means of 
a simple windlass at the top. As the shafts deepened, so they 
were "timbered" - lined with round timber props each six inches 
in diameter. This timbering was a masterpiece of precision work 
which has scarcely been equalled even at the present time. All 
the materials, both for lining the shafts and for the 
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construction of the windlasses, were hacked from the surrounding 
bush. 
At the fifty -foot level the workings were extended to join up 
the four shafts. At intervals of 125 feet exploratory cross -cuts 
were driven into the ore -body and samples removed fer analysis. 
The first three shafts were then sunk further, down to 150 feet, 
with similar connections between each and the same exploratory 
cross -cuts as before. Water difficulties were encountered and with 
the likelihood of more profitable development being available further 
to the west in the Dambo Lode, the workings were abandoned. 
A further vertical shaft, No. Eight was started towards the 
end of 1926. This too was abandoned in May 1927 at a depth of 
256 feet. Having passed through the Feldspathic Quartzites it 
penetrated heavily water -laden running ground at about 225 feet. 
This running ground was the same Mica Schists as were also to give 
trouble in the Dambo Lode Incline Shafts. 
Soon after No. 8 Shaft was abandoned a further attempt to 
develop the ore -body was made. Another vertical shaft - No. 9142 
(see Diagram II) - was begun in the Footwall Arkose where good, 
firm rocks could be expected. This indeed proved to be the case, 
and the shaft was rapidly sunk to the 300 foot level when a cross- 
cut was extended southward to the ore -body. This was explored 
for a total length of 1,500 feet with further cross -cuts at 
intervals of 125 feet as before. From the faces of some of these 
142. This was a three - compartment shaft measuring approx. 
19 x 10 feet. 
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cross -cuts horizontal drill holes were inserted to a maximum depth 
of 160 feet, again with regular samples being taken for assay. 
The strata here proved to be complicated. They are almost 
vertical with considerable crumpling along both the strike and the 
dip. The Lower Banded Shale is generally distinctive but has 
occasionally changed to mica schists as a result of the folding 
processes. Further, before the Footwall Arkose is gained there 
is also a band of conglomerate some 7 to 8 feet thick to be 
encountered.143 
The shaly schistose beds below the conglomerate were found 
to be slightly water- bearing. Locally also, especially in the 
crumpled areas, the Lower Banded Shales were also water- laden. 
It was, however, the hanging wall beds - Banded Sandstones and 
Schists - which proved to Contain very large quantities of water. 
These beds had already been shown to be treacherous, running 
ground during the previous work on the levels above (Shafts One 
to Four.) In general, therefore, it was decided to stop 
developing the cross -cuts into the hanging wall before these 
beds were reached. It would not be possible to work these beds 
before they had been drained.144 
During the course of this work on the 300 foot level the 
143. For a full account see Dr. Bancroft's memorandum dd. 
28.10.31 in the Anglo- American Corporation files. 
144. Bancroft estimated that a minimum of 3,000,000 gallons 
per day would have to be pumped when this was done. 
op.cit. 
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miners encountered two fissures or water courses which clearly 
demonstrated the correctness of Bancroft's theory that these 
features can and do traverse shaly and schistose rocks, 
permitting the ready circulation of water. One of them, towards 
the western end of the workings, caused the ground to cave and 
forced a deviation in the progress of the workings. 
Early in 1929, almost one million gallons of water a day 
were being pumped from No. 9 shaft. At this stage, the workings 
on the 300 foot level were sealed off with a watertight door. 
The shaft was continued during April and May 1929 to a depth of 
614 feet with workings as shown in Diagram II. Although no 
serious trouble from water was encountered in the shaft itself, 
the leakage through the watertight door amounted to no less than 
1,500 gallons an hour. Then, with the discovery of the 
extremely rich Nchanga West Ore -body the workings were abandoned 
indefinitely and the shaft allowed to flood. 
The miners moved on, the water crept up, until it was only 
a hundred feet from the top of the shaft. The headgear 
deteriorated, uncared for. Only the mine farm flourished, 
irrigated by water from the shaft. Rust and decay prevailed. 
Termites destroyed the woodwork, the fierce vegetation of the 
tropics smothered the surface equipment. For more than a 
quarter of a century the mine rotted away. 
Salvation for No. 9 shaft did not come until 1957 when the 
Company determined to reclaim the shaft and re- sample the ore - 
body in order to gain an accurate picture of the quantity and 
- 130 - 
value of the ore reserves in the area. Pumps were installed and 
the shaft emptied to the 300 foot level, new timbering being 
inserted as the work progressed. A pump station was established 
at this level, and, for the first time in thirty years, the 
watertight door was opened. The timber had been well -preserved 
under the water. In fact, to everyone's astonishment, the 
materials previously abandoned underground all proved to be in 
remarkably good condition. 
Greatly encouraged, the miners now hastened to reclaim the 
remainder of the shaft, setting up another pump station on the 
600 foot level. Towards the end of 1959 all was ready: the 
miners began to drive in a southerly direction towards the ore - 
body, which was reached after about five hundred feet. Two 
drives East and West, each measuring eight by eight feet were 
now extended into the ore -body. The East face collapsed.in 
February 1960 owing to bad ground and had to be abandoned. It 
was replaced by a similar tunnel nearer to the South cross -cut, 
the venture this time being successful By September 1960 the 
West drive had been lengthened because of the extremely unstable 
nature of the strata originally traversed. Diamond drill holes 
were being inserted at regular intervals to provide specimens for 
sampling. 
Thirty -three men, 
145 
including twenty -two Africans were then 
involved in the enterprise, which, as it is closely connected with 
the rapidly expanding Nchanga Open Fit, comes under the same 
145. An account of their work appears in the "Nchanga News" 
dd. 2.9.60. 
- 131 - 
management. "Wilkie's Lonely Mine ",146 as the notice at the gate 
proclaims it, seems to have a most interesting future. 
THE DAMBO LODE 
During the investigations into the River Lode, already 
described, Raymond Brooks had pursued his drilling programme 
further to the west to discover the richer Dambo Lode, which 
undeniably demanded further attention. 
Although the first three drill holes put down on the Dambo 
Lode were disappointing, the fourth one was far more satisfactory. 
After Collier had disregarded147 Horner's instructions to stop 
the hole at a depth of 480 feet, a belt of sulphide ore 
averaging 5.2% copper was intersected between depths of 575 and 
650 feet. This discovery in late 1925 was claimed by Brooks to 
be the first major discovery of sulphide copper in Northern 
Rhodesia and the stimulus which led to searches at Roan and 
Mufulira by R.J. Parker.148 It should be pointed out, though, 
that although this discovery of sulphide ore may have been the 
first of commercial value in Northern Rhodesia the inference that 
Parker was influenced by it in his own investigations has been 
hotly denied by Parker himself, whose own view of the direction 
146. Called after Mr. Neil Wilkie, then Open Pit Manager. 
147. According to R. Brooks "How the Rhodesian Coppers Were 
Found ", "Northern Rhodesia Journal" vol. 1 No. 2, 1950. 
148. Ibid. 
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of Rhodesian -Congo Border Concession by Horner was not 
complimentary.149 
As a supplement to the drilling of the Dambo Lode, two incline 
shafts No's. 1 and 2 were begun in 1926 and sunk roughly parallel 
to the footwall of the orebody, with inclines of 22° and 25 °, to 
depths of 602 feet and 740 feet respectively. Having reached a 
depth of 600 feet - equivalent to 250 feet of vertical depth - a 
"drift" was extended within the lode for a length of 1,200 feet 
and four cross -cuts were inserted north to south.150 Although 
most of this development was within the "Feldspathic Quartzites", 
the overlying "Upper Banded Shales" were also exploredby the 
cross -cuts for a horizontal distance of 75 feet - a true width of 
about 25 feet - and the underlying "Banded Sandstones and Schists" 
for a horizontal distance of about 100 feet - a true width of 
about 35 feet. 
The "Upper Banded Shales" proved to be generally impervious. 
Nevertheless they were traversed by joint planes, from some of 
which water dripped continuously. Further water was also found 
in certain areas of the "Feldspathic Quartzites ", but not in any 
important quantities. 
151 
On the other hand, the "Banded Sandstones and Schists" were 
found to be treacherous, water -laden ground, especially in the 
149. For Parker's views on his own and Horner's work see his 
letter to D'Eath dd. 2.9.49 in R.S.T. Archives. 
150. See Diagram V (end -papers). 
151. For a fuller account see Dr. Bancroft's memorandum on the 
subject dd. 28.10.31. 
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strata containing mica, where mud- rushes occasionally developed, 
On several occasions a temporary decrease in the flow of water from 
a face for a few hours was followed by a rush of mud and water which 
would quickly flood the workings to a depth of four or five feet in 
spite of all the pumping power available being in use. During one 
of these mud -rushes in April 1928, no less than a hundred tons of 
mud was washed in this way from the beds of mica schist. 
The workings were closed down in April 1928, at which stage 
the pumps were handling about one million gallons of water a day, 
three - quarters of which came from the "Banded Sandstones and 
Schists". 
THE "NCHANGA WEST" ' "ORKINGS 
Encouraged by the successful results of the work undertaken 
in the River Lode and the Dambo Lode areas, Brooks continued to 
expand his drilling programme in the area.152 Six further holes 
to the west proved barren, but the seventh, NE5,i53 just touched 
the edge of what is now known as the Nchanga West Orebody. One 
of the richest copper -ore deposits in the world had been 
discovered. 
Previous to this drilling programme the "New Discovery" 
area had been surveyed electrically in 1926 by the equipotential 
152. To the disgust of a further prospector, C.G.A. Jackson, 
who was denied the money and equipment to carry out a 
programme of drilling of his own discovery in the 
Chiwempala area, 3"'/2 miles south of Chingola. See his 
report dd. 7th June 1929, Nchanga Files. 
153. The NE (PIchanga Extension)holes were on R.C.B.C. 
property. 
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line method (see Appendix II) by a party consisting of J.C. 
Ferguson and S.H. Shaw. A weak indication was received in the 
area, but potholes and a 70 feet shaft sunk on it failed to reveal 
anything. Broughton Edge, who was in charge of the electrical 
prospecting for Minerals Separation Ltd. wanted to put down a drill - 
hole on the site, but was not permitted to do so because of 
financial stringencies. This decision not to drill probably 
robbed Edge of a resounding success.154 
During the early stages of the drilling of NE5 nothing of 
particular interest was expected from the hole. The purpose of 
the drilling to the west of the Dambo Lode was to investigate the 
possibility that the continuation of the Feldspathic Quartzites, 
in which the Dambo Lode lay, might be found to contain copper 
further west also. As the Dambo Lode ore was never found below 
the Banded Sandstones and Schists, it was customary for all holes 
to be stopped once they had reached the Lower Banded Shale horizon 
which provided a convenient and easily recognised landmark. NE5, 
together with all the other holes between it and the Dambo Lode, 
passed right down through the Dambo Lode beds without intersecting 
any copper. But, unlike the others, NE5 was not immediately 
stopped once it had entered the Lower Banded Shale. The core - 
catchers, N.M. Airey and A.J. Liebenberg, 5 reported the mistake 
154. Personal information J.C. Ferguson. Ferguson recently 
retired as the Director of Geological Surveys (Southern 
Rhodesia) and Dr. Shaw is '.,63) Director of Colonial 
Geological Surveys. 
155. I am indebted to these two for first -hand accounts of the 
proceedings. 
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to A. Royden Harrison, but they and the drillers continued working 
for another day or two while, for some inexplicable reason, the 
orders for harrison to cease work on it did not arrive. By this 
time the hole had gone down some 20 feet into the shale to a total 
depth of 815 feet. The core was extracted as usual and lay for 
some days before a chance examination of it by one of the 
geologists in the camp showed the presence of fine particles of 
bornite. On assay, a value of 6% sulphide copper was found. The 
excitement was naturally intense, and increased when a further 
deepening of the hole continued to show excellent sulphide deposits 
in the Lower Banded Shale with considerable amounts of malachite 
in the Transition Beds (Sandy Micaceous Schists) and chalcocite in 
the arkose below. 
It is difficult to over -estimate the significance of this 
fortuitous discovery.156 The future of Nchanga was still very 
much in the balance at this time. The River Lode Orebody on the 
North Limb, which was being developed from No. 9 shaft was not 
particularly impressive - it would certainly not evoke much 
interest if newly discovered at the present day. Further, the 
Dambo Lode was badly delineated and difficult to work because of 
the excessive water encountered. If the drillers of NE5 had 
ceased work immediately after the error was discovered and the 
drill had penetrated the Lower Banded Shale to a depth of only 
156. Nchanga legend has it that it was the result of an excess 
of zeal and /or alcohol on the part of one of the drillers, 
who exceeded his instructions. It has not been possible 
to verify this. 
- 136 - 
5 feet or so, it is probable that the core would have been simply 
thrown away and not examined at all. Even if it had been examined 
it would not have impressed, for the copper values greatly increased 
with depth. It was also the greatest good fortune that the chance 
examination of the core was made before the drill was dismantled and 
the casing of the hole removed. Although the core would certainly 
have yielded its secret in due course anyway, much time would have 
been wasted and expense incurred in re- drilling the hole. Most 
striking of all, perhaps, is the fact that when all the other holes 
were deepened in turn, none of them showed any copper values in the 
Lower Banded Shale or below. 
An intensive investigation by means of drilling from the 
surface was now begun. The results were astounding. Dr. Bancroft, 
investigating the area around where No. 1 Shaft157 was later to be, 
estimated, by personal sampling that there was approximately 
6,300,000 tons of copper -ore averaging 17% copper there - an 
extremely high figure.158 Later, the Nchanga resident geologist 
estimated that in the area surrounding No's 1 and 2 Shafts there 
were about 50,000,000 tons of high -grade ore to a vertical depth of 
over 2,200 feet.159 however, no estimates were made below 1,200 
feet because of the financial depression of 1929 -32, as only eleven 
157. See Diagram III (end-papers) 
158. Quoted in the Gilchrist Report dd. January, 1933. 
159. Memorandum dd. 12.9.31. 
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holes were drilled below this level during that time.160 It 
required a further twenty -seven holes to delimit the ore -body to 
the 1,200 foot level. "In fact" wrote Bancroft, "had not the 
twenty -seven holes been drilled, serious errors would have been 
involved in the calculation."lbl 
Unknown to any of those concerned, serious error had already 
crept in. The method used in preparing samples for assay was 
later found to be faulty, with the result that the quotations 
given for copper values were actually exaggerated by up to as much 
as 13 %. In addition, the old records were badly kept and often 
inaccurate. From August 1931, the estimates had to be revised 
as follows:- 
OLD ESTIMATES 
Old Nchanga New Nchanga 
(River and Dambo_Lodes) (Nchanga R West) 
NEW ASSAY RESULT162 
Sulphides 6.4% Cu. 6.0% 5.6% 
Oxides 25.25% 26.0 21.4% 
It is very easy to blame the drillers and samplers for these 
serious inaccuracies. Nevertheless, even though in 1931 a 
turbine air machine had been introduced for drilling shallower 
holes, and a petrol- driven machine had replaced the former very 
160. Wheeler (manager of Rhokana Area) to Managing Director, 
Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. London, Ref. 
J.L.32.A/46 dd. 24th June, 1946. 
161. Quoted in above letter. Wheeler himself believed that 
good ore would be found at greater depths when the 
necessary drilling capacity was available. 
162. See memorandum on Nchanga West Mine by Gilchrist dd. 
January 1933. In Nchanga "Mining File ". 
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cumbersome steam drill,163 diamond drilling results could still 
be an unwitting cause of error. Skill, intelligence and honesty 
are the attributes of a successful driller, not necessarily 
always available. The "salting" of samples was no new practice, 
although there is no evidence that it was deliberately done at 
Nchanga, as it is said to have been done at Bwana Mkubwa. The 
complex geological formations of the Nchanga area could lead to 
inaccuracy, as could the basic laws of physics (relating to the 
settling of particles in water) and the relative inefficiency of 
any mechanical device. When sampling underground, error could 
occur through the sampler failing to cut deeply enough into the 
face of the rock before taking his sample. The outer surfaces 
of the rock exposed to blasting and other mining operations 
often had particles of minerals embedded in them as a result of 
explosions or had accumulated rich deposits of metallic salts 
from solutions carried in water dripping over them.164 
One of the most notable features to be made known as a 
result of the diamond drilling programme carried out on the 
Nchanga West Orebody was the excessive oxidation of the minerals 
which had taken place at relatively Beat depths. Bancroft 
himself considered this oxidation to be a unique phenomenon.L65 
163. Nchanga geologist's report for 1931. 
164. There is an interesting account of how these effects 
could be deliberately brought about by speculators 
in McKinstry, H.P. "Mining Geology ", Prentice Hall, 
New York 1948. ck.2, 
165. See memo dd. 15.10.31 Nchanga Files. 
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From 2,140 to 2,200 feet in vertical depth, a diamond -drill 
penetrated ore averaging 3.09% copper of which 1.64% occurred as 
oxides, that is, more than 50% of the metallic minerals in the 
orebody. As this oxidation - which could only be brought about 
by contact with water - had been accompanied by partial leaching 
out of the sulphide minerals, the rocks had inevitably become even 
more permeable. Only in a few relatively small areas, and at 
varying depths was there local impermeability resulting in the 
minerals remaining as sulphides. It was plainly evident, as a 
result of this drilling, that considerable quantities of water 
were circulating to great depths almost universally within the 
orebody. 
By October 1930 No. 1 Shaft had been sunk to the 480 foot 
level and preparations made for the tunnelling of the main 
cross -cut North. 
lóó 
To speed up the unloading of the trucks 
of ore and waste, this cross -cut described a circular path 
below the shaft, so permitting continuous one -way traffic. 
The tunnel itself, which was eight feet high by nine feet wide, 
together with a ditch, was driven by a drill -column carriage 
on which were mounted four drifter machines and a scraper slide. 
The average progress through the arkose to the footwall of the 
orebody was fifteen feet a day when three shifts were operated, 
166. See Diagram III (end -papers) 
167. Devices for tunnelling and removing waste. 
- 140 - 
but sank to twelve feet when only two shifts were employed. Much 
of the cross -cut was timbered. As large quantities of water 
dripped down from the timber roof, this particular area soon became 
known amongst the miners as the strain- foresttt.168 
The first drive along the footwall was to the east. After 
about fifteen feet of progress it was found necessary to timber the 
tunnel which began to penetrate badly caved ground and to encounter 
large quantities of water which appeared to come from an 
underground water. course. On the 28th July 1931, therefore, this 
drive was abandoned in favour of an attempt to penetrate to the 
west. This Footwall Drive West was not exactly rectangular, but 






168. The more usual "rain- forest" is the area immediately facing 
the main Victoria Falls near Livingstone. As it is 
subjected to continual spray from the Falls, the 
vegetation there is luxuriant. 
- 141 - 
The ground proved to be soft and waterlogged requiring very little 
drilling and blasting for progress to be made into the footwall of 
the orebody. On the average only four holes per round were used, 
three in the orebody as lifters and one shaping hole in the back. 
As progress continued, a watercourse was encountered which caused 
the roof to cave in to a height of fifteen feet. 
From the footwall drive, No. 2 Incline Raise, of eight by six 
feet cross -section was pushed up. No timbering was necessary, for 
the ground, although soft, held up well providing that the back of 
the tunnel was arched. Several small streams were struck which 
all stopped flowing on the morning that the large water- fissure 
mentioned below (p. WiJ$ ) was pierced. 
The Auxiliary Drive East which passed through the Transition 
Beds was designed to avoid the caved ground encountered in the 
Footwall Drive East. The drive followed the strike of the beds 
through soft ground, although very little timber was used. Only 
three or four shot -holes per round were necessary to maintain 
progress, and in one or two exceptional places, the use of ordinary 
pick -axes was sufficient. 
The Small Drive East to join the service cross -cut passed 
through the Lower Banded Shales. Ten feet of this had to be 
timbered where the roof collapsed, but otherwise the ground was 
good. Similarly, although water flowed freely in the Raise to 
the service cross -cut, the ground was sufficiently firm to offset 
the use of timber.169 A stream of water also ran continuously 
169. See Diagram IIIA (end- papers) 
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from the shale beds penetrated by the service cross -cut. It is 
interesting to note that a pilot hole drilled upwards from the 
Ladderway Raise, struck the hanging wall of the Lower Banded 
Shale only seven feet above the Raise. A great quantity of 
light -brown mud flowed from this hole, to be followed, after this 
had cleared, by a continual stream of water. 
On the other hand, the Hanging Wall Drives, East and West 
were completely safe. The West Drive was timbered in parts 
where it widened to almost eighteen feet, but only a small 
amount of water came through. The East Drive was practically 
dry throughout its length.170 
170. Information originally supplied by A.R. Harrison. 
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THE NCHANGA DISASTER 
Steadily the work at Nchanga proceeded. The Hanging Wall 
Drives, East and West, made good progress. The initial flow of 
water had been small, because the cross -cut had intersected a small 
area of relatively impervious rocks, but as the Drives were extended 
the rate of flow increased appreciably. Only No. 2 Raise appeared 
comparatively dry, although even here further water was expected 
higher up where less impervious rocks were known to exist. 
The ventilation hole inserted nearby171 started below soil level 
in decomposed calcareous strata representing the basal beds of the 
Chingola Dolomite Series, and at a depth of about 150 feet passed 
into Upper Banded Shales followed by Feldspathic Quartzites, Banded 
Sandstones and Schists and the Lower Banded Shales. When the 
miners tried to locate this hole from underground by means of 
numerous horizontal drill holes they encountered a large volume of 
water which obviously came from all of the water -bearing horizons 
penetrated and chiefly from the top of the Feldspathic Quartzites 
downwards. When water was pumped from the ventilation hole it 
became plain that there was a direct connection with water -bearing 
strata in No. 3 Shaft for the water from the beds overlying the 
Lower Banded Shales ceased to flow.172 
There were at the foot of Nol Shaft five pumps giving a total 
pumping capacity of 2,500 gallons per minute or 3,600,000 gallons 
171. See Diagram III (end -papers) 
172. For a full accthunt see Dr. Bancroft's memo dd. 30.10.31 
Nchanga "Dewatering File ". 
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per day. A further safeguard in the form of a water -tight door 
had been placed in the cross -cut. As thenri_ne was generally 
believed to be safe, at least by the rank and file, there was much 
speculation amongst the miners regarding the purpose of this door 
which lay between the workings and the pumps. The atmosphere was 
light- hearted and even the meagre precautions which had been taken 
were ridiculed as being quite unnecessary.i73 Nevertheless, the 
geological staff, who were more aware of the potential danger, kept 
a wary eye on the water situation. On the orders of the Manager,GC.R. 
Stewart, a shot -drill hole was put down from the surface to 
intersect the 470 foot level horizon near the end of the cross -cut 
from No. 1 Shaft and a daily check kept on the water level in it. 
At 1 a.m. on the morning of September 17th.1931,No. 2 Raise 
had been blasted in readiness for the day shift coming on duty, 
after which a small cavity near the left hand corner of the raise 
was seen to be releasing yellow mud but no water.174 By 9.45 a.m. 
when the raise was inspected the flow had increased togbout 200 
gallons per minute, the cavity being now about fifteen feet long 
and two and a half feet wide.175 That morning Shaft No. 3 was 
dry, indicating that there was a direct communication between that 
shaft and the top of No. 2 Raise. Only ten minutes after the two 
173. Only two men - Guy Spires and Bill Mullens - both now in 
senior posts - remain at Nuhanga from the staff of 1931. 
Their accounts are remarkably similar. 
174. This was seen by N.M. Airey who reported it when going off 
shift at 7.30 a.m. Personal information. 
175. See Diagram IIIB (end -papers) 
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European inspectors had left, the cavity suddenly collapsed, 
releasing over two million gallons of water in less than an hour. 
"In my opinion," wrote Bancroft,176 "the cavity was being enlarged 
and carried further into the wall by the flow of water, which, 
gnawing headwards, suddenly tapped some fissure which probably 
interlaced at least those water -bearing horizons below the Upper 
Banded Shales. Apparently the barrier between the top of the 
cavity and this fissure was broken down within ten minutes after 
the two white men left the Raise." 
Fortunately, there was no "mud- rush" in the sense of the 
rushes of mud and water previously encountered in the two Incline 
Shafts. If there had been, it is unlikely that any of throe near 
the workings could have escaped. Nevertheless, the effect was 
awe -inspiring. A tidal wave flooded down the cross -cut and 
into the side drives, carrying all before it. Although all the 
workmen, including the 123 Africans who were on shift, managed 
to pass through the watertight door, silt and mud had already piled 
up against it to a depth of four feet, making it impossible for 
the miners to close ít.177 The Africans who were underground 
generally panicked. Having been swept along the cross -cuts by 
the flow of water, hanging for their lives to the timber props 
lining the passage, most of them arrived at the foot of No. 1 
Shaft in a state of abject terror. Many forgot the first 
176. Memo dd. 30.10.31. 
177. Those who risked their lives trying to do so included 
Messrs. Harrison and Botha. 
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principles of safety and began to clamber up the timbers of the 
shaft itself, so rendering the operation of the cage impossible. 
Many of these finally fought their way to the official ladderway 
and so reached the surface, but one, slower than the others, was 
struck by a descending cage and fell into the rapidly rising water. 
His body was notxecovered for several weeks. This was the only 
fatality. But for the cool -headedness of the cage -tender, 
V. Corser, who delayed until the last possible moment, many more 
similar accidents must have occurred. 
On the other hand, instances of African bravery took place. 
One European who had lost his helmet was given one by an 
African immediately before he set off up the ladders to safety. 
A falling wrench struck him, and even with the helmet on, caused 
him to require two stitches in a head wound. Without the 
helmet he must have died.i78 Haste was essential. All the 
underground workings were flooded and the water had risen over 
four hundred feet up No. 1 Shaft in only thirty -five minutes. 
That no more lives were lost was a miracle, the credit for which 
certainly did not lie with the responsible authorities. 
It is a reasonable supposition that in every organised mine 
or other industry, adequate precautions are taken and safeguards 
instituted to ensure that the normal danger inherent in the work 
178. It is pleasing to note that the African was well 
rewarded later by his grateful colleague. 
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is either obviated entirely or at least reduced to a minimum. 
There is no evidence to suggest that this was not done at Nchanga. 
There was, however, always present, the danger referred to 
previously - namely that the workings would intersect a water - 
filled fissure which would cause a flood. This was well -known 
to Dr. Bancroft and his immediate staff. The resident geologist 
at Nchanga -- Ellis - shortly before the disaster, had informed 
Guy Spires in private conversation that the one watertight door 
in existence was completely inadequate in the event of flooding 
and that a minimum of three was necessary.179 It is 
inconceivable that if he could impart this information as idle 
gossip to a junior employee he had not stated the same thing to 
the manager. Nevertheless, Stewart had also stated publicly at 
a "sundowner" party a fortnight before the flood that the danger 
from water underground was negligible and that even one watertight 
door was a luxury;180 This was after Bancroft had mentioned the 
possibility of a fissure being encountered to Ellis on August 
29th. Bancroft himself states, however,181 that he carefully 
avoided being an alarmist and it is possible that Ellis, and 
therefore Stewart, was not made fully to realise the gravity of 
the situation. However, in view of the fact that Stewart had 
already instituted a daily check of the water level and had 
arranged to install a Layne and Bowler pump from Mufulira, which 
179. Personal information - G. Spires. 
180. Personal information - G. Spires. 
181. Memo dd. 31.10.31. 
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pump, he hoped, might be placed in a water -tight compartment it is 
fairly certain that he appreciated the risks his men were running. 
The Mine Captain, Tyack182 was not informed of the danger under 
which he and his men were working until September 13th and the 
manager, Stewart, did not hear Bancroft's views until September 
16th, the day before the tragedy.i83 Even then, he was able to 
reassure Dr. Bancroft by informing him that as a preparation for 
the forthcoming draining of the ventilation hole, he had obtained 
from Mufulira a large pump of 2,000 gallons per minute capacity 
and was proposing to install a further pump of 1,000 gallons per 
minute within the vent hole. "I am through with small pump units 
at Nchanga" he said - a very different statement from the one made 
only a few days previously. 
Bancroft himself has stated after the eventi84 that he had 
hoped that a pumping capacity of at least 15,000,000 gallons per 
day would have been installed before any serious removal of the ore 
was begun. Even this, of course, would have been inadequate to 
deal with the flow of 2,000,000 gallons per hour which entered the 
mine. However, this additional pumping capacity would greatly 
182. Bancroft (op.cit. p.138) also notes that Steve Tyack was 
informed verbally by himself of the danger - but does not 
explain why he said nothing either to Dan Buttner, the 
Underground Manager, or, as the Consulting Geologist would 
normally do, report direct to Stewart, the Manager. 
183. Bancroft himself admitted this in his memo dd. 31.10.31 (In 
Nchanga "Dewatering" File.) in which he also quoted Stewart's 
remarks. 
184. Ibid. 
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have relieved the situation and the mine might not have been lost. 
Stewart estimated that when the flood took place about 1,200 
gallons were entering the mine each minute from the drill holes 
penetrating the ventilation hole. When the water had covered the 
shaft station at the foot of No. 1 Shaft, it was then rising in 
the shaft at the rate of eighteen inches a minute. As two 
raises were also being filled at that moment, the inflow cannot 
have been less than 4,000 gallons a minute. After the 
ventilation shaft had been plugged with cement thus blocking the 
drill holes, the inflow was soon limited to 2,800 gallons a 
minute. Pumping indicated that all the water- bearing horizons, 
at least below the Upper Banded Shales were now linked. The full 
pressure of this enormous body of water had entered the mine. 
Although Dr. Bancroft, the consultant geologist, explained all 
this at great length in his memorandum of 31st October 1931, 
written, of course, after the event, he admits that he 
deliberately omitted this question from his previous memorandum 
of February the same year. Nor, in fact, did he refer the matter 
in writing to any of the administrative and engineering staff 
responsible, although he claimed to have mentioned it many times 
in conversation. However, where numerous lives and large sums 
of money may be lost, through failure to take immediate and drastic, 
even though expensive action, can mere verbal statements ever be 
regarded as a sufficient shifting of responsibility for nothing 
further to be done? If Dr. Bancroft thought so, then he was 
guilty of negligence. But Bancroft was already famous as a 
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geologist, and this fame endured until His death in 1957.185 
None of his employers have ever questioned his efficiency. It 
appears then that Bancroft refrained from committing his opinions 
and fears to writing until they had become a "fait accompli ", for 
a specified purpose - and Stewart could hardly have been expected 
to close the mine on his own responsibility and without written 
authority. This kind of major policy decision is clearly the 
function of the consultants. Writing to the Consulting Engineer 
of the Rhokana Corporation at Nkana on 5th November 1931186 and 
enclosing the memoranda previously referred to, he states, "These 
notes contain some features pertaining to Nchanga that we have 
discussed but have not placed on record previously because we have 
felt that nothing could be gained in having them so widely 
distributed that they would become 'common knowledge'." Why 
not? Why was this knowledge not made sufficiently public for 
work to be suspended until adequate pumping equipment had been 
installed.? Why was the danger to the underground workers not 
revealed to the Mine Captain until virtually the last minute? 
What could be lost except the confidence of the public? Market 
conditions were already precarious.i87 Would the knowledge that 
the mine was a potential failure have intimidated the share- 
holders to such an extent that the Company would have collapsed 
185. For obituary see "Transactions of the Geological Society 
of South Africa" Vol. LXI. 1958. 
186. An original of this letter is still in existence on the 
Nchanga files. Further copies were sent to Johannesburg, 
Salisbury and London. 
187. The price of copper had tumbled from £72 to £27 a ton. 
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even before the flood? On the other hand, could confidence be 
retained by anything except quick and substantial profits, which 
precluded heavy capital expenditure, even in the interests of 
safety? It would appear that Bancroft, whether under 
instructions or not, was taking a calculated risk - a venture 
which did not succeed. If this was so, the guilt of negligence 
is minor compared with the truth. 
Bancroft reacted quickly to the grim news. Within three 
weeks a memorandumla had been circulated to the head offices of 
the Anglo- American, Rhokana and British South Africa Companies 
setting out his views, offering guidance for the future and 
stating plainly, "Nchanga is not a property that can be operated 
on a shoestring. Inadequate pumping installations and 
insufficient precautions during the progress of work resulted in 
the flooding of No. 1 Shaft. When the present workings are 
de- watered, there can be no justification in resuming mining under 
the conditions existing to date." Continuing, Bancroft asserted 
that to make mining safe and economical and to gain the profits 
which the high -grade ore warranted, initial expenditure should 
be directed towards draining the ore -bearing horizons and the 
hanging wall formations to the top of the middle portion of the 
Chingola Dolomite Series and at least to a depth equivalent to 
the deepest levels on which ore is being mined at the time, and 
preferably to one level below. This, he declared, should be 
188. dd. 4.11.31. 
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done for several reasons - 
1. The high -grade ore occurs in ground so badly decomposed that 
any system of mining involving the leaving of pillars would be a 
failure. 
2. Immediately above the ore -bearing Lower Banded Shales lie the 
Banded Sandstones and Schists in which mud -rushes occur. 
3. There will probably be subsidence and consequent rupturing 
of overlying strata - which must therefore be dry. 
4.. Further fissures may be encountered. 
5. "To drain the Intermediate Water Bearing Horizons a cross- 
cut should be extended for a length of 2,000 feet into the 
hanging wall from the vicinity of the ventilation hole. In 
driving this cross -cut, diamond drill holes should be 
progressively fanned out from the face. A watertight door which 
hinges in the roof in such a manner that it may be dropped 
quickly should also be installed in this cross -cut." 
6. There is a -possibility that a fissure might be met which 
would connect the workings with the enormous volume of water in 
the Chingola Dolomite Series. 
7. t in future, when the workings are deep and much 
extended, a volume of water in excess of 15,000,000 to 
20,000,000 gallons per day will have to be pumped.189 
"No mining methods should be permitted that will bring about 
any subsidence of hanging wall measures until assurance can be 
given that the hanging wall measures have been de- watered." 
189. The present figure is around 15,000,000 gallons, having 
previously been as high as 18,000,000. 
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THE REHABILITATION OF THE NCHANGA MINE 
After a number of futile attempts to dewater the flooded 
workings, culminating in severe damage to the pump, Nchanga Mine 
was abandoned indefinitely. The general economic depression of 
the early 1930's, coupled with the enormous difficulties apparently 
facing the company and the much more immediately obvious promise of 
profit from the Nkana and Mindola deposits were the main factors 
influencing this decision. All development, including drilling, 
had been completely suspended by April 1931. (see above p.108) 
This, however, was merely the end of the beginning. 
Gilchristi90 and others were concerned with the problem of making 
the mining of the valuable ores an economic proposition, and, as 
the depression slowly lifted, so did their dreams become a 
reality. By 1936 the decision had been taken to go ahead with 
the development of the property on a much greater scale than ever 
before and the preliminary work began in November of that year. 
On March 8th, 1937 the Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 
was floated with a capital of £500,000 in El shares to acquire 
from Rhokana Corporation the mining rights over four areas 
previously selected by Dr. Bancroft. These areas, known as 
Chingola (including Nchanga West), Nchanga, Kakosa and Mimbula, 
totalled approximately 38 square miles in extent.i91 Further 
prospecting rights over the Chingola Extension and Luano were also 
190. The Gilchrist Report, January 1933. Copy in Nchanga 
"Mining File ". 
191. At present the Company has acquired special grants 
totalling 59 sq. miles and possesses the surface rights over 
another 9 sq. miles in addition. 
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given by Rhokana Corporation to the new Company. 
The new Board of Directors under the chairmanship of Sir 
Ernest Oppenheimer and the local staff under the management of 
I.A. Pope were soon in action. The immediate problem was the 
dewatering of the old workings, accompanied by the need to provide 
new shafts, as none of the existing ones would be large enough to 
handle the greatly increased production which was envisaged. 
The scheme for dewatering involved the sinking of two incline 
shafts measuring 20 x 7 feet at inclines of 15° and at a position 
about 1,550 feet south of the old No. 1 vertical shaft. These 
two shafts, together with a new six compartment vertical shaft 
known as "C" shaft were designed to pass through the Foot -Wall 
strata into the basal arkose and granite at the 480 foot level. 
The surrounding surface was cleared in case caving occurred, and 
the plant area moved to the south. 
Of the two incline shafts, that known as "A" shaft was 
designed for pumping, whilst "B" shaft was intended for general 
mining operations. By the end of March, 1939, "A" shaft had 
reached a vertical depth of 520 feet at which point a pumping 
station was established with a capacity of approximately one 
million gallons per hour. A cross -cut was driven below the old 
flooded cross -cut and drainage provided to the pump chamber. 
When all was ready, forty diamond -drill holes were extended 
under control conditions of high- pressure valves into the old 
workings. The valves were opened on Christmas Day, 1938, the 
pumps began to operate, and within a week the mine was 
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practically dry. On January 2nd 1939,the wall of rock separating 
qq 
the new workings from the old was blasted down and the way lay opéh2 
The question of what was to take place next had been receiving 
theoretical consideration for some years. As early as 1933 
Gilchrist had stated193 that the immediate object after dewatering 
94 
No. 1 shaft must be the connection between No. 1 and No. 3 shafts. 
This, he considered, would present no difficulties, and as the 
connection would pass through high -grade ore, an immediate source 
of revenue would be available. After this, three possible schemes 
presented themselves - 
"A" Scheme195 By this scheme an incline was to be sunk from the 
470 foot level in No. 1 shaft to No. 2 shaft, which was to be 
continued to depth. Water would be removed through drill holes 
sunk from the surface near the North -West and North -East corners 
of the shaft. The largest quantities of water would almost 
certainly be encountered at the 450 foot level (near the top of 
the Chingola Dolomite Series) and from 775 feet to 875 feet in the 
Dolomitic Schists, where core recovery had been as low as 11 %. 
Once heavy pumps had been installed, development could proceed 
in ore below the 470 foot workings, the ore being transferred to 
the Main Ifclined Haulage through cross -cuts and ore passes. 
192. Much of the above is personal information from N.A. Wilkie. 
193. The Gilchrist Report, January 1933. 
194. See Diagrams III and VI (end -papers) 
195. See Diagram IV (end -papers) 
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The Main Incline would then be continued to the bottom of the 
syncline where it would be connected by a cross -cut to "C" shaft, 
which was envisaged as a large shaft driven to about 2,700 feet in 
the Foot -Wall rocks of the north limb of the syncline. 
This scheme brought a pointed comment from G.C.R. Stewart 
-196 
"The bitter experience of the flooding of No. 1 shaft teaches that 
every precaution should be taken to prevent, if possible, its 
recurrence, and all necessary equipment collected and every 
preparation made to deal with the situation should it arise again 
in spite of all our precautions I would add that conditions 
similar to those encountered before the flooding are likely to be 
met with again and sudden bursts of large volumes of water must be 
expected at any time throughout the development of the mine. "197 
Working to the above scheme Stewart then proposed his own 
more detailed method of tackling the problem. Firstly No. 1 
shaft should be dewatered with the existing pumps capable of 
operating at about 3,500 gallons per minute at the 470 foot level. 
No. 3 shaft should also be drained, sunk to the 470 foot level and 
equipped with pumps to give a combined capacity with No. 1 shaft 
of 9,000,000 gallons per day. The water between the two could then 
be drained and work could be done on the No. 2 inclined raise, 
196. Memo on the Gilchrist Report, attached thereto. 
197. That this was no false prophecy is shown by a telegram from 
Nchanga to the Consulting Engineer, Nairn, dd. 18.8.39 which 
states that a pilot hole in "A" shaft had started to 
liberate 200 gallons per minute. It took four days to seal 
off this water from "A" shaft. 
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raising from the 470 foot level and sinking from No. 3 shaft. 
"No further development along the strike of the ore -body should be 
attempted," he warns,198 "until the hanging -wall water is drained 
by means of pumps from the surface." He also criticised the 
unsatisfactory nature of the water -tight doors then in use and 
suggested that a "drop" type be installed. Pumping holes from 
the surface would be drilled as the normal means of dewatering in 
preparation for development. 
With the fitting of the watertight door in the 470 foot level 
cross -cut completed it would be possible to start lateral 
development in the foot -wall some fifty feet below the ore. 
Cross -cuts would be developed to join the pump holes, which, after 
drainage had been completed, could be supplied with fans on the 
surface and used for ventilation. Each cross -cut would contain 
a watertight door. After draining the hanging -wall beds, the work 
of mining the foot -wall ore could proceed in safety. 
The main shaft which was to be sunk in the foot -wall of the 
north limb of the syncline would be connected to the incline by a 
cross -cut of large enough section to act as a reservoir in the 
event of uncontrolled flooding. This would allow time to close 
the watertight door of the pump chamber. 
This comprehensive scheme, which would decide the final 
layout of the mine, would require about two and a half years 
before production could begin. 
198. Comments on Gilchrist Report 1933. 
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"B" Scheme As an alternative to the above scheme it was also 
suggested that two vertical shafts be sunk between No's. 2 and 3 
shafts with a cross -cut extending northwards from one of them to 
a pilot drainage hole near the other. This could be done in 
controlled stages coupled with the drainage of the surface 
"Dambos "199 over the syncline by means of ditches. This would 
also be of value in the anti- malaria campaign. 
"C" Scheme This was a modification of the "B" Scheme to avoid 
sinking shafts through the hanging -wall beds. The main shaft 
200 should be sunk in the hard, impervious granite of the foot -wall. 
Pumping and hauling facilities would be provided at three levels. 
From two proposed internal shafts, cross -cuts would be extended 
to the ore-body at intervals of 120 -140 feet. The main foot - 
wall haulages would be placed below the ore -body some 40 feet 
from it. In all other respects this scheme is similar to "B ". 
From a study of these schemes it iscbvious that none of them 
is perfect. In the "A" scheme, the linking of the main incline 
and the cross -cut from the proposed "C" shaft could only be 
anticipated in the distant future. Further, the actual siting 
of the "C" shaft was not ideal. However, it might be possible 
to develop No. 2 shaft as the main shaft or even continue the 
incline to the surface, where it would form the main entrance to 
199. Open areas, sometimes water courses, which flood in the 
rainy season. 
200. When the main "C" shaft was begun in May 1937 it struck 
solid granite at a depth of only 82 feet. 
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the mine. 
The "B" scheme, although it offered fairly quick access to the 
first and second Primary Panels201 and would give more time to solve 
the mining difficulties below, still involved both shafts passing 
through the heavily water -charged hanging -wall beds. 
"C" scheme would obviate this difficulty by having the new 
shaft in solid rock near the old No. 1 shaft which would then be 
too small to handle the increased production. However, much 
more cross -cutting would be involved before production could begin. 
A great advantage in the interests of safety would be that all 
pumping would take place underground at one large shaft, from 
which the surplus water could be delivered to the Nchanga stream 
well to the north where it left the syncline. It might also be 
possible to connect this new shaft to the old No. 2 shaft. 
The general considerations which would influence the final 
decision would be dictated largely by the financial position. 
Although it was reasonable to assume that nothing would transpire 
during the economic crisis of the early 1930's it was already 
known that -202 
201. Approx. 17,000,000 tons of ore averaging 7% copper 
(drilling estimate). NB. A later statement by L.A. Allen 
reviewing the progress of diamond drilling to date reveals 
that Gilchrist overestimated the tonnage by 12% - not much, 
under the circumstances (memo L.A. Allen dd. 12.11.40) 
202. These figures are extracted from the Nchanga Mining files. 
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a) the main power supply would have to come from Nkana. At an 
estimated rate of X1,700 per mile, this would cost 060,000. 
b) a pilot flotation plant capable of concentrating 500 tons of 
ore per day would cost £110,OOC. It would be unwise to exceed this 
tonnage during the initial few years of operation. 
c) Railage rates to Nkana were then at 1/9 per ton. 
d) The operating costs added up to approximately 9/- per ton 
plus 25 kw /hrs. per ton. 
e) Nkana was already producing 8,000 tons per day. 
f) If 20% of the ore mined at Nchanga was sent to Nkana for direct 
smelting two more furnaces costing £300,000 each would be required 
and in addition the smelting charges would be Cl 10 Od per ton. 
g) The capital expenditure involved would be £500,000 
(c600,000 if the pilot plant was constructed.) 
h) The work would take up to three years, with production 
commencing in under two. 
In his Report, Gilchrist produced an estimated balance 
sheet - 
Mining - at 12/6 per ton ore including 
4/- " "pumping etc.... 




per long ton copper 
r it it 
" " It 
£1377 t It " tt 
Smelting ...E1.50 " tt It I 
Royalty (at price of £50 /ton) ....E1.00 t " tt t 
£15.76 " If 11 1r 
Railway and Beira charges ....E5.45 'r tt tt tt 
Cost per long ton blister 
copper at Beira ...C21.21 " tt It tt 
Other realisation and general 
charges ...; 2.6 rt t i tt 
Cost at market ...E23.81 " /1 tt 11 
- 161 - 
Copper produced per day 
" year 45 x 300 
Annual profit at £40 /ton 
n r ri £50 /ton 
45 long tons 
13,500 long tons 
£220,000 
£350,000 
In view of this, he concluded that with an estimated capital 
expenditure of £5,600,000 it seemed that during the early stages of 
re- opening the Nchanga mine there would be sufficient return on 
expenditure to enable the mine to be rather more than self - 
supporting while the final layout of the mine and plant was being 
carried out. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN MINE 
In practice, the procedure ultimately followed was very 
similar to the "C" scheme. Throughout operations, all concerned 
were preoccupied with the problem of preventing flooding, with the 
result that this aspect must loom large in the narrative of what 
took place.203 Regardless of the method eventually used to 
remove the ore, it would be impossible to avoid fracturing the 
hanging -wall beds and it was, therefore, of fundamental importance 
that these beds be thoroughly drained before mining operations 
began. Further, as mining continued so had the water -level to 
be progressively lowered to keep pace with the mining 
development. The only way to do this was by inserting 
considerable numbers of diamond -drill holes into the porous beds 
and allowing them to drain under control to the pumps. 
The plan involved the driving of cross -cuts from the inclines 
into the hanging -wall until they penetrated the quartzite 
203. Throughout this section reference should be made to 
Diagrams VI, VIA and VIB (end -papers) 
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overlying the mica schist, taking care that they did not penetrate 
too far into the impervious Upper Banded Shales immediately below 
the dolomite schists on which the dolomite rests. Any accidental 
penetration of the water -logged dolomite would have had most 
unpleasant consequences. When ready, drill holes were inserted 
into the dolomite through valves to control the rush of water. 
The main difficulty lay in preventing these comparatively narrow 
diameter holes from silting up with mud. Dr. Bancroft suggesteF4 
that this mud should be allowed to drain freely into the cross- 
cut to avoid silting up the drainage holes. However, this would 
involve the problem of how to deal with the sudden mud -rushes 
which would inevitably occur into the cross -cut and probably fill 
it behind the watertight doors. It would be necessary to with- 
draw the water, open the watertight door, which should be 
constructed in two halves, the top opening first, and then dig out 
the mud. This would undoubtedly involve considerable delays. 
Further, the scheme would require the provision of substantial 
supports to prevent the collapse of the cross -cut, not timber, 
behind which mud could accumulate, but a steel grid, embedded in 
concrete, strong enough to stand up to the shock of blasting. 
Alternatively, the even slower method of complete cementation, 
leaving a channel for drainage, would be necessary. The idea 
of drainage holes being drilled from the surface was not then 
204. Mentioned in a letter from R.J. Nairn, Consulting 
Engineer dd. 9.9.39. In Nchanga Files. 
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favoured because they would be extremely difficult to locate 
from under ground and in any case might link up the water 
reservoirs at different levels. 
By the end of March 1939 the pumps were dealing with over 
6,000,000 gallons a day. During this time the pumping incline 
had been extended considerably.205 It reached a vertical depth 
of 1,100 feet during 1942, at which depth a pumping chamber was 
established, from which pumping was steadily increased until, 
after pumping ceased on the 500 foot level early in 1947, it 
eventually reached a total of 18,000,000 gallons a day. Meantime, 
Dr. Bancroft was writing206 to his Nchanga colleague, G.T. Walters - 
"....from the 1,050 foot cross -cut it is planned to drive within 
the Lower Banded Shales in both directions along the strike and to 
extend diamond -drill holes at intervals into the hanging -wall to 
drain at least the Hanging -wall beds (Banded Micaceous Sandstones 
with overlying Feldspathic Quartzites) between the top of the 
Lower Banded Shales and the bottom of the Upper Banded Shales. 
"The Lower Banded Shales have an average true thickness of 
45 -50 feet. Presumably, from the drive within the Lower Banded 
Shales it is planned to extend short cross -cuts at intervals 
towards the hanging -wall of these shales which will just give 
205. Under conditions of great safety and elaborate precautions. 
See memo from Mine Manager to Mine Captains and Shift 
Bosses dd. 8.1.38. 
206. Letter dd. 1.11.43. 
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"sufficient room for the diamond -drill holes to be extended towards 
the Upper Banded Shales. I very much hope that none of the cross- 
cuts from which diamond - drilling is to be done will have less than 
a cover of 15 feet true thickness of the Lower Banded Shales left 
intact over them.207 This should afford a reasonably safe barrier 
through which drilling can be extended into the immediately over- 
lying more or less soft, muddy Banded Micaceous Sandstones." 
Although valuable, the advice was not really necessary as every 
possible precaution was already being taken.208 The General 
Manager was able to enumerate these measures within a few days.209 
The main features of the work on the 1,050 foot level he 
listed as follows - 
a) Pilot holes of 12 feet are drilled before blasting, which 
does not take place if water flows under pressure from the holes. 
b) Diamond -drill holes are drilled through stand pipes and high 
pressure valves. 
c) All diamond - drilling will be done from cross -cuts driven 
north and south of the main drive. The southern cross -cuts are 
into quartzite. 
d) In the "dewatering" drives the track is carried on short 
piers below which is a drain of cross -section 6'8" x 3'0" - 
sufficient to carry all normal water. 
207. Bancroft's emphasis. 
208. Memo W.A. Pope, the General Manager, dd. 6.11.43. 
209. Letter from N.A. Pope to Asst. Consulting Engineer, 
Anglo- American dd. 13.11.43. 
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e) The Survey and Geology departments keep a close watch over the 
area. 
"Unless unforeseen difficulties arise ", he was able to claim, 
"the work now being undertaken should be carried to a successful 
conclusion without trouble and at reasonable cost. "210 
The management's views could then be summarised. No difficulty 
was anticipated in lowering the water table in the ore -body itself 
or in the beds immediately above it. However, it was possible 
that the water in the dolomite might not be affected by operations 
in the lower ore -body. It could only be hoped that sufficient 
fractures existed in the Upper Banded Shales to allow at least 
some of the dolomite water to drain into the lower beds. Failing 
this, deliberate puncturing of the Upper Banded Shales would be 
undertaken from about the 1,050 foot level. 
It was considered that caving211 could safely be started on 
the 625 foot level irrespective of the level of the water -table 
in the dolomite, but below that level any mining operations would 
necessitate attention to this water, as the waving procedure 
could conceivably fracture the containing rocks, permitting the 
large volume of dolomite water to enter the workings. It would 
not, however, be necessary to work out the procedure for draining 
this water until such a course became necessary. In any case, 
nothing could be done until the banded sandstones, quartzites 
210. Letter from General Manager dd. 13.11.43. 
211. This is explained later in the section on mining techniques. 
See bclou! p- 116 e!' sear 
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and schists had themselves been sufficiently drained to below the 
level of where the necessary access cross -cuts would have to be 
placed. Even without considering the dolomite beds, at least 
5,000,000 gallons a day would have to be pumped to lower the water - 
table in the ore -body, and immediately above it, to any great 
extent. 
It was at this stage that the Nchanga geologist Dr. Marais 
produced a new scheme to aid dewatering which was given 
considerable prominence by the Acting Manager, H.F. Grace, in 
his correspondence with the Consulting Engineer.212 According 
to Dr. Marais, one of the main difficulties of drilling up from 
the 1,050 foot level was that the holes were too long, had to 
be cased in soft areas and therefore finished up with too small 
a diameter. Instead of them he proposed that shot -drill holes 
should be drilled from the surface. These could be spaced as 
necessary and would have a final diameter of six or eight inches. 
The depth of the water -table could be controlled by the depth 
at which these holes were made to intersect the Upper Banded 
Shales and Feldspathic Quartzites. This plan would not only 
reduce the volume of water required to be pumped, but would also 
ensure more regularity in the supply of underground water used 
on the plant and for domestic purposes. Further, of even more 
importance in planning ahead, it would provide a definite 
indication at any given time of where the water- táb1Le actually was. 
212. In particular see letter dd. 29.9.44. 
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Marais therefore suggested that an experimental diamond 
drill hole should be put down from surface at a point just north 
of the intersection of the 1,050 foot cross -cut and the 1,050 
foot dewatering drive, to reach approximately 25 feet above the 
1,050 foot level. Then, if there was an increased flow of water, 
a row of large diameter shot -drill holes should be drilled along 
the strike in such a position as to intersect the Upper Banded 
Shales at the point "A ",215 that is, at a point a little below 
the position where the most northerly possible fracture plane 
induced by caving operations on the 760 foot level intersects 
the Upper Shales. This would ensure that the water -table was 
always lowered to a point below that at which the subsidence 
caused by caving could fracture the retaining rocks and release 
the water. Later, a second row of holes could be drilled to 
intersect the Upper Banded Shales at "B "214 which would extend 
the range of operations to the 970 foot level. An important 
point was that this work did not all have to be done at once, 
the holes only being extended along the strike as far as was 
necessary to ensure safe conditions for the workings below. 
They would never at any time need to extend far beyond the end 
of the operating sub -haulage, the actual spacing of them being 
determined by trial. 
213. See Diagram VIA (end -papers) 
214. Diagram VIA (end -papers) 
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This suggestion, which was later to become the acdepted 
practice215 and meet with great success216 was rejected by Dr. 
Bancroft217 at this time on the grounds that in the first place 
the water cavities were lenticular and that secondly too many drill 
holes would be required. Instead he suggested that the water in 
the Banded Sandstones and Shales should be removed through under- 
ground drill hobs and one or more cross -cuts, and that the removal 
of the water from above the Upper Banded Shales would best be 
accomplished by underground drill holes fitted with discharge 
valves, which would be placed in a drive extended along the strike 
within the Feldspathic Sandstones. 
This being the decision, the sooner work could start, in 
view of the difficulties envisaged, the better.218 The cross- 
cut was to be 6' x 9' with the lower 3 feet as a concreted drain. 
Watertight doors would be fitted as required. 
215. By a decision taken at a round -table conference and noted 
by W.A. Pope in letter to Directors dd. 24.11.48. 
216. Memo. from Acting Underground Manager, N.A. Wilkie to 
Acting Asst. Manager dd. 14.6.50. See also memo. from 
the Geologist, McKinnon, to the Acting General Manager dd. 
6.7.53 "Each of these inflows from surface boreholes brought 
about substantial and permanent reductions in the dolomite 
water -table level far in excess of that brought about by 
any underground holes....This experience has indicated that 
the fastest way to dewater the dolomite reservoir is to 
drain the crystalline dolomite and the fastest way to do 
this is by means of surface boreholes. If these can be 
extended to drainage points in or near the normal extraction 
workings, the necessity of costly, time -consuming cross- 
cutting is obviated. 
217. Letter to Dr. Marais dd. 4.1.45. 
218. Consulting Engineer, W.A. Odgers, to Manager dd. 4.1.45. 
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The measures taken by the management to reduce the dangers 
from flooding in the 1,050 foot water Cross -cut North were in 
marked contrast to the approach prior to 1931 and well illustrate 
the extreme care and attention which the present Company has always 
shown towards the interests of safety. The official requirements 
were listed in a memorandum from the Underground Manager to the 
Assistant Underground Manager dated the 4th. April 1946 - 
rt 
1. Pilot diamond -drill holes must be inserted to 100 feet ahead 
of the face. 
2. If water in quantity or under pressure is struck, further 
diamond -drill holes must be drilled to effect drainage.. 
3. If a full bore of water persists and no further holes are 
possible, the face must be stopped until the water runs off, even 
if a long period of time is required. 
4. Immediately a diamond -drill hole is drilled the water pressure 
must be taken. 
The maximum advance must never be less than 40 feet from the 
end of the pilot hole. 
6. If no water in quantity is encountered - 
(a) 6 x 15 ft. holes shall be drilled for cementation as 
indicated. 
(b) Cement is to be pumped at a pressure of at least 1,000 
lbs. per sq. in. 
(c) After pumping, a 5 ft. round, including 2 x 12 ft. pilot 
holes, should be drilled and blasted electrically. 
(d) During blasting, the water -tight door must be closed. 
(e) The Mine Captain must be present during blasting, must 
verify "d" above, and report any increase in water or 
mud liberated by the blast. 
(f) Before lashinPakes place, the top half of the door 
must be opened first to allow observations of the 
conditions behind the door. 
219. Removing the debris. 
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(g) The lasher is to be accompanied by an official to examine 
conditions before lashing is commenced. 
(h) All pilot holes and cementation holes must be measured by 
the shift -boss and mine captain and logged. 
(i) The sump under the watertight door must be kept clear, and 
the door tested at least once a day in the presence of the 
mine captain. 
(j) If the door requires closing, the bottom half must be 
closed first. 
7. This memorandum is to be signed by all those concerned in the 
operation, the penalty for breaches of the instructions being instant 
B 
dismissal. 
Although no one can deny that such mining as this will always 
be a difficult and dangerous operation, the measures enumerated 
above go far towards making it a feasible proposition with a 
minimum of risk for those actually involved. It is ironical that 
the labour was largely in vain, for in spite of drilling numerous 
holes from this cross -cut and carefully keeping them open, the 
amount of water pumped from the mine during the three months from 
April to June 1947 showed no material increase.220 It was this 
no doubt which brought about the decision to try drill holes from 
the surface. 
Despite all precautions, the bottom of t"Att shaft flooded early 
in December 1949. The shock of this, although no damage was done, 
brought forth a severely critical letter from the Managing Director 
in London, Mr. C.F.S. Taylor,221 which was firmly dealt with by the 
General Manager W.A. Pope in his correspondence with the Managing 
220. Memo. from geologist McKinnon to Asst. Manager dd. 4.7.47. 
221. Letter L.J.60 -A/50 dd. 21.4.50. 
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Director in Johannesburg.222 
After summarising the difficulties experienced with small 
diameter diamond -drill holes and the cross -cuts and noting the 
successes obtained from them, he continues, "All the ore needed to 
run the proposed extensions to the plant to the end of 1953 will be 
obtained. There is sufficient above the 970 foot level to ensure 
this....After 1953 the requisite 300,000 tons per month for the 
plant can be mined from the Nchanga ore -body from levels above the 
water -table." 
He goes on to comment on Mr. Taylor's remark that, concerning 
the flooding of "A" shaft, he had "heard opinions expressed that we 
were fortunate that the results were not worse." There was never 
any danger of flooding vital areas at any time, he declared. The 
watertight doors on the 1,100 foot level were intended to confine 
any flooding to "A" shaft and protect the pump chamber. In fact, 
it was not necessary to close the doors. The capacity of the 
fixed pumps in the pump chamber was more than adequate to deal with 
the situation, and although the mobile pumps were unable to cope, 
the watertight doors existed because of this very possibility. 
The pumping equipment was always adequately safeguarded by water- 
tight doors, whilst the regular testing of the water -table before 
any mining operations was a perfectly satisfactory method of 
ensuring that a major flood would not take place. 
In any case, Mr. Taylor's implied suggestions that there was 
no real policy regarding the dewatering problem, that opirrions 
222. Letter M.J. 169/50 dd. 11.7.50. 
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differed among the experts and that there was doubt whether future 
tonnage commitments could safely be met were all unfair criticisms. 
The records clearly show that everything done had taken place as the 
result of the most complete consultation and agreement between the 
mine management and the consulting engineers, and had followed the 
basis of a definite policy. Further, this policy was the one 
initially proposed by Dr. Bancroft himself in 1944, although 
modifications had been made owing to the many unavoidable delays in 
implementing the original scheme.223 Dr. Bancroft continually 
urged haste, but never complained about the method of approach, 
which was, fundamentally, his own. There seemed little doubt, at 
this point, that the future tonnage requirements would be met 
provided progress was maintained. 
It will be recalled that Dr. Bancroft had rejected the idea of 
shot -drill holes from the surface, for what then appeared to be 
sound reasons. (see above p.i6t' ) Instead, his intention was 
to dewater the Banded Sandstones and Schists by drilling through 
them from the 1,050 foot contour drive. Between this water and 
the water in the dolomites lie the impervious Upper Banded Shales, 
in which he proposed to place another contour drive from which it 
would be possible to drill into and so release the water in the 
dolomite. However, in order to get into the correct position for 
this second contour drive, a cross -cut had to pass through the 
Banded Sandstones and Schists. 
223. e.g. wartime difficulties in obtaining such items as drill - 
hole casing. 
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It was here that the trouble arose, for these beds were soft in 
places, contained much water and were subject to mud -rushes. In 
view of the fact that the 1,050 foot level was the one from which 
the dewatering of the Banded Sandstones and Schists was to take place, 
by means of holes drilled steeply upwards, it becomes obvious that the 
1,050 foot level cross -cut must pass, throughout its length, through 
undrained ground. In retrospect it seems unfortunate that such a 
choice of site for it should have been made.224 Early in 1945, when 
it had reached a point about 30 feet below the bottom of the lower 
water horizon it encountered a flow which reached 2,000,000 gallons 
a day, was abandoned and was subsequently used as a drainage point 
for this water. 
It is not certain to what extent the decision not to proceed 
further with the cross -cut was dictated by necessity, or expedient. 
However, although technically the work might be possible the danger 
was extreme. The ground was in places so soft that drill rods 
from the surface sank through it under their own weight and the 
probable water pressure was going to be about 100 lbs per sq.in. 
There would be little opportunity for closing the watertight door 
if an inrush occurred, and in general the element of chance was too 
prominent for the attempt to be justified. 
In 1947, after work had been suspended for two years, the 
General Manager, Mr. Pope and the Consulting Engineer, Mr. Nichols 
fully discussed the matter and agreed that notwithstanding the 
224. See comments of C.P. Nichols (Cons. Eng.) to Managing 
Director, Anglo- American, Johannesburg dd. 2.8.50. 
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urgency of the dewatering problem they could not risk advancing this 
face. 5 
As an alternative a decision was taken to attempt drainage of 
the dolomites by drilling through from surface to the 1,050 foot 
contour drive, casing the holes below the Upper Banded Shale. A 
number of these holes successfully penetrated the workings. The 
danger, of course, was that previously raised by Dr. Bancroft, that 
a collapse of the casing could release water into the lower water 
horizon and it was therefore agreed that any hole which was not 
apparently producing a normal flow should be immediately plugged at 
the Upper Banded Shale horizon. 
At the same time, the process of drilling up from the 1,050 
foot contour drive had been continued. The flow from these plus 
the heavy draw -off from the abandoned cross -cut was lowering the 
lower water horizon at an appreciable rate. Obviously if more 
cross -cuts could be started from the 1,050 foot level to try to 
get through to the Upper Banded Shales the process would be 
considerably accelerated. However, the considerable fall of the 
water -table already noted suggested to those concerned that if a 
cross -cut was driven at a higher elevation it might penetrate 
ground which was already partly drained. This would greatly 
decrease the probable difficulties of the venture. Therefore, 
a cross -cut on the 970 foot level was started. Although this 
cross -cut did, in fact, encounter water and soft ground, the 
225. Discussed in letter from Nichols dd. 2.8.50 to Managing 
Director, Johannesburg. 
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water was not under any great pressure and did not prove an 
insuperable obstacle. The cross -cut attained its objective; east 
and west drives were opened and holes drilled up into the dolomite 
water. To hasten the completion of the project, large- diameter 
holes were also put down from surface, several of which were highly 
successful giving a yield of over 2,000,000 gallons a day each.226 
The fall of the dolomite water -table continued steadily. From 
mid 1947 to mid 1950 it fell 120 feet in hole M.1., 160 feet in 
No. 2 borehole and over 125 feet in M.3 which had dried up by 
August 1950.227 It appeared reasonable to suppose that if this 
reduction was maintained there would be little difficulty in 
maintaining the water -level below the fracture line of the cave. 
228 
Nevertheless, Nichols sounded a warning 
"We wish to repeat our firm opinion that the rate of 
extraction from the Nchanga West Ore -body should be reduced 
from the 240,000 tons per month required for the Third Stage 
Expansion as soon as the Nchanga Ore -body 9 can be brought into 
production. The possible maximum fracture line of the beds, 
when caving to the 1,085 foot level sub -haulage, intersects the 
226. Paper by M.W. Rushton and K.E. McKay, General Manager and 
Manager respectively, in the Journal of the Institution 
of Mining and Metallurgy, December 1960. 
227. Figures from Nchanga Files. 
228. Letter dd. 2.8.50 op.cit. 
229. NoW the "Open Pit ". This is discussed in a later section. 
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"Upper Banded Shale at about 680 feet below the surface (the present 
intersection of the dolomite water horizon and the Upper Banded Shale, 
over the centre of the workings, is about 420 feet below surface) and 
while we may reasonably assume from the evidence available that the 
dolomite water level can be brought below this point at the required 
date by intensive drainage on the 970 foot level, we do not think it 
safe to estimate on continued rapid extraction from the Nchanga West 
Ore -body until we are firmly established as regards drainage from the 
1,600 foot level pump chamber. Apart from the dewatering aspect, we 
do not consider it good policy230 to concentrate all mining on the 
Nchanga West Ore -body, but we have emphasised the dewatering aspect 
here to make it clear that it is not only policy that has to be 
considered." 
He then goes on to concur with the General Manager's comments 
on the critical letter from London.231 
we would also point out that criticism of the loss of the face 
of a shaft, sunk under the conditions in "A ", or of the consequence 
of this loss, can only be justifiable if it can be shown that there 
were precautions that could have been taken and were not taken. In 
this connection we feel it right to remind London that Nchanga we 
sunk many thousands of feet of shaft and driven a considerable 
distance of dewatering developments under extremely difficult 
conditions. The 970 cross -cut in particular called for a 
considerable degree of skill and judgment. 
230. The implications of this are discussed later, See below 
231. From C.F.S. Taylor op.cit. 
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"We trust that we have made it clear that the mine management 
and ourselves are giving the problem all the attention it deserves." 
By mid 1953 the position was beooming relatively clear.233 
The dolomite water problem was virtually solved, and the question of 
the water in the Banded Sandstones and Schists and in the Arkose was 
of far more immediate concern. The uppermost reservoirs had been 
so reduced that caving from the 1,085 foot under -cut could be 
started, although this was not scheduledto begin until June 1957. 
This was not the case though with the two lowest reservoirs which 
were still too high for the work to begin. The main danger was the 
Arkose reservoir in which the ]evel was still 300 feet above the 
1,500 foot Main Cross -cut. There was a risk that the valley in 
rle 
the basement rocks234 which had caused flooding of "A" shaft could 
extend to the 1,500 foot Main Haulage and cause an inflow which 
might overwhelm the pumping capacity in "C" shaft, unless 
adequate -precautions were taken. 
McKinnon then produced a scheme for consideration during 
future planning. The first essential was obviously to reduce the 
Arkose water, which should be done by developing the 1,550 foot 
sub -haulage as quickly as possible and drilling from there. 
This was dependent on the 1,600 foot level pump chamber being in 
232. Dr. Bancroft also agreed with these comments, See letter 
J.L. 140 -A /50 dd. 8.8.50 from the Asst. Manager, Phillimore 
to the Managing Director, London. 
233. McKinnon to Acting General Manager dd. 8.7.53. 
234. See Diagram VIB (end -papers) 
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operation.235 Sufficient of these holes could be extended through 
the Lower Banded Shales to lower the Banded Sandstones and Schists 
reservoir to about the 1,050 foot level and so facilitate the mining 
of a drainage raise between the 1,050 foot and 970 foot Dewatering 
Cross -cuts. 
In addition, three surface dewatering holes should be drilled 
to the Lower Banded Shales near the 2,130 foot sub- haulage.236 The 
centre one would be over the proposed 2,130 foot level Dewatering 
Cross -cut North and the others at 500 feet on either side along the 
strike. Additional holes could be drilled as circumstances 
dictated. As each hole would require about nine months to drill, 
and as the 2,130 foot level sub -haulage was scheduled to start in 
September, 1956, the drilling should not be delayed longer than 
necessary. This scheme would permit controlled and safe dewatering 
to be possible, with the result that caving of the Nchanga West 
Ore -body could proceed down to the 1,620 foot level under -cut. 
The schedule of events may now be brought briefly up to date. 
Dewatering operations are now well in advance of mining, so much so 
that:in 1959 the volume of water pumped from the mine began to 
decrease, until, from the earlier average of over 17,000,000 
gallons a day it had dwindled to 15,000,000 gallons a day.?37 
235. An estimated maximum capacity of 10,000,000 gallons per day 
would be required from the 1,600 foot level pumps and 
30,000,000 gallons per day when the pumps were at the 
2,190 foot level. 
236. Shown in red on Diagram VIB (end- papers) 
237. The present pumping capacity from underground is over 
40,000,000 gallons per day. 
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The removal of water from the underground workings is a two -edged 
problem. Although much of the danger and difficulty of developing 
the mine has been caused through an excess of water, nevertheless 
the availability of this water on the surface is an essential factor 
in the scheme of operations. The plant, the mine and the township 
relied on it for everyday usage, there being up till recently no 
other source of supply. Further, all of the available supply was 
used.238 Faced with this dilemma, the management erected a pump 
station on the banks of the Kafue River, some five miles away. 
This station, with a capacity of 6,000,000 gallons a day, came into 
operation in 1960. It is not yet supplying anything like this 
amount, so that there is plenty of scope for handling any future 
increase in demand. 
MINING TECHNIQUES AT NCHANGA (I) 
Once the dewatering procedure at Nchanga was seen to be 
an outstanding success, the question of production began to loom 
large on the horizon. During these years in the late 1930's far- 
sighted men, including some of the mining fraternity, began to 
notice also the gathering clouds of war. With the ever -increasing 
menace of Nazi Germany a harsh reality, all the indications were 
that a maximum output of copper would soon become not merely a 
238. The differential flotation plant alone uses 10,000,000 
gallons a day, and the average total consumption of 
mine and township is 17,000,000 gallons a day. 
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desirable economic possibility, but a vital factor in the war 
effort. Paradoxically though, the motive for providing a maximum 
output might also be the means of preventing it from becoming a 
reality, for the outbreak of war would almost inevitably involve 
considerable reductions in the quantities of the essential materials 
and equipment required for the maintenance and operation of the mine 
which could be obtained from overseas. As early as March 1938, 
eight months before the Munich Conference, it had been suggested 
that the permanent hoists and headgear for the Vertical Shaft 
should be ordered as soon as possible rather than wait until the 
shaft was completed.239 The worry in the minds of the engineers 
was not an idle one, for the exigencies of the war years did 
actually delay the dewatering programme.240 
To advise on the best method of removing the ore with the 
maximum efficiency and expediency and minimum cost an American 
expert, Mr. W.E. Romig, was engaged by the Anglo- American 
Company. Romig very soon began to justify his position. His 
first step was to list the available information on the ore - 
body.241 It was very limited - 
1. A cross -cut on the 360 foot level had passed through the 
foot -wall into the ore -body, but had not contacted the / 
239. Personal letter from R. Parker at Nchanga to the Consulting 
Engineer, R.J. Nairn dd. 12.3.38. The Vertical "C" 
Shaft did not in fact pass the 1,200 foot level until the 
end of 1939. 
240. See above p. 
21+1. Report from W.E. Romig dd. 3.7.39. Nchanga Mining Files. 
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hanging -wall. 
2. A cross -cut on the 480 foot level had been extended similarly. 
3. There were other workings - cross -cuts and drifts - on the 480 
foot level which did not contact any wall. 
4. Flat diamond -drill holes from the 480 foot level had penetrated 
both the hanging -wall and the foot -wall. 
5. Diamond -drill holes had been put down from surface. 
It is plain then, that the footwall had been exposed at only two 
points, and the hanging -wall not at all. 
At this time, the water -table was only slightly below the 
360 foot level. 
Work had meantime been progressing on a pilot plant designed 
to treat 500 tons of ore a day. This was due to commence 
operations on August 2nd.1939242 but in fact was commissioned on 
the following day. This plant was finally closed down on 
January 27th 1946 when the new concentrator, which was able to 
handle 3,000 thort tons of ore a day, came into operation. A 
temporary assay laboratory was also opened. 
During the preceding weeks, Romig's task had been to produce 
a plan of operations. Two possible methods were! open to him - 
243 
a) "top- slicing" - self -explanatory process and - b) "caving ". 
Romig soon came to the conclusion that a system of caving would 
be the most desirable. Not only was the ore -body of a soft 
242. Letter Pope to Nairn dd. 1.8.39. 
243. See below p. Iá6 
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nature highly suitable for the process, but the strong arkose foot - 
wall would ensure good mining conditions. On the other hand, the 
hanging -wall, which consisted in places of shale overlain by mica 
schist and banded sandstone was also soft and would readily follow 
down the ore -body as it caved. Romig was confident that the méthod 
would succeed.244 This did not mean, though that the plan was not 
fraught with difficulties. A possible one was that after a 
considerable amount of caving had been carried out, the collapse of 
the overhead ground might cause such pressure on the workings that 
they would be crushed and the maintenance of the scraper- drifts and 
finger raises245 seriously handicapped. Only actual experiment 
would provide an answer. Further, the mud in the sandstone and 
schist of the hanging -wall would have to be thoroughly drained. 
(This would, of course, apply equally to the "top- slicing" method.) 
In his report246 Nairn explained the steps which had already been 
taken. The draining of the hanging -wall beds was proceeding 
satisfactorily and had reached almost to the 470 foot level in the 
area immediately overlying the ore -body. The drilling of a series 
of holes, each about 600 feet long to the dolomite above the upper 
shale horizon had already been started, the idea being that 
although the flow to the pumps would be increased, the possibility 
of a sudden inrush of water to the workings would be considerably 
reduced. 
244. Report from Nairn to the Anglo- American Corporation dd.27.7.39. 
245. See below pp. I$% ¿k scab, 
246. Nairn op.cit. 
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Romig had by now produced his estimates of costs - 5/- a ton 
for the caving method and 8/- to 10/- a ton for top slicing. An 
area at the extmne south end of the ore -body had been set aside for 
experiments in top -slicing, otherwise a system of "continuous caving" 
would be operated, extending both east and west and down dip 
simultaneously from the centre of the ore -body. This is a 
modification of the "block caving" technique in which the ore -body 
is divided into segments for removal. 
The more obvious "cut and fill" method was not considered 
suitable here because of the considerable thickness of the ore - 
body - 50' - 100' - and the likelihood of serious subsidence of the 
overlying ground. The cost would be high - over 20/- a ton - the 
supporting pillars of ore left behind would have to be thick and 
close together, so causing considerable waste, and there was a 
lack of suitable material with which to fill the gaps between them. 
It could be considered only if serious difficulties were encountered 
in draining the hanging -wall beds. 
As the orebody was limited in width, the foot -wall development 
was being so arranged that the scraper raises would be developed 
between levels, which themselves would be 160 feet apart. Finger 
raises would be pushed up to the ore -body from the scraper raises. 
On the various levels, the "scrapings" from the raises would be 
loaded into trucks and hauled by locomotive to bins which would be 
connected to the main hauling level leading to the shaft.247 
247. These technicalities are explained below p.16 el' eeo1 
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The complicated techniques of this method of mining required 
extreme safety precautions. In addition to the measures to be 
taken against flooding, the problem of possible collapse of the 
workings due to pressure from above as caving proceeded, had to be 
dealt with. Very probably, the finger raises would require 
timbering, and for this, together with the actual drawing of ore 
from the raises, highly trained, experienced men would be required. 
They were not available locally. By arrangement with Messrs. Pope 
and Nairn, therefore, Romig arranged to make tentative enquiries in 
the United States for suitable experts to come to Nchanga. Two 
timbermen, a Mine Captain to take char_'e of withdrawing ore, and an 
Assistant Underground Manager were envisaged. 
In addition, further safeguards would have to be devised to 
prevent an increase of accidents, in the unfamiliar conditions of 
caving, to the African employees. Suitable training for Europeans 
and Africans alike would take some considerable time, during which 
production could not be expected to be high. Expenses would also 
initially be substantial. For a production of 1,000 tons of ore 
per day the costs from July 1939 to March 1940 would be 
approximately X1,161,550.248 The intention, as previously seen, 
was to start at the extreme south end of the ore -body near No. 1 
248. Romig's estimate. NB. One of the criticisms frequently 
made against Romig by those who worked with him was his 
failure adequately to translate his own concepts of large 
scale operations to the relatively small scale orebody 
at Nchanga. 
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Shaft. This would reduce ore loss to a minimum, but as the ore was 
comparatively poor there, the initial results from the pilot plant 
would not appear promising. It would have to be remembered that 
these results were certain to iniprove.249 
There was yet another factor which had to be considered. In 
some areas the Nchanga ore -body overlaps the deeper and richer 
Nchanga West Ore -body. What was to happen to the 1,700,000 tons of 
ore above the 970 foot level if caving of the lower ore -body took 
place underneath it? The problem had not escaped the notice of the 
planners. The consulting Engineer, Nairn, clarified the position 
to his directors250 by making some telling points. This tonnage 
was actually comparatively low, the grade of ore was poor and the 
mining of it would prove difficult and expensive. In the lower 
ore -body itself above the 970 foot level the reserves indicated a 
life of 20 -25 years at a removal rate of 4,000 tons a day.251 In 
view of the low profits which would be made from the upper ore -body, 
he recommended that this ore be left out of the planning at that 
time. 
249. The general scheme is clearly shown in Diagram VI 
(end -papers) 
250. Letter dd. 5.4.41. 
251. Bancroft's Nchanga West estimate had been 46,500,000 tons. 
By October 1940 it was 103,200,000 tons. This high figure 
was not generally publicised at the time. 
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The Nchanga West Ore -body, which is the subject of the caving 
operations, is on the flatter, south limb of the Nchanga syncline.252 
It dips at an angle which varies from 15° to 25° north and has an 
average thickness of 80 feet, although the maximum and minimum widths 
range from 200 feet to only a very few feet in the narrowest parts. 
The ore -bearing rocks include the Arkose, Transition Beds, and the 
Lower Banded Shale. Beneath them, there is a hard granite, in which, 
together with the Arkose, the actual workings are sited. The ore - 
bearing rocks, together with the Banded Sandstones on top of them, 
are soft and easily caved. In places, however, the copper minerals 
penetrate down into the Arkose for as much as 60 feet. Where this 
occurs a different caving technique becomes necessary. 
MINING TECHNIQUES AT NCHANGA (II)255 
The method of mining the Nchanga West Ore -body, as introduced 
by W.E. ' Romig, is known as a "continuous long -wall caving system ". 
Basically, it consists of inserting into the foot -wall of the ore - 
body, from below, a number of evenly spaced draw points known as 
"finger- raises ". These finger- raises lead to collecting points 
known as "scraper- drifts" along which the rock is mechanically 
scraped to the service raises and sub -haulages. 
when the finger- raises are ready, the layer of ore (the bottom 
layer) immediately above them is broken up by blasting and allowed 
252. See Diagram IV (end -papers) 
253. See Diagram VIII (end -papers) 
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to collapse into the finger- raises. When this is drawn off, the ore 
above caves, through gravity, and may be drawn off through the finger - 
raises at a controlled rate. This process is repeated down the dip 
of the ore- body.254 
There are, of course, both advantages and disadvantages to this 
method of mining. By allowing gravity to do the work of breaking 
up the ore, expensive drilling and blasting is obviated. On the 
other hand, the initial development is costly, so that the method 
is uneconomic unless the ore -body to be worked is a thick one. 
Further, it is impossible to be selective when undercutting, 
and a dilution rate of 5% - 15% of waste rock is inevitable. 
When the continuous caving system came into operation it was 
essential that costs be kept to a minimum, bearing in mind that the 
maximum anticipated output of ore was not expected to exceed 
120,000 tons per month. Therefore, the scale of development was 
relatively small. The haulages, 9 ft. by 8 ft. in cross -section, 
were driven along the strike some 35 ft. below the foot -wall and 
about 150 ft. apart. The vertical height between each was about 
40 ft. The scraper drifts were pushed up from one haulage to 
the next at 30 ft. intervals and the finger- raises were 15 ft. 
255 
apart, placed alternatively on either side of the scraper drifts. 
After the finger raises had been mined in an orthodox manner, the 
ore was induced to cave and scraped down the scraper raises into 
254. See Diagram IX (end -papers) 
255. See Diagram X (end -papers) 
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4 -ton Granby cars.256 The direction of caving was along the line 
of strike, working out to the limits of the ore -body. Those 
"old- timers" - and there are several - who were involved in this 
experiment, all recall that although there was an immediate return 
of ore for processing, there were many disadvantages, the most 
serious being the long delays involved in removing the ore to the 
hoists. Only 15,000 tons per month per haulage could be withdrawn 
under this system. 
The essential improvement took place in 1943257 The 
haulages were now put in lower down at about 50 feet below the foot - 
wall and the inclined distances between them increased to about 
180 feet. Approximately equi- distant between the haulages and the 
foot -wall - that is about 25 feet above the haulages - were 
inserted "grizzly "258 drives which linked up the lower ends of the 
scraper drifts. Each grizzly led to the haulage via a transfer 
raise (a short passage down which the ore passing through the 
grizzly fell) and at the bottom end of each transfer raise was a 
manually operated wooden loading box from which the Granby cars 
were filled. The production from each level now rose to 40,000 
256. Specially designed wagons embodying a tilting arrangement 
for unloading the ore as required. Later, Lawrence Allen 
introduced a larger 10 -ton car. Now, 25 -ton cars are 
used. 
257.. See below p. 197 
258. "Grizzlies" are large gratings through which rock and ore 
may fall. The grating holds back over -sized pieces of 
rock, which are then reduced by blasting. 
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tons per month, which was adequate to supply the 150,000 tons 
required by the crushers, when four levels were in operation. 
The haulages were now constructed rather larger in cross -section, 
12 x 10 ft. at first and then 13 x 12 ft. Nevertheless, even though 
production increased, disadvantages remained. Too many loading 
boxes were needed - one for each scraper raise - which meant that 
cheap and less efficient wooden ones had to be used instead of much 
more efficient, but expensive, steel ones. Extra labour was also 
required to operate the loading boxes. Finally, and most serious, 
the fumes from the necessary blasting, for example, on the grizzlies, 
passed into working areas on higher levels causing more trouble for 
the ventilation engineers and a strict time -table for blasting. 
The delays in removing ore led to experiments which are now 
the standard procedure. The ore is now scraped from several 
scraper drifts into one large pass which leads to the haulage and 
culminates in a steel loading box with a door operated by compressed 
air.259 From the grizzly at every scraper -drift there is a small 
sub -transfer chute raise leading to the transfer raise. The ore 
is scraped from the finger raises along the scraper drift and 
allowed to fall through the grizzly into the transfer raise along 
which it is scraped through another grizzly and into a pass which 
leads to the haulage below. Auxiliary haulages are driven to 
increase the production still further. The removal of the ore 
(tramming) is done by 25 -ton side - tipping cars which are pulled 
by 12 -ton electiic locomotives. 
259. See Diagram VIII (end -papers) 
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The system is highly efficient, the 1963 output being about 
150,000 tons per month from each level. Not only that, there is 
now no fear of fumes circulating in other workings. The steel 
loading boxes are placed every 400 feet along the haulages, thus 
making loading easy, but this is a danger in that a breakdown would 
cause considerable disorganisation. Constant checks are made and 
a system of planned maintenance operates throughout. 
UNDERGROUND WORKINGS AT NCHANGA WEST ORE- BODY26O 
Shafts 
The Nchanga West Ore -body is serviced by a total of fifteen 
shafts, the main hoisting shafts being "C" and "D ", both situated 
in the foot -wall rocks and equipped with steel headframes. 
Hoisting Shafts 
"C" shaft is a square, vertical shaft having six compartments 
and reaching a vertical depth of 2,521 feet. The main levels are 
at approximately 500 feet intervals down to the 2,120 foot level. 
The compartments contain two 10 ton skips, a double -deck cage 
(capacity 120 men), a counterweight, a ladder way and numerous 
pipes and cables. All the waste rock is brought up by this shaft. 
"D" shaft is a four compartment, rectangular, vertical shaft 
which is sited 139 feet west of "C" shaft and reaches a depth of 
1,743 feet. It contains two pairs of 10 ton skips, one pair of 
260. In the "Transactions of the Institution of Mining and 
Metallurgy" Vol. 70, Part 3, 1960 -61 there is a survey 
of the Nchanga Mine at that date by M.W. Rushton and K.E. 
MRckay, then General Manager and Manager respectively. I 
wish to acknowledge my debt to their work and also to Mr. 
Neil Wilkie for his unlimited patience in translating the 
technicalities of their article into lay terms. 
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which can be replaced by a triple -deck cage to handle men and 
materials on the day shift. The skips are for hoisting ore only. 
Both these shafts are interconnected on all main levels and have 
a combined hoisting capacity of 500,000 tons of ore and waste a 
month. They are concreted throughout and the hoisting is semi- 
automatic in its operation. 
Service Shafts 
A system of service inclines approximately parallel to the foot - 
wall but in sound rock well below it have been extended from the 
surface to the 1,500 foot level. These shafts handle most of the 
material required underground and provide access to the caving 
areas. Some of the air supply is also introduced down these shafts. 
At vertical intervals of 130 feet sub -haulage levels have been 
driven from which the actual extraction workings are opened up. 
Below the 1,500 foot level, it was found that sub -vertical 
shafts with automatic lifts were quicker and more economic. The 
first of these, known as "F" shaft reached the 2,120 foot level in 
1960.261 
Pumping Shafts 
These are independent of, and sealed off from the other 
workings and would provide an independent entrance to all the 
pump stations down to the 2,200 foot level in the event of flooding. 
261. Throughout this section reference should be made to 
Diagram VII. 
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Main Haulages, or cross -cuts to the ore -body are sited on the 480, 
970, 1,500 and 2,120 foot levels. Those on the lower levels below 
the 970 foot level are now the ones mainly used, as most of the 
production of the mine now comes from these deeper areas. The 970 
foot and 1,500 foot lemis have twin cross -cuts to the sub -haulage, 
extra space being required for ventilation purposes. One -way high- 
speed traffic operates along them. The purpose of these main 
haulages is to remove ore and waste from the mine. The material 
to be removed comes along the sub -haulages above the main haulages 
(at right angles to them), is transferred into them via ore passes 
and then taken by train to the hoisting shafts. 
Sub -Haulages, which have been developed from the service inclines 
and from the main levels provide access to the caved areas above 
them. All the mined material passes through them en route to the 
surface. 
In 1963 two areas were being caved - a length of about 2,400 
feet between the 970 foot level and the 1,220 foot level in the 
centre, and, in the western section, a length of about 1,100 feet 
between the 970 and 1,085 foot levels. Between these two is an 
area of about 700 feet of barren rock. 
As had been anticipated, the outbreak of war in 1939 and the 
consequent unavailability of essential materials seriously curtailed 
the programme as originally envisaged and led to the postponement 
of capital development. Nevertheless, the output from the mine 
during the war years was considerable. In the six years from 
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March 1939 to March 1945 the concentrates sent from the pilot plant 
at Nchanga to the concentrator at Nkana (Kitwe) yielded 76,584 long 
tons of copper.262 The capital of the mine was also increased to 
07,500,000 in July 1946. 
During the immediate post -war years there was an increasing 
demand for coal which could not be met by the collieries at Wankie 
in Southern Rhodesia. Imports from South Africa and from the 
United States via Lobito Bay still failed to meet the deficit and 
in consequence, it proved necessary to adapt in part the power 
plants dt the Copperbelt mines to woodburning. Each mine employed 
large numbers of woodcutters and seriously denuded the surrounding 
countryside of trees. At the present time it is possible to 
observe large amounts of new growth springing from the stumps left 
behind by the cutters. Already the new growth is almost as high 
as the old, although not as thick, and in a few more years the 
damage should be altogether made good. The cutting of trees is 
now forbidden in the peri -urban areas; African contractors cut 
firewood under licence and "charcoal Burners" still operate, but 
that is all.263 
In spite of the efforts of the mines to maintain their fuel 
supplies,none was entirely successful. Each mine in turn had to 
close down temporarily to enable stocks of fuel to accumulate. 
262. Figures in the Nchanga Files. Naturally, no information 
was publicised during the war years. 
263. See Article by C.E. Duff, Q.B.E. in "Northern Rhodesia 
Journal" Vol. II, No. 1, 1953. 
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This exrlains why for the year ended March 1948, the production of 
blister copper from Nchanga was only 23,468 long tons, roughly 3,500 
tons below the rated capacity of the mine. 
During 2.948 the two mining groups agreed to link the thermal 
power plants at Nchanga, Rhokana, Mufulira and the Roan Antelope, and 
to this end, the Northern Rhodesia Power Corporation was created as a 
subsidiary of the mining companies. The great advantage of this 
scheme was that to raise the capacity of all the plants it was now 
necessary to incorporate extra equipment only at one (Nchanga). 
Nevertheless, it was realised that expansion of the existing 
thermal plants was unsatisfactory, and it was in this knowledge that 
the Belgians in the Congo were contacted about the possibilities of 
using hydro- electricity. This ultimately led to the setting up of 
the Rhodesia Congo Border Power Corporation in 1953 to co- ordinate 
the existing thermal plants and to integrate them with the Congo 
hydro- electric system and, later, with Kariba. 
The Copperbelt system had been integrated with Union Miniare 
by 1956 when power first began to flow from the installation at 
Le Marinel on the Lualaba River to the Copperbelt central switching 
station at Kitwe. Early in 1960 Kariba power was linked in and by 
1963 provided over two -thirds of the Copperbelt requirements, which 
for that year totalled 2,039,000,000 kilowatt hours.264 
264. Figures compiled from the various Annual Reports. 
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By 1950 the corner had been turned at Nchanga and years of 
progress and profit brightened the horizon ahead. A dividend of 
4/- a share was declared for this year on the basis of accumulated, 
unappropriated profits of well over x;2,000,000. The price of 
copper had by now risen to E153 a long ton and the ore reserves 
developed underground were 8,710,900 tons at an average of 7.51% 
copper.265 This was indeed, good news for the shareholders. As 
a means of increasing efficiency, the entire management and control 
of the Company was now removed from the United Kingdom. This 
change in procedure came into operation on January 1st, 1951. 
265. In April 1960, the ore reserves of the Nchanga West 
Orebody alone totalled 74,000,000 tons averaging 5.96% 
copper. 
- 196 - 
CHAPTER VI 
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1939. 
1939 marked a turning point in the development of the Copperbelt; 
for the outbreak of war at once removed all fears centred around 
economic issues. Immediately, the demand for copper by the British 
Government became greater than the capacity of the mines to fulfil it. 
But even though markets and employment were secure, this in no way 
implied an economic boom as had occurred during the First World War. 
Labour shortages, difficulties- in obtaining raw materials and 
supplies for maintenance and expansion, transportation problems, 
especially to Europe, heavy taxation, labour unrest, rises in the cost 
of living and price fixation all combined to reduce dividends, and 
restrict production even though a maximum effort was made by the 
Companies. The Nkana smelter, already in need of major overhaul, 
was so affected by the high silica content of the concentrates 
supplied by Nchanga that by the end of 1940 it was found necessary 
to reduce production from 9,500 short tons per annum, as agreed in 
December 1939, to a monthly average of 8,100 short tons in 1941. 
Fortunately this proved to be only a temporary measure, production 
being back to 9,500 tons per annum by April 1942. Again, the high 
silica content of the Nchanga ore played havoc with the waste heat 
boilers at Nkana, with the result that yet another production cut 
was forced on the Rhokana Corporation, the output being eventually 
stabilised in May 1944 at 8,66o short tons per annum. By this 
time the copper supplies available to the Allied Governments were 
approximately equal to the war requirements and the Rhokana 
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difficulties did not therefore command top priority from the British 
Government. Previously, of course, every effort had been made to 
maintain Rhodesian copper output at a maximum level. It was on this 
account that in 1943 the British Ministry of Supply advanced 
£750,000 to Nchanga to cover half the cost of the immediate Nchanga 
West improvement and development requirements (see above p.188), 
which resulted in the Nchanga output rising from 6,000 tons in 1940 
to 20,000 tons in 1944. Similarly, Mufulira and the Roan Antelope 
increased their annual production to wartime peaks of approximately 
86,000 and 75,000 tons respectively. A good example of the 
prevailing trends may be seen from the production figures for 
blister copper at Roan Antelope during the war years. This 
information is extracted from a report by R.M. Peterson (the General 
Manager) dated 30th June 1945 and preserved in the R.S.T. Archives. 
For obvious reasons, no production data was published during this 
period. 
Production of Blister Copper at Roan Antelope 
Year ended 30th June Blister Copper 
(long tons) 
Cost of Production 
(F.O.B. Beira) 
1940 75,195 £21. 3. 9 
1941 67,745 25 15 to 
1942 65,665 29 12 11 
1943 69,188 33 16 8 
1944 64,189 38 13 11 
1945 54,895 4o 17 10 
Total 396,877 Av. £31. 2. 8 
Average 66,146 
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A11 of the above production was contracted for by the British 
Government. Although the falls in production in 1941 and 1942 were 
caused by intrinsic, mihing difficulties, the impact of the British 
actions is clearly mirrored in the decline in 1944 and 1945. 
Similarly, the rising costs of production are clearly seen. It 
might be argued that the fixed price of £62.0 offered a substantial 
profit, and indeed, this was soi66 but the intention of the British 
Government (faithfully honoured by the Companies) was that 
considerable sums would be ploughed back into further developments, 
which in turn, accounts for some of the increase in the cost of 
production. It is, nevertheless, noteworthy that the cost of 
production per ton (delivered in Europe) of £28.851 in 1931 -32 had 
fallen to £19.586 by 1934 -35, a figure which did not change 
substantially until the outbreak of war in 1939 and the rising 
costs which followed.267 
266. Net profits averaged £7.10.0 per ton during the war years. 
torizon January 1965 pp.21-25. 
267. The above figures are quoted in the Peterson Report dd. 
30.6.45 in the R.S.T. Archives. 





COPPER PRODUCTION L 
1939 211,668 50.6 
1940 262,394 63.6 
1941 228,254 62.0 
1942 246,597 62.0 
1943 250,955 62.0 
1944 220,827 62.0 
1945 194,014 62.0 
1946 182,289 77.2 
1947 192,500 130.6 
1948 213,633 134.0 
1949 259,081 133.0 
1950 276,433 179.0 
1951 309,141 220.7 
1952 312,363 259.5 
1953 362,581 256.3 
1954 378,611 249.3 
1955 342.191 352.3 
1956 383,484 329.1 
1957 416,211 219.7 
1958 374,435 197.6 
1959 530,083 237.8 
1960 557,676 246.2 
1941 -52 - Official control prices 
1953 (Jan. -Sept.) average of control prices 
1953 (Oct. -Dec.) London Metal Exchange cash prices 
1954 -60 , , t t , 
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Although the relief felt throughout the entire world at the 
cessation of hostilities in 1945 was shared in Northern Rhodesia, 
yet there was a real fear that a slump, as had occurred after the 
First World War and again in 1930, would create unemployment and 
hardship for many of those involved in the Northern Rhodesian 
copper industry. Already, in 1944, with the collapse of Germany, 
the British Government had reduced its purchases from the 
Copperbelt and the Ministry of Supply had ended its bulk -purchase 
programme. It was with this kind of apprehension in mind that the 
Mine -Workers' Union had pressed for wage increases and a "closed 
shop" in 1940 and 1941. Certainly, there seemed some basis for 
these fears. Over -production seemed probable if maintained at 
war -time rates in a post -war age, aluminium was a potential rival 
to copper, and in any case, the costs of copper production were not 
likely to decrease. On the contrary, wages were rising and the 
technical problems - and therefore expense - of development work 
were becoming far more serious than before.268 Fuel and power 
were also serious problems, as was the shortage of railway 
accommodation both for raw materials and supplies and the export 
268. Appendix III details production costs for the R.S.T. Group. 
The Anglo- American Corporation refused to supply their own 
figures. The R.S.T. information was obtained from a 
memorandum, letter No. 2089/62/K dd. 16.10.62 from A.C. 
Annfield, Secretary, Northern Rhodesia Chamber of Mines, to 
I.D. Gregory, Senior Lecturer in Geography, The Teachers' 
College, Bulawayo. 
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of the finished product. 
Nevertheless, the sceptics were soon to be proved wrong and the 
Copperbelt entered on an era of unparalleled prosperity during which 
the price of copper rose from an average of f77. 3. 5 per ton in 1946 
to an average maximum of £402.10. 0 in 1955 before slumping to 
£176. 5. 0 in 1957. There were many reasons for this extraordinary 
phenomenon - post -war reconstruction, expanding industry, particularly 
in the field of electrical goods, and the devaluation of sterling in 
1949 which overnight increased the sterling price of copper by 
44/.269 But perhaps most important of all was the rapid 
realisation by the statesmen of the world that although the war was 
officially over it had merely reverted to another form. The "cold 
war" which ensued made further re- armament by the major powers 
essential, and this, along with stock -piling as a corollary, 
provided a major incentive to increases in production. Thus new 
prospecting companies were organised and steps taken to develop 
further mines. This policy was further encouraged by the amended 
taxation legislation introduced in Northern Rhodesia in 1951 by 
which capital expenditure on new mines may be "written off" out of 
profits before taxes become payable, and subsequent annual capital 
outlay is allowed as operating cost for taxation purposes. 
269. The exchange rate altered from 0/4.02 to 0/2.80 to the Cl. 
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KANSANSHI 
In 1951 Rhodesian Anglo- American Ltd. was granted an option 
to purchase Kansanshi, the option was exercised, the Kansanshi 
Copper Mining Company was registered in March 1953 and the venture 
came under the auspices of Rhokana Corporation. Work on the site 
was renewed in 1952 after the original agreement had been ratified. 
Again though, the investigations were inconclusive. Numbers of 
diamond drill holes were put down, some of which encountered veins 
of sulphide copper, but it was still impossible to relate them to 
what was already known or to base firm calculations on the core 
values recovered. To make matters worse, a large inflow of water 
began at the bottom of the reconditioned North Shaft - now at 
300 feet - causing work there to be temporarily suspended. The 
South Shaft seemed more promising as three of the veins intersected 
by a cross -cut at 300 feet appeared to be connected to others on the 
150 foot level. 
From July 1954 until March 1955 shortage of money caused a 
temporary hold -up in the work. When exploration recommenced, the 
main drive on the 300 foot level was extended to the bottom of the 
North Shaft, thus linking the two. The water situation was now 
greatly alleviated, as the pumps at the South Shaft could also cope 
with the inflow from the North. Working conditions also considerably 
improved. The South Shaft was extended to a depth of 810 feet - 
dislcosing substantial veins of sulphide ore, particularly at the 
500 foot level. A power plant was set up and a concentrator to 
handle sulphide ore constructed. This came into operation towards 
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the end of 1956. 
A sound future for Kansanshi seemed assured when tragedy struck. 
On October 31st 1957 a rush of water on the 500 foot level 
overwhelmed the pumping station and began to rise in the South 
Shaft, where the pumps on the 300 foot level could not deal with the 
flood in addition to the normal discharge from the North Shaft. 
These pumps were also drowned, the water level becoming finally 
established at about 250 feet below the level of the shaft collar. 
The mine was then closed and left on a "care and maintenance" 
basis, in which position it still remains. 
BANCROFT 
In addition to the Kansanshi area, Rhokana Corporation was 
also interested in the Kirila Bomwe and Konkola deposits, where 
drilling had been started as early as February 1949 when the 
corporation, encouraged by the rising copper prices, formed a new 
company to acquire and exploit these Special Grants. The new 
Company, which was envisaged on a grand scale with a nominal 
capital of 05,000,000, was incorporated in Northern Rhodesia on 
May 21st 1953 as Bancroft Mines Limited, with Rhokana Corporation 
acting as local managers until K.E. Mackay was appointed as 
270. Now (1963) General Manager, Rhokana Corporation 
Metallurgical Division, a personal friend of the writer, 
who has been of considerable assistance. 
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manager in February 1954. The intensive drilling programme was 
greatly reduced from this year, attention being then directed 
towards exploitation of the enormous ore reserves revealed.271 
The original development plans provided for the sinking of 
two main shafts, one at Konkola and the other at the Kirila Bomwe 
South Orebody. A concentrator capable of handling 150,000 tons 
of ore a month was also to be constructed. To facilitate the 
new traffic a twenty miles extension of the main Chingola -Kitwe 
railway line was laid to Bancroft from Luano. The main road 
was also widened to cater for the greatly increased traffic 
brought about as a result of the new European and African town- 
ships which sprang up. These townships, amongst the most 
modern on the Copperbelt, profited from the experiences of 
earlier towns and are models of their kind, being situated on the 
most naturally advantageous sites and enjoying practically every 
amenity. The mine was officially opened by Sir Ernest 
0ppenhdmer on March 29th.1957, the event being also the last 
public appearance before his death of the hero of the occasion, 
Dr. Bancroft himself. 
271. At 30.6.60 these stood as follows - 
Kirila Bomwe South 
Orebody 50,373,700 short tons ay. 4.35% copper 
" North 
Orebody 22,476,200 It It " 4.10% " 
Konkola Orebody 32,073,400 " " " 2.48% " 
Total 104,923,300 3.73% 
Chamber of Mines Yearbook 1960. 
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1956 was a stormy year in the history of the Copperbelt, with 
numerous strikes and political- industrial disputes disrupting the 
economic progress of the area. Of greatest moment to the situation 
at Bancroft was the strike of European artisans which began there on 
December 7th, over a triviality and was prolonged and exaggerated out 
of all proportion to the original incident by the matters of 
principle involved and the injuries to their pride.suffered by the 
various organisations during the course of the negotiations. 
Although by then the Kirila Bomwe South Shaft had reached a depth 
of 1,510 feet and the Konkola Shaft was down to 1,400 feet, with a 
third shaft being sunk to serve the Kirila Bomwe North Orebody, there 
were grave fears that production would be unable to start on 
schedule in January 1957. In the event, the fears proved 
unfounded, with production commencing on time at the planned 
initial capacity of 42,800 long tons of copper per year. 
With the decision early in 1958 that a general reduction in 
production of 10% should be made in copper output to prevent over - 
trading, the price of copper having then fallen from £437 a ton in 
March 1956 to 0181, the directors of the Rhodesian Anglo- 
American Company found themselves in a dilemma. Bancroft Mine 
has very great potential; yet it has a very serious problem to 
face in that the volume of underground water encountered in the 
workings is enormous. In 1961 a daily average of 33,000,000 
gallons was pumped from the mine- representing 27.5 tons of water 
for every ton of ore. Many minor floodings had occurred and new 
problems were being encountered daily. It was found to be more 
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economical, under the circumstances, to cease production temporarily 
for a period of one year, transferring the balance of production to 
Nchanga, which mine was easily able to handle the increase. Apart 
from those men engaged on further development of the Kirila Bomwe 
South Orebody, the Bancroft miners were assimilated into the other 
Copperbelt mines.272 
This closure of Bancroft Mihe was intended only as a temporary 
economic measure, and indeed, the mine re- opened for limited 
production on April 1st 1959. Although not operating at full 
capacity, the mine still produced over 51,000 tons of copper during 
its first operational year, making from this a profit of almost 
£3,700,000.273 
272. This recession affected the economy of the entire Federal 
area, creating a major slump through the fall in income from 
taxes to all four governments. The following table vividly 
illustrates this. 
Taxes received by 1957 1959 
Federal Government £1 6,819,000 £577,000 
N.R. It 11,027,000 5,651,000 
S.R. 3,304,000 1,126,000 
Nyasaland " 1,518,000 476,000 
TOTAL 032,668,000 012,671,000 
In consequence there were drastic cuts in goveiement and 
private development. (The above figures were originally 
published by the Information Department of the former 
Federal Government and reprinted in e.g. Horizon, Jan.1965.) 
273. Bancroft Mines Ltd., Annual Report, 1960. 
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In view of the technical difficulties and the need to curtail 
production, the Konkola Shaft was not re- opened, all work being 
concentrated on the Kirila Bomwe South Orebody through No. I Shaft. 
Underground development continued to proceed apace with twin 
inclined shafts being constructed to exploit the orebody below the 
immediate workings. It was also proposed to exploit the Kirila 
Bomwe North Orebody by linking it underground to the Kirila Bomwe 
South Orebody, the ore from the former orebody being transported 
underground to No. 1 Shaft, near which the surface workings are 
situated. To handle the additional water involved, the pumping 
capacity at No. 1 Shaft was increased to 57,000,000 gallons a 
day.274 
CHIBULUMA 
One of the last discoveries to be made before intensive 
prospecting was halted on the outbreak of war in 1939 was in the 
Nkana South Limb area, some seven miles south of Nkana, where a 
systematic drilling and pitting programme was being carried out 
in sediments believed to contain copper deposits. The result of 
this activity - the Chibuluma Orebody, 25 feet thick, 1,800 feet in 
274. It is interesting - and disappointing - to note that 
Bancroft still fails to stand on its own feet. As recently 
as August 1964 plans were afoot to amalgamate the mine with 
Nchanga and offers of Nchanga shares were successfully made 
to the Bancroft shareholders. A more balanced economy 
and production should now ensue. 
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length and containing approximately 8,000,000 short tons of ore 
averaging 5.04% copper and 0.22% cobalt - is a classic example of the 
value of modern scientific prospecting techniques in an area where 
the ore does not outcrop and no obvious surface indications are 
visible. The main prospecting drilling had been completed by 1949 
and development began under the auspices of Mufulira in 1951. The 
Chibuluma Mine and township of Kalalushi then began to appear out 
of the "bush". The original cost of equipping and developing the 
mine was approximately 06,000,000 of which the General Services 
Administration of the United States Government provided 05,000,000 
in terms of an agreement providing for repayment from the copper and 
cobalt produced. This loan has since been repaid in full. 
By December 1951 the main inclined Shaft - Norrie Shaft - 
had been completed, the erection of the concentrator began in 1954, 
the first stopes were opened in October 1955, the concentrator 
began operations in March 1956 and full production began two months 
later, with the Mufulira smelter and the Ndola cobalt plant 
handling the concentrates resulting from the production of 45,000 
short tons of ore per month. Recently, in March 1963, after four 
years of development a second orebody, Chibuluma West, some two 
miles to the west of the main body was opened up. These two 
orebodies are now connected by an underground haulage at the 820 
foot level. The 1962 ore reserves were 10,196,000 tons 
averaging 4.67% copper and 0.15% cobalt.275 
275. Chibuluma Mines Ltd. Annual Report 30.6.62 
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MUFULIRA 
The exploitation and development of Mufulira, as also the Roan 
Antelope, had been steady but not spectacular during the post -war 
years. However, in 1948 an electrical survey over the area gave 
some indications of mineralisation to the west,and, after drilling 
from the surface, a drillhole, MW 62, some 2,000 feet west of the 
Mufulira Stream intersected what is now known as "C" orebody at a 
depth of 1,500 feet. The orebody averaged 72 feet in thickness 
and contained 2.8% copper. In the same year, 1952, the 
electrolytic refinery which had been begun in 1950, came into 
operation. 
The improved prospects for copper in the mid 1950's led to a 
decision to develop Mufulira West in 1957, the preparations being 
finally completed early in 1962. The scheme, which cost 
E16,000,000, brought production at Mufulira up to 162,000 long 
tons of copper a year by 1964, a rise of some 50 %, and thus made 
Mufulira the second largest underground producer of copper in the 
world after El Teniente in Chile. (The largest overall producer 
in the Commonwealth is Nchanga.) Inevitably, the decision to 
increase production meant also a massive extension of subsidiary 
workings. The concentrator and smelter were enlarged and five 
new shafts sunk. A new crushing plant, tailings dam to extend 
over more than 3,000 acres, and surface conveyor system were 
installed, and to cater for the increased labour force, mumerous 
houses, including the new African township of Butondo were 
constructed. 
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THE ROAN ANTELOPE 
The original Beatty Shaft sunk at the eastern and shallow end 
of the Roan Antelope Orebody between 1929 and 1931 was supplemented 
by Storke Shaft as early as 1935. This latter was sited some 
7,000 feet west of the first shaft which gradually became relegated 
to the function of hoisting waste rock. Eventually, with the 
practical exhaustion of the ore at the eastern end of the orebody, 
Beatty Shaft was closed altogether, the headgear being used to equip 
a new shaft, Irwin Shaft, which was started some three miles to the 
west of Storke Shaft in June 1948. Another shaft, MacLaren 
Shaft, a further mile to the west, bottomed in September 1962 at 
4,054 feet - the deepest shaft yet sunk from surface on the 
Copperbelt. All three are linked underground at the 1,900 foot 
level. 
A major engineering work during the immediate post -war period 
was the diversion of the Luanshya Stream, which flowed across the 
orebody. The stream was diverted through a tunnel which skirts 
the east side of the orebody, and a dam was built to the north. 
There was almost a mishap in March 1948 when exceptionally heavy 
rains caused floodings and the consequent suspension of under- 
ground work - except for pumping - for five days. Drastic 
precautions have since been taken to prevent any recurrence of the 
event. 
The underground workings at the Roan Antelope are noted for 
their excessive size, the actual frontal workings in the orebody 
being over four miles in length. Smelter and concentrator 
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extensions have also taken place commensurate with increased 
production which stood at some 92,000 long tons a year in 1960. 
Before marketing the anodes produced are further refined by Ndola 
Copper Refineries Ltd., which company had been formed by R.S.T. and 
British Insulated Callender's Cables in 1954 to deal with the 
increasing demand for highly refined electrolytic copper. By 1961 
this refinery was handling the total Roan output. 
The copper values at the Roan Antelope which average under 
2.0% for ore hoisted are clearly the poorest on the Copperbelt.276 
It follows, therefore, that any rapid deterioration in the copper 
market would have more disastrous effects on this mine than on the 
others, especially as the mine suffers, like Bancroft and Nchanga, 
from a severe water problem. It was to mitigate this economic 
problem and streamline the operations of the whole that Rhodesian 
Selection Trust and Roan Antelope amalgamated in 1962. The main 
interest, though, of this otherwise routine business manoeuvre 
lies in the fact that although the American Metal Climax Company 
previously held 331/3% of Roan Antelope and 51% of Rhodesian 
Selection Trust, in the new combine its holding was 43.5% which 
was no longer an overall controlling interest. It is a reasonable 
276. Although the Roan reserves are given as averaging 3.04% 
copper (still the poorest on the Copperbelt) in the 
Chamber of Mines Yearbook, 1960, yet a figure of "rather 
under 2 per cent total copper" was quoted to the Seventh 
Commonwealth Mining and Metallurgical Congress in May 1961 
and printed in the privately circulated programme of the 
Northern Rhodesia section of that congress. Excessive 
dilution of the ore by waste could cause the discrepancy. 
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speculation that when the Roan Antelope itself ceases to be an 
economic proposition, attention will be diverted to the Baluba 
Orebody.X77 A new company, Baluba Mines Ltd., was floated in 1954 
under the chairmanship of Lewin Tucker, but so far, only 
prospecting work has been carried out. It is, however, already 
clear that the known reserves of 112,000,000 short tons of ore 
averaging 2.41% copper and 0.16% cobalt278 provide the potential 
for a very large future mine. 
RhOKANA 
Within the Rhokana Corporation itself there have been three 
major post -war developments. The first of these was the decision 
in 1946 to sell the Rhokana electrolytic refinery at Nkana to a 
new company, Rhodesia Copper Refineries Ltd. in which oontrol is 
shared jointly by Rhokana and Nchanga. Then, in 1952, there was 
set up the Rhoanglo Mine Services Ltd. in which Rhodesian Anglo- 
American technical services are centralised. This preceded the 
Rhodesian Selection Trust equivalent by six years. But most 
important of all was the decision that, as from January 1st 1951, 
the head offices of Nchanga, Rhodesia Copper Refineries and 
Rhokana should be transferred from London to Northern Rhodesia. 
This was not a political decision although Ernest Oppenheimer 
himself later pointed out that his company felt a "moral 
obligation "279 to help to develop the Rhodesias. The motives 
277. See above pp. 
278. Baluba Mines Ltd. Annual Report 30th June, 1962. 
279. Statement to shareholders 1956. 
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were basically economic in that administrative and technical 
efficiency would be increased by having a locally based headquarters 
and in addition the heavy taxation liabilities of companies 
registered in the United Kingdom would no longer apply. The 
R.S.T. Group followed suit in 1953. 
The two most spectacular post -war developments on the 
Copperbelt, certainly to the layman and possibly to the 
technologist also, involve Chambishi and Nchanga. 
CHAMBISHI 
It will be recalled that after the initial prospecting by 
Parker and Grey from 1927280 Chambishi had lain neglected. The 
original activity was halted by the depression of the early 
1930's. Then, when the devaluation of sterling in 1949 
stimulated further development, attention was devoted to opening 
up the Chibuluma Mine instead because of its rich copper ore and 
cobalt.281 Similarly, the increased buoyancy felt in 1956 led to 
the decision to exploit the Mufulira West area. Thus in 1960 
Chambishi had reverted to bush, the ruins of the original 
buildings overgrown by tropical vegetation. Only in 1962, on 
May 21st, was it announced by Rhodesian Selection Trust that a 
280. See above p.75. 
281. See above p.207/208. 
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new company, Chambishi Mines Ltd. was to begin a £7,500,000 
programme to develop Chambishi as an open -cast mine. This was one 
of the first fruits of the merger of Rhodesian Selection Trust and 
the Roan Antelope which had taken place shortly before. A new 
mining town is therefore rapidly springing up in what is virtually 
the geographical heart of the Copperbelt - a remarkable expression 
of confidence in the future of the world copper market and of 
Northern Rhodesia in particular. 
THE NCHANGA AND CHINGOLA OPEN PITS 
To appreciate the function of the Nchanga and Chingola Open 
Pits it is necessary to consider the ore reserves available for 
exploitation on the Nchanga property. Comparative figures, as 
published by the Company, are as follows:- 
The River Lode 
Chingola Ore Body 
Nchanga Ore Body 
Nchanga West Ore Body 
Jan.1955 March 1960282 





4.2 1,731,240 4.29 
7.0 14,183,196 4.89 
3.51 88,996,680 3.53 
6.9 74,558,860 5.96 
It is immediately apparent that although the Nchanga West deposit 
is considerably richer in copper than any of the others, it contains 
a much smaller tonnage than the neglected Nchanga Ore -body. 
During the early years of development, when one of the main 
incentives was to produce paying ore in the shortest possible 
time all the attention had naturally been devoted to the rich 
282. The total ore reserve at 30.6.61 amounted to 184,166,000 
short tons averaging 4.63% copper. Chamber of Mines 
Yearbook 1961. 
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Nchanga West Ore -body. Although this meant that the mine came to 
a profitable stage relatively quickly, it also meant that the 
exploitation of the property was being conducted in an unbalanced 
way. The Consulting Engineer, Nichols, had noted this as early as 
1950,283 without any immediate response. However, the 
development which took place during the early 1950's and which 
has already been discussed in detail in this work, brought the 
output of the mine to its theoretical potential in 1954, without 
handling any other than Nchanga West ore. It was then decided, 
in the long -term interests of the Company, that the value of the 
ore mined in the future should conform as far as possible to the 
average values of the reserves as a whole. As the full potential 
of the Chingola Ore -body was not known at this stage, and as the 
River Lode was comparatively small, this decision actually meant 
that the production from the Nchanga West deposit was to be 
deliberately diluted with poorer quality ore which could only come 
from the Nchanga Ore -body. A balanced production at this stage 
would involve reducing the output at Nchanga West and adding each 
month a total of 150,000 tons of the Nchanga ore. 
The difficulty, of course, is obvious. Whereas the extraction 
workings beneath the Nchanga West Ore -body are in solid arkose or 
granite, the Feldspathic Quartzite which contains the Nchanga ore 
lies immeiiately above the very soft and loose Upper Banded 
283. Letter dd. 2.8.50. See above p. 175. 
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Sandstones. The entire history of the mine has been one of struggle 
against the flooding and mud -rushes encountered in these strata. 
Although it would certainly have been possible to have operated by 
using conventional underground mining methods, the costs of dewatering 
and supporting the workings would have been out of all proportion to 
the envisaged gains. It was eventually proved, after extensive 
diamond drilling, prospect pitting and cross - cutting from these into 
the ore -body, that mining by open -pit methods would be feasible. 
There were, of course, many difficulties. The angle of dip on the 
south side of the syncline was between 25° and 30° and the ultimate 
vertical depth was about 800 feet. Further, the heavy, 
concentrated rainfall between November and April brought 
possibilities of floods and landslides within the pit itself.284 
On the credit side, the overburden is extremely deep - up to 
600 feet when the Nchanga Pit reaches its maximum depth of 800 
feet - and is composed of earth and soft, decomposed rock which is 
comparatively easy to remove. No drilling or blasting is required 
and large capacity earth -moving equipment could be economically 
284. In 1961 Professor J.E.B. Jennings of the Witwatersrand 
University began an investigation into soil stability in 
the Open Pit. The Management intend to build a laboratory 
in the near future to investigate what the maximum angle of 
the Pit slopes may safely be. This must determine how deep 
the Pits can be sunk. If the angle is to be very low the 
economic potential of the Pits will be greatly restricted. 
Nevertheless, under present circumstances, about 33,000,000 
tons of the 89,000,000 in the Nchanga Orebody will be 
recovered from the Nchanga Pit. (Personal information from 
the Open Pit Manager, N.A. Wilkie) 
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employed. The ore -body itself is a substantial one - up to 8o feet 
thick - and at its upper end is only 120 feet from the surface, under 
a layer of earth.285 
The original layout of the Pit is along the strike of the Nchanga 
Ore-body for 3,500 feet, which will allow a maximum depth of over 
700 feet. The Pit is being excavated in a series of steps 
("benches ") each about 35 feet high and 110 feet wide. Work was 
commenced on 21st April 1955, the development being carried out by 
three large electrically operated shovels, each excavating eight 
tons of earth at a bite. To remove the earth from the Pit were 
trains, consisting of eight trucks each holding 45 tons, hauled by 
diesel locomotives. In addition there were six rubber -tyred 
trucks each carrying 30 tons and another six with a capacity of 
22 tons. 
In November 1958 a remarkable bucket -wheel excavator was 
imported from Germany at a cost of E210,000. This enormous 
machine, with its eight buckets, each holding a ton of earth, can 
remove the overburden at speeds of up to about half a ton each 
second. The earth is then transported on a conveyor belt almost 
three miles long to another gigantic machine286 which stacks it on 
a waste dump. The conveyor system and stacker involved a further 
285. Apparently not much, Nevertheless, to expose it required 
the removal of 8,000,000 tons of earth (Anglo- American 
Annual Report 1956). 
286. 66 feet high, 250 feet long and weighing 388 tons. 
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outlay of 0180,000. The actual operating of the excavator is 
carried out by only one European and four Africans.287,288 
The ore itself, in the Feldspathic Quartzite, has to be blasted 
into pieces of a convenient size before it can be removed. The 
monthly output of 80,000 tons for the concentrator is loaded by 
mechanical shovel into 25 -ton trucks which convey it to two 8 ft. 
diameter ore passes, lined with concrete, which are located in the 
floor of the Pit. The ore passes through grizzlies at the top of 
these passes and then falls to a loading point on the 625 foot 
level sub -haulage which leads to the Nchanga West workings. Here 
it is hauled to the surface up the main "C" or "D" shafts along with 
the Nchanga West ore. This is a much simpler and more economical 
process than any scheme of direct removal from the Pit. Very low 
quality ore is stockpiled for future use as required. 
The Chingola Ore -body is really only an extension of the 
Nchanga West Deposit after an intervening barren area. But 
whereas in 1955 it was thought to be a comparatively small deposit 
of some 2,000,000 tons of high -grade ore, diamond drilling in 1956, 
and subsequently, has increased the reserve to 14,000,000 tons, 
287. The total personnel of the Pits number 303 (Nchanga) and 
87 (Chingola). Figures supplied by N.A. Wilkie. 
288. The bucket -whell excavator plus the mechanical shovels still 
remaining remove almost 1,000,000 tons of overburden and ore 
per month between them. By December 1st 1961 over 
50,000,000 tons of earth had been removed, giving a yield of 
3,500,000 tons of ore. The planned ore -production is 
80,000 tons per month and at all times sufficient ore for 
18 months mining is fully developed. Information by 
N.A. Wilkie. 
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with the prospect of more yet to be found. The ore -body lies in a 
shallow syncline which has a very complicated structure due to 
folding of the strata. The ore -body is 1,500 feet long and 90 feet 
wide, and is mainly in the form of oxides which are treated locally. 
The decision to mine it by Open -Pit methods was taken in 1957, 
for similar motives to those which had brought about the Nchanga Open 
Pit. The purpose289 was not to increase output but to permit of the 
maximuì flexibility of output as dictated by prevailing 
circumstances. A balanced production would be even more easy to 
maintain with three separate sources of supply than before. 
Aa the Company did not have the equipment available for 
developing the pit in 1954, the initial task of removing the over- 
burden was undertaken by contractors until the necessary machinery 
arrived. The techniques used were much the same as in the 
Nchanga Pit. The excavation of overburden is made by a 10 -ton 
electric shovel which serves ten 22 -ton trucks. Another electric 
shovel removes the ore, which is brought to surface in the same 
trucks.X90 The benches in the pit are 38 feet high in the over- 
burden and 30 feet high in the ore. 
At the present time the ore is being mined at the rate of 
40,000 tons per month, with a developed reserve of 732,000 tons. 
289. Nchanga Annual Report 1957. H.F. Oppenheimer's review. 
290. Equipment is interchanged between the Nchanga and Chingola 
Pits as required. The Nchanga Pit workshops are also 
responsible for repairing the Chingola equipment. 
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The overburden and low -grade ore are dumped in separate piles on 
the surface, while the better ore is taken to the plant by a 
private 23 mile railway.291 The grade varies enormously from 
level to level and poses considerable problems to the concentrator 
staff. 
291. This railway crosses the main road to Bancroft and the 
Congo by a high -level bridge. During the disturbances 
inspired by the United National Independence Party in 
1961 an attempt was made to blow up this bridge, without 
success. 
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PROSPECTING 
Although Dr. Bancroft reduced surface prospecting to a virtual 
routine and was able, in consequence, to produce the first 
comprehensive geological map of the Copperbelt, he ignored 
altogether one of the most intriguing surface manifestations of 
mineralisation - vegetative guides. 
It was well -known to the early prospectors that vegetation 
was frequently sparse and stunted in areas w here copper deposits 
lay at but a short distance below the surface. This 
manifestation was, for example, most marked at the Roan Antelope. 
In addition a small, blue flower, rather like a forget -me -not, 
was frequenf.y seen in areas where outcrops of copper ore occurred. 
However, as the flower is almost always associated with visible 
outcrops, it was of no real value as a prospecting guide. Still 
less so was the species of Cryptosepalum, known to the Africans 
as "mpandala" or "sambashi ", whose small pink flowers were 
believed to be a certain indication of copper. It has been 
conclusively proved by recent tests that this flower grows 
equally well anywhere in the district and its presence near 
copper deposits is purely coincidental. 
In October 1949, however, the Kennecot Copper Corporation 
in America requested by cable to the General Manager of Roan 
Antelope that further information regarding the above - 
mentioned blue flower be provided. This request was passed 
on th the Roan Geological Department with astonishing results. 
Samples of all the flowers growing on and near the orebody were 
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collected and it became immediately evident that the unclassified 
blue flower, which had been the initial cause of the investigations, 
grew equally profusely on or off the ore -body. So did all but one 
of the other flowers - a member of the sage family which grew only 
over the ore -body and could not be found more than a few yards from 
it. Just in case there might be some significance in this fact, 
the plant was then extensively plotted throughout the area - with 
the disappointing result that it appeared everywhere regardless of 
the proximity of copper. 
Only at this stage was the plant subjected to close scrutiny. 
On close examination there proved to be two almost identical 
varieties of the same plant. The mauve-white petals differed 
very slightly, as also did the calyx and the texture of the 
leaves - and one type grew only over the ore -bodies. 
As information became more abundant, so did the confidence 
of the investigators increase. The new flower charts followed 
the contours of known ore -bodies with uncanny accuracy. The 
plant was sent to the Curator of Tropical Botany at Kew Gardens 
and there formally identified as "Ocimum Homblei de Wild ", the 
"pseudo" copper flower being also identified as "Becium obovatum 
E. Mey" - a different genus altogether. 
The plant was now subjected to chemical analysis and proved 
to be a copper accumulator. Copper in quantities of up to 
4,500 parts per million was found as opposed to the normal 
copper content in plants of less than 20 parts per million. It 
was also proved that the seeds of the plant would germinate only 
- 223 - 
if there was a copper content of at least 50 parts per million and 
not more than 600 parts per million in the water used for their 
culture. Plants immediately died if planted in copper -free soils. 
Tests have been made from areas as far apart as Lusaka and the 
Congo border, all but two with success. Even in these two cases, 
rational explanations for failure were available. Further, the 
testing of areas not previously known to contain copper, on the 
basis of the discovery of the flower, has given successful results 
in the form of large new reserves. A new and valuable copper 
indicator has therefore been found.292 
Ironically, as more and more deposits have been found, so have 
the actual difficulties of finding them increased. It is now 
fairly certain that all the surface outcrops have been 
discovered and investigated, and the geologist is now faced with 
the problem of searching for copper of which no visible signs 
exist - the Chibuluma and Chibuluma West ore -bodies are cases in 
point. Further senses other than sight must be brought into 
operation, the use of super -sensitive chemical assay, and 
electrical, electronic and magnetic apparatus replacing the 
relatively insensitive human nose and ear. In this way, the 
292. For a most interesting illustrated article on the copper 
flower see "Horizon" - a magazine for R.S.T. employees - 
of January 1959, from which some of the above information 
was taken. 
NB. Although the "copper flower" is always found growing 
above ore- bodies the converse is not true. Some ore - 
bodies have no "copper flowers" growing on them. 
Therefore the plant can never replace the more orthodox 
geophysical investigations. 
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development of techniques of tracing mineralisation in streams back 
to its source has taken place. Very delicate chemical tests are also 
available to test the amounts of copper in the soils above ore -bodies, 
and, coupled with the possible visible evidence of the copper flower 
and the "clearings" formed by the slight "poisoning" of other 
vegetation, these provide a reliable guide on which to base the 
decision of whether or not to drill. Clearings in the bush caused 
by mineralisation show up particularly well in aerial photographs - 
a technique in use on the Copperbelt since 1926.293 
Geophysical methods were first introduced on the Copperbelt 
in 1926 when an electrical survey over the Nchanga ore -bodies was 
made.294 
Amongst the numerous geophysical methods now in use are 
electrical, electro- magnetic, magnetic, gravity and seismic. 
Unfortunately, as the sulphide ore -bodies are found only at depths 
of more than 200 feet below the surface, the above methods are not 
very successful in tracing them, the effects of the laterite layer 
above them tending to "blot out" the reactions of the ore -body 
itself on the measuring instruments. Fortunately the electrical 
method known as "self- potential" has proved fairly effective, as 
has testing for radio -activity, which is often associated with 
copper. This may be done from low- flying aircraft, for 
example helicopters. 
293. For details see Owen Letcher: "South Central Africa 
pp. 86 -7. Also Walker, G.L.: "Surveying from the Air 
in Central Africa" - Engineering and Mining Journal, 
January 1929, pp. 49 -52. 
294. See "Horizon" Sept. 1959. Also Appendix No. II. 
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Nevertheless, these various scientific methods have never yet 
proved the existence of a mine and the geologist is,once more forced 
back to the time- honoured methods of pitting and drilling. The 
drilling is usually done at the richest point indicated by the 
prospect pits, and may have to go down to well over 300 feet before 
unweathered formations are reached which core well and provide 
concrete evidence of mineralisation. Many years of investigation 
are usually necessary before sufficient knowledge can be gained to 
justify exploitation. 
At the present time, transport and supply is carried on 
mainly by air, often by helicopter, with the result that the 
expense of building and maintaining roads is greatly diminished, 
porterage becomes unnecessary and the prospector can be deposited 
on the site of his work without the need for prolonged and time - 
wasting treks from the nearest centre of civilisation. 
A further complication, not envisaged in the early days, 
has now arisen to add still further to the difficulties 
encountered by the prospector and those who employ him. The 
Copperbelt contains considerable acreages which are known as 
Exclusive Prospecting Areas and further large areas known as 
Mining Special Grants. The actual position of the prospector 
and 6f the mining companies in these areas deserves careful 
study. 
In the Laws of Northern Rhodesia295 the rights and 
295. Chapter 91 sections 19 and 20. 
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obligations of the prospector are clearly defined. His work "shall 
not confer any right, title or interest whatsoever in any land." 
Further, he must obtain the permission of the property owner before 
he may work near such items as buildings, ploughed land, growing 
crops, roads, dams and various other places. Work in such areas 
also embodies further difficulties not encountered elsewhere, for, 
with the removal of the natural vegetation, disturbances of the 
soil, introduction of metal in the form of fences and so on, the 
basic clues by which the prospector is guided tend to disappear. 
Not only is his own work rendered more arduous and complicated, 
but the disturbance to the property owner is correspondingly 
greater. 
No individual prospecting is now permitted on the Copperbe1t96 
Four large blocks of Crown land in the middle of the area are 
reserved by the Government Mining Engineer. Of the remainder, 
nine areas were held as exclusive prospecting areas by the Anglo- 
American Group under licences valid until 1963 (Kafue 1960) of 
which four had already been prospected and the licences 
surrendered by 1960. Seventeen further exclusive prospecting 
areas came under the control of the Rhodesian Selection Trust 
with licences valid until 1961, by which time most of them had 
been investigated. Smaller areas may be set aside for further 
intensive investigation and possibly later registered as mining 
296. Except for the residue of land not taken up, which was 
opened to individual prospectors in 1941 - Govt. 
Notice 37/1941. 
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special grants.297 
The problem then, in exclusive prospecting areas is to decide 
how far to permit capital expenditure and development of the surface 
of the land in view of what the prospectors might discover 
underneath it. In general the basic principle would seem to be 
that the natural vegetation should not be cleared until the initial 
prospecting has been completed, whilst at the same time ensuring 
that land be not alienated from normal use merely because it happens 
to lie within an exclusive prospecting area. The "Duff Report"+298 
recommends that in doubtful cases the Government Mining Engineer 
should always be consulted. 
The mining special grants provide an altogether different set 
of circumstances from the exclusive prospecting areas. The 
holders of them have not only the right to work minerals over 
extensive areas but may also make almost unlimited use of the 
surface whilst actually mining.299 Any surface developments on 
them would have to give way to any future development that the 
mining companies might wish to make. In some cases, farming 
operations have already begun, but it is obvious that in the 
297. For speculation and further details see the "First Report 
on a Regional Survey of the Copperbelt 1959" Ch. 7 
sections A & B (The "Duff Report ") - Govt. Printer, 
Lusaka 1960. 
NB. The position regarding prospecting areas and special 
grants is in a constant.state of flux. The information 
given above was correct for early 1961. 
298. Para. 209. 
299. For details see the Mining Law Cap. 91, Sections 54 -57. 
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event of a grantholder exercising his right to work his property the 
farms would have to be sold to the holder of the grant, even if this 
meant settling the price by arbitration.300 
Some of the latest grants to be registered have had farms 
established in the areas prior to the grant being made. It would 
appear that in these cases permission to work in the areas near 
houses, crops and so on previously mentioned, would have to be 
obtained, and in the event of large -scale working the property 
would have to be bought outright. It is unfortunate for all 
concerned that very often the land reserved for mining in this way 
is often also the most well- drained and fertile farming soil. 
It may be argued that the payment of full compensation to a 
farmer who is dispossessed from his property on a mining special 
grant occasions no special loss to him. This is true, but it 
takes no account of the loss to the Territory as a whole of 
capital, time and the fruits of labour over the years. The 
productivity of farms is built up gradually and cannot be replaced 
overnight. In view of all this it is desirable that land 
intended for permanent agricultural or other development should 
be separated as far as possible from the mining special grants301 
300. Increased land values due to mineral deposits would be 
discounted in the valuation. 
301. It should be noted that much land is held by the mining 
companies as freehold, in which case no complications 
arise. The companies are well aware of the problems 
involved and now offer considerably longer leases than 
previously. They also take every precaution to ensure 
that the minimum disturbance takes place. The number of 
farms actually taken over for.mining development is 
small. 
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This has led in some cases, such as Ndola and Mufulira, to the 
cramping of town planning and development to avoid encroachment on 
mining grant areas. This problem of the conflicting uses of land 
is far from being settled and will pose problems for planners for 
many years to come. 
- 230 - 
APPENDIX I 
SOME NOTES ON THE NATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF 
COPPER -ORE. DEPOSITS IN CENTRAL AFRICA. 
The discovery and working of copper deposits in south -central 
Africa must not be regarded solely as a European phenomenon. It is 
true that there never was a Bronze Age in Africa, south of the 
Sahara, as there was elsewhere, the earliest metal users in south 
and central Africa using iron from the beginning and working it in 
a manner similar to that evolved by other Iron Age people in Europe 
and Asia. Nevertheless, where surface deposits of other metals 
such as copper, tin, gold or silver were found, there is no doubt 
that they, too, were extensively worked and the resulting ingots, 
ornaments and weapons not only retained for local use but also 
traded, often to considerable distances. 
The first reference to copper being worked in south - central 
Africa is to be found in a unique book, "Relatione del Reame di 
Congo et delle circonvicine Contrade", by the Portuguese Filippo 
Pigafetta, published in Rome in 1591. In this volume, published 
almost three centuries before David Livingstone's journeys, there 
is reference to the copper mines of the Bembe. If, as is 
possible, the name relates to the Bemba tribe or to Lake Bembe - 
the former name of Lake Bangweulu - the mines may well be 
identified either with these of Katanga or the present Northern 
Rhodesian Copperbelt. About the same time also, an Englishman, 
Andrew Battell, a prisoner of the Portuguese in An.ppla _ spoke of 
natives in the far interior bringing copper to trade in the 
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natives in the far interior bringing copper to trade in the central 
and coastal areas of Southern Angola. "Again ", writes J. Desmond 
Clark,1 "it is not improbable that this copper may have come from 
our own Copperbelt."2 Occasional copper ornaments have been found 
on "Stamped Ware "3 sites in Northern and Southern Rhodesia, whilst 
Southern. Rhodesia is particularly rich in finds from centres of stone 
building of which the ruins at Khami, Zimbabwe and elsewhere are a 
silent memorial.4 Numerous tools, ornaments and weapons in various 
metals have been found, testifying to an ever increasing 
development of mining and smelting, particularly of copper, in 
Katanga and adjacent parts of Northern Rhodesia. Katanga copper 
also reached as far as the Portuguese settlements in Mozambique, 
north -east to the coast of Tanganyika and possibly to the Angola 
coast also.- 
1. Former Curator of the Rhodes -Livingstone Museum. Now 
Professor of Archaeology, Los Angeles. 
2. "Pre-European Copper Working ". Roan Antelope Magazine, 
May 1957 pp. 12 -16. 
3. So called from the impressed designs on their pottery. The 
sites date back to the 14th Century in some areas. One 
example was found in 1956 between Chingola and Bancroft. 
4. The most important pre- European stone building in Southern 
Rhodesia, that at Zimbabwe may date in part back to the 11th 
Century. This does not necessarily place the metallic 
remains at the same early date. 
5 I am indebted for much of this information to J. Desmond 
Clark. 
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The Portuguese, Lacerda, on his journey through Central 
Africa in 1798 noted the use of copper for necklaces, bracelets 
and anklets.6 Even he made no direct reference to Katanga, the 
first European mention of the area being in the companion account 
to Lacerda's journey by the traders P.J. Baptista and Amaro Jos4 
who crossed Africa from Angola to Tete in 1802, after Lacerda's 
death.? 
"When we started from this farm of Chamuginga Mussenda," 
wrote Baptista, "we travelled across others with valleys and saw 
on the summit of the hills stones which appear true (green ?)8 and 
where they dig the copper; in the midst of this country is where 
they make the bars and pay such bars to the Quiburi or his 
successor for that Lord of the Salina to send them to the Muatayanvo 
or to whoever the Muatayanvo sends for them. These two 
proprietors were also at one time Soveréigns of the lands as well 
as owners of the mines left them by their predecessors." Later, 
however, the Cazembe acquired them by force and at the time of 
Baptista's visit they were in subjection to both him and 
Muatayanvo. The estimated position of these copperfields was 
between 25 - 26° E and 11° S. 
6.. "The Lands of the Cazembe - Lacerda's Journey to Cazembe 
in 1798" - Sir. R.F. Burton, Royal Geographical Society 
of London 1873, p.18. 
7. "Journey of the Pombeiros or Native Travelling Traders 
P.J. Baptista and Amaro Jose ", Burton, Royal Geographical 
Society, London 1873. 
8. Malachite. 
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In the 1850's the famous missionary explorer Dr. David 
Livingstone reported observing the use of copper rings as ornaments 
and a few years later, in 1873, the explorer Cameron noted what is 
probably the first written reference to Katanga as a place -name. 
"Copper is found in large quantities in Katanga and for a considerable 
distance to the westward.... The natives, too, know of the gold, 
but it is soft and they did not value it, preferring the red 
copper to the white. "10 The missionary Arnot was also well aware 
of the widespread fame of the Katanga mines and noted in 1886 that 
the copper was traded, through the Arabs, as far north as Uganda.11 
He and Livingstone were the first to bringback any details of the 
Katanga workings, although the first European actually to see them 
was probably the German explorer P. Reichard in 1884.12 
Arnot also visited the sites in 1886. The malachite was 
found on certain bare hilltops and was removed by the natives, who 
dug round shafts some 15 -20 feet deep for the purpose.13 The 
actual mining was restricted to certain families who formed a kind 
9. "Missionary Travels in Southern Africa ". Murray, London 1857 
pp.276 and 291. 
10. "Across Africa" vol. II ch.17. Daldy, Isbister and Co. 
London 1877. 
11. "Missionary Travels in Central Africa ". Holness, London 
1914 p.76. 
12. Owen Letcher. "South- Central Africa ". African 
Publications, Johannesburg 1932 p.44. 
13. Professor Clark'says they were sometimes as much as 100 feet 
deep. Th's could only have been in particularly firm ground, 
for shafts were normally abandoned when any risk became 
apparent. Probably for the same reason no lateral workings 
ever extended from the bottom of the shafts. Trench -like 
cuts were also sometimes made in Northern Rhodesia e.g. at 
Kansanshi and Bwana Mkubwa. 
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of trade "caste" jealously guarding their secrets and handing them 
down from generation to generation.i4 The mining operations were 
conducted during the dry season, from May until the onset of the . 
rains in November. Entire families participated, the rocks being 
dug out with iron picks or, if too hard, being cracked by lighting 
a fire against them and then suddenly cooling them with water before 
levering them away. Bark buckets and ropes were used to bring the 
earth and ore to the surface.15 
All the accounts mention malachite only, and it appears that 
this was the only form of copper ore mined and smelted by primitive 
methods in Central Africa. Smelting was a highly specialised 
process, carried out under the direction of master smelters. 
The furnaces were constructed of clay and anthill16 and fired by 
charcoal from the very hard wood "Afrormosia angolensis ". 
Although very little information was available until recently, 
it was known that these furnaces were small, producing about 
fifteen pounds of copper at one smelting. After a second 
smelting to refine the metal, the molten copper was collected in 
a bowl- shaped clay pot and poured directly into the previously 
14. Arnot op.cit. p.90. 
15. Progress was often rapid. Livingstone mentions that 
11 men dug 3,500 lbs. of copper in three months. 
"Last Journals ", Murray, London 1874. Entry dated 
28.4.1871. 
16. There are tales of the early European miners and prospectors 
in the Nddla and Solwezi areas finding old furnaces 
hollowed out from the sides of anthills, Personal 
information W. Pickering. 
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prepared moulds, generally made of clay.17 The resulting ingots 
were sometimes turned into ornaments or weapons, but more usually 
traded as bulk metal. 
The shape of the ingots varied considerably. Currency bars 
were manufactured in the form of a capital "I" about four feet long 
and weighing sixty to seventy pounds.18'19 Others were in the form 
of a capital "H" or a Maltese Cross. These types were seen by both 
Livingstone and Arnot. Smaller ingots were also made in various 
shapes, and in some cases the copper was traded as wire made by 
drawing the hot metal through a hole of the appropriate diameter 
in a special plate designed for the purpose.. According to 
Livingstone, much of the copper was traded for beads,20 but apart 
from its obvious use as currency, it served many useful purposes 
amongst the African peoples - weapons, ornaments, ceremonial 
objects and even occasionally for inlay work on iron. 
As Professor Claik has pointed out,21 most of the available 
facts known up to the present time regarding early copper mining 
and smelting in south - central Africa refer to Katanga and not to 
the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt at all. Although evidence of 
ancient workings is widespread on the Copperbelt, the actual 
17. Or in sand by the fingers of the workers. Arnot op.cit. 
p.90. 
18. One measuring 4'6" and weighing 30 lbs was discovered 
9" below ground on a farm near Lusaka in 1952 - "Rhokana 
Review ", April 1952. 
19. Livingstone, "Last Journals" p. 179. 
20. Ibid p.123. 
21. Roan Antelope Magazine op.cit. 
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methods used could only be assumed to be the same as those in the 
neighbouring Katanga - and undoubtedly they must have been very 
similar, if not identical. However, more definite information 
has now become available. Although the last official native 
smelting of copper in the Copperbelt area was as long ago as 1912, 
in November 1960, Mr. Chaplin of the Rhodes -Livingstone museum 
discovered survivors of the smelters living in a village to the 
west of Solwezi. They were persuaded to recondition their 
implements and demonstrate their techniques to a number of 
interested persons, including the Central African Film Unit. Iron 
was being successfully smelted on this occasion, but attempts to 
obtain a workable quantity of copper were a failure, this 
unfortunate result being blamed by the smelters on the poor 
quality of the ore provided for the experiment by the Nchanga 
Mine :22 
22. Personal information - Mr. Chaplin. 
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APPENDIX II 
THE EQUIPOTENTIAL LINE METHOD OF ELECTRICAL PROSPECTING 
In 1925, A. Broughton Edge, A.R.S.M., B.Sc., M.I.M.M., was 
engaged by Minerals Separation Ltd. to carry out geophysical 
prospecting by electrical methods in Northern Rhodesia. In that 
year he obtained excellent results in the Lunsemfwa area, north of 
Broken Hill, as a result of which he was offered a much bigger 
contract for 1926 -27. This necessitated his engaging four 
assistants, D. Williams, now Professor of Mining Geology at the 
Royal School of Mines, S.H. Shaw, now Director of Colonial 
Geological: Surveys, J.H. Taylor, lately retired as a senior 
geologist for the Central Mining - Rand Mines group, and J.C. 
Ferguson, who was until recently the Director of Geological 
Surveys in Southern Rhodesia. The rest of the staff - surveyors, 
draughtsmen and two mechanics to run the generators - were 
recruited in Rhodesia. 
The principal method used by Broughton Edge was the 
equipotential line, with alternating current at 540 cycles 
(4.5 amps at 80 volts). The generators could also deliver 
direct current with a 1,080 cycle ripple (16 amps at 50 volts). 
These generators were small, flat twin petrol engines which were 
built by Bosch of Germany during the 1914 -18 War, possibly for 
military signalling purposes. The weight of the complete unit 
was about 200 lbs. 
The basic principle of the method was simple. A line 
measuring one mile was cleared through the bush and along it 
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a power line was suspended on poles, the ends of the line being 
buried in the ground. When current from the generator at the mid- 
point of the line was passed along the wire, it continued below 
ground by passing through any conductive materials, e.g. copper, 
which might exist. It was then possible to track this and plot 
the position of these conductive materials. The method worked 
well at Lunsemfwa where sulphides lay close to the surface, but 
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TABLE I 
European 



















Mechanic £ 65 £45 
Gardener £40 E30 
Geologist and Jnt. 
Mining Engineers £45 £30 
Hospital Nurses c25 £15 
Mine Captain £60 
Stenographer £35 £15 
Shift Bosses £62.1o.O £47.1.0.0 
Surveyors £55 £35 
European Daily Paid per hour Max. Min. 
Bricklayer 3/6 
Crane Driver á/- 
Electrician 3/6d 
Fitter 3/6 
Handymen 2/101hd 2/6d 
Loco and Lorry drivers 3 /4rad 2/6 
Motor mechanic 3/6 2/9 
Miners 30/- per 27/6 per 
shift shift 
African 
Underground timbermen 30/- " 
Night Watchmen 2/9d hour 
Daily Rates (Not including bonuses.) 
Recruiting 5d - 1 /ld 
Watchmen 6d - 1 /5d 
Caretaker - 1 /3d 
Garden lrzd - 9itd 
Compound Police 6d - 2 /1d Head Police 
Garage ld - 1/- 
Office Boys 2d - 2/104d 
Bricklayers 7d - 2/9d Bricklayers' 
labourers 2d 
Time Office 
Clerks 9/zd - 2 /1O *d 
Compound Clerks lld - 2/1134d 
Engine Drivers 8d - 1 /31hd 
Boss Boys 8d - 1 /4d 
Timbering 8d - 1/- 
2/10d 
- 8/zd 
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TABLE II 
BASIC RATES OF WAGES OF AFRICAN MINE WORKERS BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE GUILLEBAUD AWARD 1953 
Surface 
Pay per Ticket 
before the award 
Group 1: 
Surface 
Pay per Ticket 






















65/- loo/ - 
67/6 102/6 
70/- 105/ - 
72/6 1.07/6 














Pay per Ticket Pay per Ticket 
before the award after the award 
Group 5: 
172/6 217/6 







































290/ - 340/ - 















Underground. Underground Underground Underground 
Pay per ticket Pay per ticket Pay per ticket Pay per Ticket 
before the award after the award before the nard after the award 
Grou 1: (contd.) Group 5: (contd.) 
60/- 95/- 192/6 237/6 
62/6 97/6 195/- 240/- 
65/- 100/- 197/6 242/6 





Grou 2 q_119_111._±: 
65/ -. 100/- 197 242/6 
67/6 102/6 202/6 247/6 
70/- 105/- 207/6 252/6 
72/6 107/6 212/6 257/6 
75/- 110/- 217/6 262/6 
77/6 112/6 222/6 267/6 
80/- 115/- 225/- 270/- 
82/6 117/6 
Group 3: 2.2_17_: 11:21 
77/6 232/6 112/6 282/6 
80/- 115/- 237/6 287/6 
82/6 117/6 242/6 292/6 
85/- 120/- 247/6 297/6 
87/6 122/6 252/6 302/6 
90/- 125/- 257/6 307/6 
92/6 127/6 260/- 310/ - 
Grou 4: Group 8: 
90/- 130/- 257/6 307/6 
92/6 132/6 262/6 312/6 
95/- 135/- 267/6 317/6 
97/6 137/6 272/6 322/6 
100/- 140/- 282/6 332/6 
102/6 142/6 292/6 342/6 
105/- 145/- 302/6 352/6 




345/- 395/ - 
355/- 405/- 
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Corporation in Northern Rhodesia." (Presented to the 
symposium on the geology of copper in Africa by the 
Association of African Geological Surveys, 1959.) 
WILKIE, N.A. 
and HOLT, W.: "A Description of Open Pit Mining at Nchanga 
Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. Northern Rhodesia." 
Presented to N.R. Section of the Seventh 
Commonwealth Mining and Metallurgical Congress, 
May, 1961. 
Other more general papers include - 
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: Rhodes- Livingstone Institute. 
(especially vols. 11,12,13. 1958 -59.) 
MACKINTOSH, C.W.: "Some Pioneer Missions of Northern Rhodesia 
& Nyasaland." Livingstone, Rhodes- Livingstone Museum, 
1950. 
MITCHELL:, J. CLYDE.: "African Urbanisation in Ndola & Luanshya." 
Lusaka, Rhodes -Livingstone Institute, 1ß54. 
' "The Kalela Dance." Manchester, M.U.P., 1956. 
WILSON, G.: "An Essay on the Economics of Detribalisation in 
Northern Rhodesia." Livingstone, Rhodes -Livingstone 
Papers 5/6, 1941 -42. 
NEWSPAPERS. 
BANCROFT BULLETIN AND KASANBANKANYA (Bancroft African employees 
from 13.1.61,) 
BULAWAYO CHRONICLE 
CENTRAL AFRICAN DAILY NEWS 
CENTRAL AFRICAN MAIL 




MUFULIRA STAR (formerly Mufulira African Star) 
NCHANGA DRUM 
NCHANGA NEWS) replaced 5.10.62 by NCHANGA WEEKLY 
255 
NEWS, COMMENTS, REVIEWS (Ndola Copper Refineries Ltd. Nov. 1959 to 
August 1960. Out of print) 
NORTHERN NEWS 






MUFULIRA KASOBELA Wàll sheets. Replaced from 18.1,63 by weekly 
MUFULIRA MIRROR 
There are at present (1963) no newspapers on the Copperbelt 
produced entirely for Africans by Africans, although some employ 
Africans on the reporting and editorial staff and are designed for 
the African market. 
MAGAZINES AND JOURNALS 
(Only articles of major interest and importance are noted.) 
AFRICAN WORLD ANNUAL 
AFRICAN ADMINISTRATION, JOURNAL OF Vol. 3 pp.113 -17, 1951 
CONYNGHAM, L.D. "African Towns in Northern 
Rhodesia." 
CENTRAL AFRICAN EXAMINER 
ENGINEERING AND MINING JOURNAL, NEW YORK 
1922, April, BALL, S. "Copper Smelting by Central 
African Natives." 
1929, Jan. WALKER, G.L. "Surveying From the Air 
in Central Africa." 
1944, (series) BROOKS, R. "Xrow: the Rhodesian 
Coppers were Found." 
GEOLOGICAL SOCIETY, LONDON, JOURNAL OF 
Vol. 88, 1932. JACKSON, G.C.A. "The Geology of the 
Nchanga District, Northern 
Rhodesia." 
HORIZON (Monthly magazine of R.S.T. Group, successor to ROAN 
ANTELOPE AND MUFULIRA MAGAZINES) 
1959 Jan. ANONYMOUS Article on the Copper Flower. 
1959 March, May, June. PRAIN, SIR R. "How the Copper 
Industry Developed." 
1959 May. BROOKS, R. Photographs of pre -European smelting. 
1959 August. gp. 10 -19. GARLICK, W.G. "How the. 
Copperb.elt Ore -bodies were formed." 
1959 December pp. 28 -32. "Underground operations at 
Roan." 
1960 Jan.pp. 20 -25 Underground operations at Mufulira." 
Magazines and Journals (contd.) 
- 256 - 
HORIZON 1960 Feb. pp.12 -17 "Underground operations at Chibuluma. ") 
1960 March pp.30 -32 "Ventilation" ) 
1960 May pp.18 -24 "Concentrator operations." ) 
1960 July pp.14 -18 "Smelting operations." ) 
1960 August pp.16 -20 "Refinery operations." ) 
General series by HORIZON entitled "A Guide to 
Copper Mining." 
1960 August pp.24 -25 Early photographs of Roan Antelope. 
1960 Dec. pp.26 -28 WHITE, C.M.N. "The Role of 
Witchcraft in Central Africa." 
1960 Dec. pp.4 -11 MACKERSEY, I & MOIR, J. Article on 
discovery and career of James Moir. 
1961 Jan. pp. 22 -24 Article on Mufulira West. 
1961 March pp.18 -19 "The ghost mines of Mumbwa." 
1961 April pp.4 -10 SCANNELL, T. "A dynamic union with a 
turbulent career." 
1961 May pp.28 -35 JURETIC, F. "Shafts - their role in 
mining operations." 
1962 July pp.12 -15 "Headframes." 
1962 Oct. SCANNELL, T. Article on J.E.G. Williams. 
IL MISSIONARIO FRANCESCANO 
1956 Nov. MAZZIERI, Very Rev. F. Article on Copperbelt 
Missionary Work. (In Italian) 
INSTITUTION OF MINING AND METALLURGY, TRANSACTIONS OF 
1934 -35 PICKARD, T.A. "Primitive Smelting of Copper and 
Bronze." (extract in R.S.T. archives) 
1935 -36 pp.317 -64 PARKER, R.J. & GRAY, A. with comments by 
HORNER, P.K. "Prospecting and Geological Survey (1927 -1929) 
of the 'Nkana Concession'." 
1949 PETTIJOHN, W.T. & NORRIE, J.P. "An Outline of 
Underground Operations at Mufulira Copper Mines Ltd." 
(extract in R.S.T. archives) 
1953 -54 Vol. 63 pt. 1 pp. 1 -8 GUERNSEY, T.D. "Summary of 
Early Prospecting in Northern Rhodesia." 
1960 -61 Vol. 70 pt. 3 pp.77 -131 RUSHTON & MACKAY, K. "The 
Nchanga Mine." M. 
LUNTANDANYA (Nkana African Magazine) 
MINING MAGAZINE 
MUFULIRA MAGAZINE 
MOSSA (Mine Officials and Salaried Staff Association Magazine) 
1952 Dec. pp.13 -19 BRUMMER, J.J. "Discovery of the Mufulira 
Mine." 
NKHWAZI (Northern Rhodesia Police Magazine) 
1957 June. "Report on the Mongu Witchcraft Trials." 
NORTHERN RHODESIA GAZETTE 
1950 Vol. 1 No. 2 BROOKS, R. "How the Rhodesian Coppers 
Were Found." 
1953 Vol. II No. 2 BEECH, A.E. "Early Days Around the 
Copperbelt." 
- 257 - 
Magazines and Journals (contd.) 
NORTHERN RHODESIA GAZETTE 
1954 Vol. II No. 3 MUNDAY, Rev. J.T. "The Fear of 
Witchcraft." 
1957 Vol. III No. 3 JORDAN, E. KNOWLES "Old Ndola." 
1958 Vol. III Nos. 5 -6 BUTLER, L.G. "Lusaka African 
Community - Chilenje." 
NORTHERN RHODESIA MINING JOURNAL 
NSHILA (Northern Rhodesia Government Magazine) 
OPTIMA (quarterly, Anglo- American Corporation of South Africa.) 
1955 March. NELEMS, H.E. "Open Pit Mining at Nchanga." 
1956 Sept. NICHOLS, C.P. "The Bancroft Mine - a tale of 
tribulation and triumph." 
RHODESIAN MINING JOURNAL 
1959 Vol. 24 No. 13. ARMSTRONG, D. "The Geology of 
Bancroft Mine." 
RHODES -LIVINGSTONE JOURNAL 
1950 Vol. X. KING, E.R.G. "On Educating African Girls in 
Northern Rhodesia." 
1951 Vol. XII MITCHELL, J. CLYDE "A Note on the 
Urbanisation of Africans on the Copperbelt." 
1954 Vol. XIV. CUNNISON, I. "A Note on the Lunda Concept 
of Custom." 
1954 Vol. XIV. MITCHELL, J.C. "The Distribution of 
African Labour by Area of Origin on the Copper Mines of 
Northern Rhodesia." 
1954 Vol. XVI. GANN, L.H. "The End of the Slave Trade 
in British Central Africa 1889 -1912." 
1955 Vol. XVIII. GANN, L.H. "The Northern Rhodesian 
Copper Industry and the World of Copper 1923 -52." 








Nov. Article on Malaria Control. 
Jan. McDERMOTT, E.K. "Shaft Sinking." 
Jan. GUERNSEY, T.D. "Bancroft Mine." 
Jan. GUERNSEY, T.D. "Bwana's Baby - the Nkana Claims." 
MAGAZINE 
1957 May Clark, J. DESMOND. Article on Pre - European 
Copper Working in Central Africa. 
ROYAL AFRICAN SOCIETY, JOURNAL OF 
1937 Vol. XXXVI (supplement) SPEARPOINT, F. "The African 
Native and the Rhodesian Copper Mines." 
SOUTH AFRICAN ENGINEERING AND MINING JOURNAL 
1957 June CLARK, J. DESMOND. "Pre- European Copper 
Working in South Central Africa." 
HANSARD Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council and Federal 
Assembly. 
- 258 - 
Minor Private Publications 
THE AFRICAN MINEWORKER IN THE COPPERBELT OF NORTHERN RHODESIA. 
(R.S.T. 1960) 
O'BRIEN, P.L.A. 1958 COPPER DEPOSITS AND THEIR ENVIRONMENT IN 
NORTHERN RHODESIA 
(Publication No. 44 of the Commission for 
Scientific and Technical Co- operation in 
Africa, South of the Sahara. Reunion 
Conjointe, Leopoldville) 
THE HISTORY AND PROGRESS OF THE ANGLO- AMERICAN CORPORATION OF 
SOUTH AFRICA LTD. (A.A.C. 1961) 
Y THE DAMBO LODE WORKINGS. 
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